How You Finance Goldman Sachs’ Profits

Wirepullers: Goldman Sachs è forse la banca più importante al mondo, e non deve essere un caso se i suoi manager prima o poi finiscono in una qualche amministrazione pubblica (in Italia gli esempi di Romano Prodi e Mario Draghi). Qualcuno addirittura pensa che sia la stessa Goldman Sachs a piazzarli nei punti nevralgici della politica mondiale, per poterla controllare come una sorta di piovra che si muove nell'ombra. Non sappiamo se questo sia vero, è indubbio però che Goldman Sachs è un colosso economico molto potente. (1)

This is perhaps the most important thing I learned over my years working on Wall Street, including as a managing director at Goldman Sachs: Numbers lie. In a normal time, the fact that the numbers generated by the nation's biggest banks can't be trusted might not matter very much to the rest of us. But since the record bank profits we're now hearing about are essentially created by massive federal funding, perhaps it behooves us to dig beneath their data. On July 27, 10 congressmen, led by Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.), did just that, writing a letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke questioning the Fed's role in Goldman's rapid return to the top of Wall Street.

To understand this particular giveaway, look back to September 21, 2008. It was a frenzied night for Goldman Sachs and the only other remaining major investment bank, Morgan Stanley. Their three main competitors were gone. Bear Stearns had been taken over by JPMorgan Chase in March, 2008, Lehman Brothers had just declared bankruptcy due to lack of capital, and Bank of America had been pushed to acquire Merrill Lynch because the firm didn't have enough cash to survive on its own. Anxious to avoid a similar fate, hat in hand, they came to the Fed for access to desperately needed capital. All they had to do was become bank holding companies to get it. So, without so much as clearing the standard five-day antitrust waiting period for such a change, the Fed granted their wish.

Bank holding companies (which all the biggest financial firms now are) come under the regulatory purview of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC. The capital they keep in reserve in case of emergency (like, say, toxic assets hemorrhaging on their books, or credit derivatives trades not being paid) is supposed to be greater than investment banks'. That's the trade-off. You get access to federal assistance, you pony up more capital, and you take less risk.

Goldman didn't like the last part. It makes most of its money speculating, or trading. So it asked the Fed to be exempt from what's called the Market Risk Rules that bank holding companies adhere to when computing their risk.

Keep in mind that by virtue of becoming a bank holding company, Goldman received a total of $63.6 billion in federal subsidies (that we know about—probably more if the Fed were ever forced to disclose its $7.6 trillion of borrower details). There was the $10 billion it got from TARP (which it repaid), the $12.9 billion it grabbed from AIG's spoils—even though Goldman had stated beforehand that it was protected from losses incurred by AIG's free fall, and if that were the case, would not have needed that money, let alone deserved it. Then, there's the $29.7 billion it's used so far out of the $35 billion it has available, backed by the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and finally, there's the $11 billion available under the Fed's Commercial Paper Funding Facility.

Tactically, after bagging this bounty, Goldman asked the Fed, its new regulator, if it could use its old risk model to determine capital reserves. It wanted to use the model that its old investment bank regulator, the SEC, was fine with, called VaR, or value at risk. VaR pretty much allows banks to plug in their own parameters, and based on these, calculate how much risk they have, and thus how much capital they need to hold against it. VaR was the same lax SEC-approved risk model that investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers used, with the aforementioned results.

On February 5, 2009, the Fed granted Goldman's request. This meant that not only was Goldman getting big federal subsidies, but also that it could keep betting big without saving aside as much capital as the other banks. Using VaR gave Goldman more leeway to, well, accentuate the positive. Yes, Goldman is a more risk-prone firm now than it was before it got to play with our money.

Which brings us back to these recent quarterly earnings. Goldman posted record profits of $3.4 billion on revenues of $13.76 billion. More than 78 precent of those revenues came from its most risky division, the one that requires the most capital to operate, Trading and Principal Investments. Of those, the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) area within that division brought in a record $6.8 billion in revenues. That's the division, by the way, that I worked in and that Lloyd Blankfein managed on his way up the Goldman totem pole. (It's also the division that would stand to gain the most if Waxman's cap-and-trade bill passes) .

Since Goldman is trading big with our money, why not also use it to pay big bonuses? It's not like there are any strings attached. For the first half of 2009, Goldman set aside $11.4 billion for compensation—34 percent more than for the first half of 2008, keeping them on target for a record bonus year—even though they still owe the federal government $53.6 billion, a sum more than four times that bonus amount.

But capital is still key. Capital is the lifeblood that pumps through a financial organization. You can't trade without it. As of June 26, 2009, Goldman's total capital was $254 billion, but that included $191 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing (meaning money it had borrowed without putting up any collateral for it). On November 28, 2008 (4Q 2008), it had only $168 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing. Thus, its long-term unsecured debt jumped 14 percent. Though Goldman doesn't disclose exactly where all this debt comes from, given the $23 billion jump, we can only wonder whether some of it has come from government subsidies or the Fed's secret facilities.

Not only that, by virtue of how it's set up, most of Goldman's unsecured funding comes in through its parent company, Group Inc. (Think the top point of an umbrella with each spoke being a subsidiary.) This parent parcels that money out to Goldman's subsidiaries, some of which are regulated, some of which aren't. This means that even though Goldman is supposed to be regulated by the Fed and other agencies, it has unregulated elements receiving unsecured funding—just like before the crisis, but with more of our money involved.
As for JPMorgan Chase, its profit of $2.7 billion was up 36 percent for the second quarter of 2009 vs. the same quarter last year, but a lot of that also came from trading revenues, meaning its speculative endeavors are driving its profits. Over on the consumer side, the firm had to set aside nearly $30 billion in reserve for credit-related losses. Riding on its trading laurels, when its consumer business is still in deterioration mode, is not a recipe for stability, no matter how much cheering JPMorgan Chase's results got from Wall Street. Betting is betting.

Let's pause for some reflection: The bank "stars" made most of their money on speculation, got nearly $124 billion in government guarantees and subsidies between them over the past year and a half, yet saw continued losses in the credit products most affected by consumer credit problems. Both are setting aside top-dollar bonuses. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon mentioned that he's concerned about attracting talent, a translation for wanting to pay investment bankers big bucks—because, after all, they suffered so terribly last year, and he needs to stay competitive with his friends at Goldman. This doesn't add up to a really healthy scenario. It's more like bad déjà vu.

As a recent New York Times article (and many other publications in different words) said, "For the most part, the worst of the financial crisis seems to be over." Sure, the crisis may appear to be over because the major banks of Wall Street are speculating well with government subsidies. But that's a dangerous conclusion. It doesn't mean that finance firms could thrive without the artificial, public-funded assistance. And it certainly doesn't mean that consumers are any better off than they were before the crisis emerged. It's just that they didn't get the same generous subsidies.

Autore: Nomi Prins

Fonte: www.motherjones.com

The Chinese Come Calling

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (4)

What a hoot. The Chinese Communists invaded Washington on Monday demanding not that we sacrifice our freedoms but rather that we balance our budget. Creditors get to make that kind of call. And the Marxists of Beijing, who have turned out to be the world's most prudent bankers, are worried about their assets invested in our banana republic.

"China has a huge amount of investment in the United States, mainly in the form of Treasury bonds. We are concerned about the security of our financial assets" was the way China's assistant finance minister put it. Briefing reporters at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, he added, "We sincerely hope the US fiscal deficit will be reduced, year after year." Quite sincerely, one suspects, given a US budget shortfall this year that is slated to reach $1.85 trillion.

Suddenly, it was US officials who were promising deep reform to their disgraced economic system rather than demanding it from incompetent foreigners. President Barack Obama's economic team of Clinton-era holdovers, who a decade ago had hectored China on the virtues of fiscal responsibility, now were falling over themselves to reassure the Chinese that their $1.5 trillion stake in US government-issued securities is safe, and that they should buy more at this week's $200 billion Treasury auction. If they don't, we're in big trouble.

US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner promised to behave, saying the US is "committed to taking the necessary measures to bring our fiscal deficits down to a more sustainable level once recovery is firmly established." Now let's hope that the Chinese Communists and their natural allies among congressional deficit hawks will be able to keep him to his word.

And don't blame any of this on peacenik liberals. The new conciliatory--nay, deferential--tone toward China precedes the Obama administration, having begun in bilateral talks during the last years of the Bush administration as the US economy began its ignominious downfall. It was George W. Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, who set the course when the former Goldman Sachs chairman realized how dependent were his Wall Street buddies on Chinese goodwill.

But from all of this adversity may come something good: recognition that the United States is not the repository of all wisdom. Maybe the Chinese have found a model different from ours that also works? Might there not be an Arab, Latin or Indian one that also qualifies and need not be overthrown?

The tone of this week's talks, ironically held at the Reagan Building and co-chaired by Geithner and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, finally signaled the end of the cold war assumption that regimes with labels like communist and capitalist could not form profitable partnerships. On the contrary, as Secretary Clinton noted, it is time to move from "a multipolar world to a multipartner world." And President Obama in opening the conference made clear that the partnership between China and the US is decisive: "The relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world."

Mark it as a historic Rip van Winkle moment. For those who recall the rhetoric of the cold war, the idea that we would someday be cooperating with Chinese Communists because they had humbled us economically rather than militarily is a startling turnabout. How did they get to be better capitalists than us, and being that they are good capitalists, why are we still spending hundreds of billions a year on high-tech military weapons to counter a potential Chinese military threat when the weapons they are using are all market-driven deployments?

A recognition that our tension with China is not military in nature came at this week's conference in an announcement by Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of the US Pacific Command, that agreement had been reached with his Chinese counterparts on improving relations: "A statement was made by a Chinese delegation official yesterday [Monday] that no country can develop sound policy if they try and do so in isolation. And I think that's a great way of addressing the sense that all of us feel, the desire, to get back together again and discuss exercises, discuss personnel exchanges, discuss responses to humanitarian assistance crises and the provision of disaster relief."

Not bad for a start, and maybe we can help solve our economic problems by selling our latest high-tech weapons to China as we do to the rest of the world. Or better yet, we could do some serious damage to our deficits, and our dependence on the Chinese, by sharply cutting expensive weapons programs now that the cold war is finally over.

Autore: Robert Scheer

Fonte: www.thenation.com

With China, Money Talks

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (3)

Strategic and economic dialogue? Forget it, Hillary -- it's China.

It's a new dawn of summitry in Washington with this week's Strategic & Economic Dialogue between the United States and China, a meeting of several hundred top government officials to talk about shared interests. The discussions made little news -- some shared macroeconomic ideas here, a framework for climate-change discussions there. Mainly, they served to keep leaders in both countries informed of each other's plans and motivations, a way to prepare both countries for four years of Obama administration policy.

Earlier in the year, the administration changed what had been the Strategic Economic Dialogue, previously led only by the Treasury Department, into the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, jointly led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. Despite the structural change, though, the summit demonstrated that economic issues trump all other concerns, leaving Clinton at something of a disadvantage.

The narrative that undergirds the U.S.-China relationship is by now rote: Chastened U.S. officials who once lectured their counterparts in the People's Republic on financial liberalization are now humbled in front of their largest creditor, reduced to offering promises of fiscal responsibility. But that conventional wisdom is both boring and rather irrelevant. Neither country can afford to disturb the fiscal relationship between the two nations. Chinese officials who normally stress out about U.S. borrowing -- no banker likes to see their debtor in the red -- seemed unusually convinced by Office of Management and Budget Direct Peter Orszag's speech on the U.S. government's plan to reduce the deficit after the recession, delivered during one of the summit's official exchanges.

Throughout those exchanges, the central message from U.S. officials was a warning: We will not be providing the world's consumer demand anymore as Americans increase their savings. U.S. officials also advised China to shift its policies to cultivate domestic consumption and to reduce exports and investments. Meanwhile, China pushed demands for a larger role in international economic institutions. Both sides complained about each other's protectionism. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to push forward climate-change negotiations, consulted on North Korea and Iran, and agreed to take the whole show on the road to Beijing next year. Nonetheless, issues of trade and finance dominated the talks.

I was reminded why that is the case at the conclusion of the conference, a gala dinner at the Ritz Carlton. The event was dedicated to prosperity -- a program studded with corporate and banking logos certainly made that point. Heavy hitters from both delegations were in attendance, and the U.S.-China Business Council hosted the whole affair. Were all that not enough, the dinner itself was practically a jamboree of Leftie bête noirs, with Robert Rubin and Henry Kissinger both making remarks.

There's little question that as long as China and the U.S. are the two largest economies in the world and deeply intertwined, all other issues will be a distant second priority. So it makes sense that the explicit talk was of trade deals and carbon caps, while references to the recent crackdown on the Uighurs, China's Muslim minorities in Xinjaing province, were carefully worded. That doesn't mean Clinton's strategic discussions are a waste of her time, but the importance of maintaining our economic partnership overlays a patina of realism on a relationship that cries out for idealism.

As we debate the importance of engagement versus isolation in foreign affairs, it is heartening to see hundreds of high-level government officials from two very different countries meet with each other to candidly discuss critical issues. Kissinger's emotion at the gala as he recalled the great moment when the U.S. and China opened relations nearly 40 years ago was a reminder of what diplomacy can accomplish.

President Barack Obama, delivering an opening statement on the first day of the dialogue, noted that "some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America that think there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a different view. I believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations; a future when our nations are partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity."

His vision is the right one, and it is shared by one of the leaders of the Chinese delegation: State Councilor Dai Bingguo explicitly told Americans that China sought no arms race or hegemony, simply internal prosperity. But a subtler point was made by China's other delegation head, Vice Premier Wang Qishan.
"The trend of the China-U.S relationship is decided by the common interest of our two peoples," he said. "The statesmen in both countries can only follow this trend, and must follow this trend."

The common interest of the peoples, rather than the economic elite, ought to be the driving motivation behind the two countries interactions. There is no doubt that economic openness has brought wealth to both countries, and the Obama administration is happy to laud the Chinese for bringing millions out of poverty. But in a relationship between "capitalism with American characteristics" and "socialism with Chinese characteristics," sometimes the people -- whether they be workers losing jobs in the United States or the millions of Chinese living without political freedom or prosperity -- have interests other than the elites. Today, we're in an economic crisis, and pragmatism overrides all else. But as recovery continues, the U.S. will require more thought on the strategic track, and perhaps in a few years our discussions with China, as they should be with all our friends, will be more frank.

Autore: Tim Fernholz

Fonte: www.prospect.org

Usa-Cina, le prove di G-2 e la vera "bolla" cinese

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (2)

Il vertice Stati Uniti-Cina dei giorni scorsi ha fornito ulteriori elementi di riflessione riguardo l'ipotesi G-2, una governance globale sempre più imperniata sull'asse Washington-Pechino su temi quali l'economia, il clima, la non-proliferazione nucleare. Il presidente americano Obama ha parlato di partnership strategica, spiegando che "le relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Cina daranno forma al 21esimo secolo". La natura strategica e non solo economica che Washington vuole conferire alla cooperazione con la Cina è confermata dalla definizione stessa dei due giorni di incontri come "Dialogo strategico ed economico" e dall'intervento congiunto, alla vigilia, del segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton e del segretario al Tesoro Timothy Geithner, che dalle colonne del Wall Street Journal hanno sostenuto la necessità di "discussioni di livello strategico" tra Usa-Cina.

Nel dibattito sulla natura dei rapporti da tenere con la Cina, a Washington si confrontano due scuole di pensiero: i "funzionalisti" e gli "strategici", li definisce John Lee, studioso dell'Hudson Institute. I primi ritengono che Stati Uniti e Cina sono così interdipendenti dal punto di vista economico da essere obbligati ad essere partner strategici. Una cooperazione da cui entrambi avrebbero tutto da guadagnare - invece che una competizione a "somma zero" - è a loro avviso un obiettivo fattibile. Tutti gli eventuali motivi di tensione tra le due potenze sono transitori e dovuti per lo più ad incomprensioni, mentre le profonde divergenze che ancora esistono passano in secondo piano se ci si concentra sui problemi pratici. "Quando siete sulla stessa barca, dovete attraversare il fiume in modo pacifico", è il proverbio cinese cui hanno fatto ricorso la Clinton e Geithner per spiegarsi. Gli "strategici" non hanno una visione così rosea. Per loro i rapporti tra Stati Uniti e Cina vanno letti nell'ottica di una competizione strategica, una rivalità irreversibile e già in corso. Ciò non significa che non debbano migliorare le loro relazioni e aumentare la reciproca comprensione per minimizzare le tensioni, ma che ogni cooperazione può essere solo tattica, non strategica. Dietro di essa uno scontro sostanziale di interessi e valori, che può essere gestito ma non risolto, a meno che interessi e valori dell'una o dell'altra potenza non mutino, ma è altamente improbabile.

Nell'attuale amministrazione i "funzionalisti" stanno prevalendo, osserva Lee. Dal punto di vista economico la collaborazione è obbligata perché la Cina detiene oltre 2 mila miliardi di dollari di debito Usa. Gli Stati Uniti hanno quindi interesse che la Cina continui a finanziare il loro debito, soprattutto in un momento di crisi e quindi di crescita del deficit federale. Per quanto li riguarda, anche i cinesi hanno interesse ad aiutare la ripresa americana e mondiale, perché la loro economia dipende quasi del tutto dalle esportazioni, e si trovano nella posizione di non potersi liberare dalle enormi riserve in dollari che hanno accumulato, poiché solo iniziare a farlo significherebbe far cadere il valore del dollaro e quindi esporsi a perdite ingenti.

Su altri temi però la cooperazione tra Stati Uniti e Cina è più incerta, perché gli interessi di fondo divergono. I temi del clima, della non-proliferazione nucleare e del rispetto dei diritti umani hanno pesanti implicazioni sulla sopravvivenza stessa del regime di Pechino, che infatti cerca di prendere tempo. Andare incontro alle richieste americane su tali questioni potrebbe significare per il Partito comunista perdere il monopolio del potere, o per lo meno trovarsi di fronte sfide interne alla sua autorità sempre più insidiose. Il tumultuoso sviluppo cinese è reso possibile dal mancato rispetto dell'ambiente e dei diritti dei lavoratori. La riduzione delle emissioni rischierebbe di frenare il tasso di crescita, e quindi di alimentare tensioni sociali (centinaia di proteste e ribellioni avvengono già ogni anno) che potrebbero destabilizzare il regime. Fondamentali per l'economia, la sicurezza e per le ambizioni strategiche di Pechino sono inoltre i rapporti con la Corea del Nord e l'Iran. La Cina si oppone all'adozione di sanzioni più stringenti nei confronti di Pyongyang e Teheran, ma anche se il suo veto all'Onu dovesse cadere, senza una sua convinta adesione ad eventuali nuove sanzioni, esse risulterebbero comunque inefficaci. Con l'Iran la Cina ha rapporti sempre più stretti dal punto di vista energetico e commerciale, mentre il collasso del regime nordcoreano aprirebbe la strada alla riunificazione delle due Coree ai suoi confini, ma sotto l'ombrello politico e militare americano. Uno scacco alle sue ambizioni egemoniche in Asia. Per non parlare dei diritti umani e del rispetto delle minoranze culturali e religiose. E' fin troppo evidente la sfida al potere del partito unico e al centralismo che rappresenterebbero reali aperture in questi campi.

I "funzionalisti" credono che la crescita economica incoraggerà riforme politiche interne e che in futuro, quindi, la Cina diventerà un attore responsabile, e persino difensore, dell'attuale ordine "liberale" in Asia. Al contrario, gli "strategici" pensano che la Cina sia una potenza "revisionista", cioè essenzialmente interessata a sovvertire quest'ordine. Sono i settori dell'economia controllati dallo stato che si stanno rafforzando, non il settore privato, che viene "deliberatamente soppresso", osserva John Lee. Delle circa 1.500 compagnie quotate sulle Borse di Shanghai e Shenzhen, meno del 50 per cento sono davvero private e il 95 per cento del pacchetto di stimolo da 586 miliardi di dollari, annunciato dal governo cinese nel novembre scorso, andrà a imprese controllate dallo stato. Ciò renderà probabilmente la Cina più potente, ma "non la spingerà verso le riforme politiche", visto che il Partito comunista avrà modo e risorse per "rafforzare il suo potere e la sua posizione nell'economia e nella società".

Con l'aumentare della sua potenza, la Cina sarà sempre meno propensa, non più propensa, obiettano gli "strategici", a preservare l'attuale ordine regionale in Asia, che i cinesi ritengono strumentale a mantenere l'egemonia americana nella regione. Anche se ne avrà tratto beneficio, a Pechino potrebbe risultare stretto l'ordine esistente quando il suo potere si sarà accresciuto. Gli "strategici" non possono impedire l'ascesa della Cina, né lo vogliono, spiega Lee, ma sostengono che le ambizioni strategiche di Pechino devono essere "contenute", soprattutto in Asia. A questo scopo gli Stati Uniti devono imbrigliare la Cina nella rete delle loro alleanze regionali con il Giappone, la Corea del Sud, l'Australia, l'Indonesia, la Tailandia, le Filippine, Singapore e, sempre di più, con l'India. Per questo gli "strategici" vedono come un pericolo l'approccio G-2 nelle relazioni tra Washington e Pechino, perché un dialogo strategico "tra eguali", proprio ciò che i cinesi desiderano, rischia di lasciare in secondo piano gli alleati asiatici che possono aiutare l'America a contenere le ambizioni cinesi. E infatti molti di loro, come la Corea del Sud e il Giappone, vedendo nell'attuale equilibrio assicurato dagli Usa la migliore garanzia di pace e stabilità durature, temono l'approccio G-2 dei "funzionalisti", perché potrebbe compromettere quest'ordine. Finché i problemi economici domineranno la scena - conclude John Lee - i "funzionalisti" avranno campo libero. Gli altri a Washington e in Asia possono solo sperare che nel frattempo l'influenza americana non si riduca troppo.

In tutto questo, la crescita economica cinese non dovrebbe essere considerata un dato scontato, una variabile indipendente. Mentre la bolla cinese di cui molti analisti finanziari temono l'esplosione è quella azionaria, secondo Vitaliy N. Katsenelson bisogna guardare altrove: è "l'intera economia cinese che si sta preparando a esplodere", ha scritto per Foreign Policy. L'economia cinese ha dimostrato finora "un'incredibile resistenza". Nonostante le esportazioni siano calate di oltre il 20 per cento a causa della crisi dei suoi principali "clienti" (Stati Uniti ed Europa), le più recenti stime parlano di una crescita annuale dell'8 per cento. La Cina ha strumenti di potere estremamente più potenti, e rapidi, di quelli americani per stimolare l'economia. Ecco perché le stime di crescita sono ancora così "robuste". La Federal Reserve può stampare denaro, ma non può obbligare le banche a prestarlo, a meno che non vengano nazionalizzate, e non può obbligare le imprese e i consumatori a spendere. Dal momento che la Cina non è una democrazia, non ha di questi problemi. Il governo comunista di Pechino possiede larga parte dell'apparato di creazione della moneta e di spesa. L'offerta di moneta è salita del 28,5 per cento nel mese di giugno. E poiché controlla le banche, può obbligarle a prestare soldi, come può obbligare le imprese di stato a prestare e a spendere. In Cina non esistono le lungaggini e le complicazioni delle democrazie. "Se il governo centrale decide di costruire un'autostrada, gli basta tracciare una linea retta sulla mappa. Qualsiasi ostacolo può essere sacrificato per il bene superiore". Non avendo una rete di protezione sociale come nei Paesi sviluppati, per impedire l'esplodere delle tensioni sociali a causa di milioni di disoccupati e affamati nelle grandi città, il governo cinese sta facendo di tutto per stimolare artificialmente l'economia, nella speranza di prendere tempo finché il sistema globale non si sarà stabilizzato.

"Non bisogna confondere però - avverte Katsenelson - una crescita rapida con una crescita sostenibile". Gran parte della crescita cinese dell'ultimo decennio è stata possibile grazie ai soldi prestati agli Stati Uniti perché continuassero a comprare beni cinesi. La Cina è affetta da un reale eccesso di capacità produttiva. In questo momento di crisi sostiene la sua crescita con un cattivo indebitamento interno - perché "prestiti forzati sono cattivi prestiti". L'elenco delle conseguenze negative, secondo Katsenelson, è "molto lungo", ma "il risultato finale è semplice": "Non c'è alcun miracolo nella miracolosa crescita cinese, e la Cina pagherà un prezzo. L'unica domanda è quando e quanto".

La Cina ha venduto i suoi prodotti negli Stati Uniti ricevendo in cambio dollari, ma ha scelto di non convertirli in renminbi, per evitare che il valore del dollaro calasse e quello del renminbi salisse, rendendo meno competitivi i prodotti cinesi e quindi danneggiando le esportazioni. Se lo avesse fatto, la Cina avrebbe esportato meno, e la sua economia sarebbe cresciuta a un tasso minore, ma non si troverebbe nella delicata situazione in cui si trova oggi. Adesso infatti la Cina detiene 2,2 mila miliardi di dollari in titoli di debito Usa, ma avrebbe bisogno di denaro all'interno per finanziare la sua crescita. Se li vendesse, la sua moneta schizzerebbe alle stelle, e perderebbe il suo vantaggio competitivo di produttore "low-cost". Ecco perché la Cina sta disperatamente cercando di capire come liberarsi dei dollari senza far cadere il loro valore, ma il governo Usa non è d'aiuto. Continua a stampare moneta e a emettere Buoni del Tesoro, e a chiedere ai cinesi di comprarli. Difficile capire quando questa enorme bolla cinese esploderà, conclude Katsenelson, "ma come abbiamo imparato di recente, puoi sfidare le leggi di gravità finanziaria solo per poco tempo... Più a lungo gli eccessi durano, più violentemente la gravità finanziaria riporterà l'economia cinese sulla Terra".

Autore: Federico Punzi

Fonte: www.ilvelino.it

An Insider's Guide to Washington's China War

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (1)

When it comes to U.S.-China policy, Washington is broadly separated into two camps: the "functionalists" and the "strategists." And as the two countries have met in Washington this week, the internal debate has begun to unfold. U.S. President Barack Obama told his counterparts that Washington and Beijing should be "partners"; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for broad "strategic level discussions." Make no mistake: The functionalists are winning.

The functionalists tend to be economists and those concerned with the U.S.-China economic relationship. The United States and China are so economically intertwined, the functionalists argue, that they ought to be strategic partners as well. Win-win cooperation -- not zero-sum competition -- is a very achievable goal. Barriers between the two countries are transactional, and any tensions are usually due to mere misunderstanding. Yes, there are profound disagreements, but fix the practical problems, and many obstacles toward a fruitful partnership will eventually melt away. In fact, they will have to melt away -- out of necessity on both sides. As Clinton and Geithner put it, quoting a Chinese proverb, "When you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river peacefully."

"Strategists," however, don't see quite such a rosy picture. For them, the U.S.-China relationship is one of strategic competition -- an irreversible rivalry already well under way. Sure, Washington and Beijing ought to improve their interactions and mutual understanding to minimize friction. But any such cooperation is tactical, nothing more. Underlying all bilateral interactions, the strategists believe, is a fundamental clash of interests and values that can be managed but never solved unless the values and interests of either Washington or Beijing change -- and that's highly unlikely.

Amid global recession, at a time when China owns a hefty sum of U.S. Treasury bonds, it's easy to see why the functionalists have the upper hand. The Chinese economy is ticking at an enviable pace that many hope will spur global (and U.S.) growth back to life. Encouraging economic growth in China has the doubly touted benefit of accelerating the prospects for domestic political reform. China could, over time, become a willing participant in -- and even defender of -- the liberal regional order in Asia, the functionalists believe.

But there's a logic leap here, overlooked to America's peril. As China grows richer, it is the state-controlled sectors of the economy that are growing more powerful, not the independent private sector -- which has been deliberately suppressed. Of the roughly 1,500 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, less than 50 are genuinely private. As much as 95 percent of Beijing's $586 billion economic stimulus package, announced last November, will go to state-controlled enterprises. This makes China Inc. more powerful but does not push it closer to political reform. On the contrary, it has offered the Chinese Communist Party better and more resources to entrench its power and position in the country's economy and society.

The implications go well beyond China's borders, strategists warn. As Beijing's power grows, it will be less inclined, not more, to uphold the current regional order in Asia. In a recent study of 100 recent articles by more than two dozen of China's top strategic thinkers, I found that four of every five articles spoke of circumventing, reducing, or superseding U.S. power and ideas in Asia. China views the liberal order as one designed to preserve American hegemony in the region. Even if Beijing has so far benefited enormously from rising up within the existing order, it might not be so friendly to it once it's risen far enough.

Washington's strategists cannot prevent China's rise, nor do they want to. But they do argue that the country's strategic ambitions must be constrained, especially in Asia. That will mean enmeshing China in the regional hierarchy that is underwritten by U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and increasingly, India. Acutely aware of this existing dynamic, China prefers to deal either with Washington or Asia -- never both.
This is why the "G-2" approach to U.S.-China relations is more dangerous than reassuring. Strategists fear that such a top-level dialogue of equals, discussing non-economic issues such as security and regional institutions, would offer Beijing precisely the strategic billing it desires from Washington -- with little in return. Already, U.S. allies in Asia -- basically the whole region minus Myanmar, North Korea, Cambodia and Laos -- fear that U.S. leverage over Beijing will be too easily given away.

As advantageous as functionalists' win-win U.S.-China cooperation may seem, the hidden loser may well be Asia, where most states see the current U.S.-led power structure as the best guarantee of continued peace and stability. Rushing into a G-2 approach - the kind that Washington functionalists prefer -- would jeopardize much of this.

Unfortunately, so long as economic matters dominate, functionalists may well win the day. Others in Washington and throughout Asia can only hope that too much U.S. leverage on China is not whittled away in the meantime.

Autore: John Lee

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com