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domenica 11 ottobre 2009

Running The Odds on Copenhagen

Wirepullers: tra pochi mesi, a dicembre, i grandi della Terra si riuniranno a Copenhagen per la revisione del Protocollo di Kyoto. Sembra molto difficile che questo appuntamento possa entrare nella storia come un momento di rottura e di cambiamento della politica mondiale rispetto ai temi legati all'ambiente, ma la presenza dell'amministrazione Obama, o forse l'assenza dell'amministrazione Bush, lascia sperare che qualche passo avanti possa essere fatto. Saranno soprattutto americani, cinesi e le grandi economie emergenti (Brasile e India su tutti) a dover fare qualcosa per trovare gli accordi più utili (o meno dannosi) al pianeta. mentre in Europa qualcosa si è già iniziato a fare. (4)

Can a global climate pact save our behinds? We asked a prominent game theorist.

"Is Copenhagen Dead?" we wondered last week, as two prominent officials sounded the alarm over a lack of committment by the United States and other economic powers leading up to December's big climate-change summit. Of course, that's hardly news to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, a New York University political scientist who has made a career of applying game theory to world-affairs puzzlers. He and his students identify questions that hinge upon jostling among key political players; research the players' motivations, relationships, and past behavior; and then use advanced computer modeling to predict how they will act under scores of scenarios.

His method is fairly controversial, but Bueno de Mesquita boasts a high accuracy rate. According to a recent profile in the New York Times Magazine, the CIA has hired him to run upwards of a thousand predictions, and later determined in a report that the professor "'hit the bull's-eye' twice as often as its own analysts did." (The professor also appeared on Jon Stewart this week.) One of the examples in his new book, The Predictioneer's Game, which hits bookstores September 29, looks at whether an international climate pact stands a chance when it comes to stabilizing global carbon dioxide emissions down the road. We asked him to drill down a bit.

Mother Jones: What specific question did you pose regarding Copenhagen?
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: Actually, the question was broader. I was looking at what the long-term political trends and support internationally would be for reducing greenhouse gas emissions through international treaties.

MJ: What turned out to be the most important factor?
BBdM: In general, when one tries to put together a universal, global agreement, there are two sorts of patterns. To get almost everybody to sign on, the agreement might not ask for significant changes in behavior. Or it asks for significant changes but lacks either good monitoring—so it's hard to detect who's cheating—or sanctioning power to punish cheaters. So in essence, it fails to work. If you look at the record of Kyoto, that's a pretty good description. Even the Japanese, who were very enthusiastic, shortly thereafter announced that they couldn't meet the reductions they had agreed to.

MJ: What's the outlook for Copenhagen?
BBdM: Our analysis shows that the Copenhagen setting will be used to put together what I would describe as a feel-good agreement without teeth. The drivers are that the US and the Europeans are less willing to take really big steps in the absence of similar commitments from the growing greenhouse emitters: China, India, Brazil, and so forth. So the problem is that things don't get enforced. It's not that this is going to fail immediately. The analysis shows that over the first few years there will be improvement, and then commitment will erode steadily and move away from enforcing the agreement. At the same time, technology changes will be pushing in a positive direction. The other thing this shows is that if the US were committed to a fundamental change in greenhouse gas emissions, it doesn't need Copenhagen; it doesn't need an international agreement. This could be done unilaterally. If Congress decided that it's gonna put a fixed tax on gasoline to ensure that gas doesn't fall below some optimal price, say $5 a gallon, people would change their behavior. There's nothing stopping the US from doing that.

MJ: So somebody has to commit political suicide to make this happen?
BBdM: That's probably correct. Every sensible politician will be in favor of something happening off of their watch: Yes, we will commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions starting year X—X being the year they're no longer in office.

MJ: Was anything surprising about these results?
BBdM: What surprised me is that support built a head of steam, but it collapses quite dramatically within 5 to 10 years. I was surprised at how quickly and sharply it erodes.

MJ: Did you look at how catastrophic events—rapid melting of polar ice caps—could drive behavior?
BBdM: I have run the model hundreds of times, allowing key variables to receive probabilistically determined shocks, changes to their value. It's an effort to anticipate the social, economic, political, and environmental earthquakes that we can't anticipate. We don't know how big they'll be, we don't know when they'll come, but we can allow for a very wide array of these possibilities. In The Predictioneer's Game, there's a graph that shows worst case, best case, and the probability density around the likely outcome. It shows that this is a very robust result—there's a 95 percent confidence interval around the predictions, and as I recall, it was pretty narrow. The predicted results were quite stable.

MJ: Is there any scenario under which Copenhagen succeeds?
BBdM: The best-case scenario produces a sustained small improvement relative to the current [Kyoto] baseline emissions. A majority of the scenarios do not. None of the scenarios produces a big shift toward massive enforcement of an international agreement.

MJ: Did someone hire you to do this analysis?
BBdM: This was done by some of my undergraduate students in an NYU seminar course called "Solving Foreign Crises." They get very, very, very intense feedback on their assumptions and the generation of the data. The group that worked on the environment was a particularly smart group of kids, so I have a lot of confidence in their data.

MJ: Must have been a depressing project.
BBdM: They were coming at it from a very optimistic and hopeful view. They spent a lot of the semester trying to work out the strategic maneuvers that one or another group of players could adopt to alter the lay of the land. And it was hard to alter.

MJ: So why does commitment to the agreement erode?
BBdM: The reason that comes out in the modeling is a) it's not working, and b) conditions on the ground—the cost of fossil fuel, for instance, and improvements in technology—mean that people will be regulating out of self-interest, rather than out of some collective action.

MJ: It seems our politicians are allergic to doing anything that has an economic impact, like raising gas taxes.
BBdM: This is the difficulty, and this is why they would like an international agreement they can hide behind: "Well, those guys aren't behaving well, so how can we punish our citizens when they're not?" As opposed to, "Yeah, we really believe in this so we're going to adjust our domestic policy." They are allergic to things that cost them significantly the prospect of getting reelected.

Autore: Michael Mechanic

Norway's New Clout Over Oil Industry's Green Goals

Wirepullers: tra pochi mesi, a dicembre, i grandi della Terra si riuniranno a Copenhagen per la revisione del Protocollo di Kyoto. Sembra molto difficile che questo appuntamento possa entrare nella storia come un momento di rottura e di cambiamento della politica mondiale rispetto ai temi legati all'ambiente, ma la presenza dell'amministrazione Obama, o forse l'assenza dell'amministrazione Bush, lascia sperare che qualche passo avanti possa essere fatto. Saranno soprattutto americani, cinesi e le grandi economie emergenti (Brasile e India su tutti) a dover fare qualcosa per trovare gli accordi più utili (o meno dannosi) al pianeta. mentre in Europa qualcosa si è già iniziato a fare. (3)

With a population of just 4.6 million, Norway can't hope for more than modest political influence when it comes to combating global warming. But it can use its leverage in the boardroom to advance the country's favorite cause. Norway controls the largest sovereign wealth fund (SWF) outside the Middle East, worth $435 billion, and the pot is growing fast. A timely decision to raise the proportion of equities in the portfolio allowed the Government Pension Fund, which invests the country's oil and gas revenues, to snap up stocks at the start of this year's global rally. Result: the fund now ranks as Europe's largest equity investor, owning 1 percent of all the world's shares. The second quarter of this year saw a 12.7 percent return on its investments, the biggest in the fund's 10-year history.

And the fund won't hesitate to use its soft power. Unlike other SWFs, Norway's has some clear environmental goals. In August it issued a document listing measures on climate change that it expects from businesses in which it holds a stake, including an obligation to set targets for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. In the future, it plans to screen 500 leading companies and send each an annual scorecard marking its performance. Anne Kvam, the fund's head of corporate governance, says Norway would use "all available tools" to get companies to comply. In practice, that could mean forcing changes in a company's leadership. A novel solution: using big oil revenues to control Big Oil.

Autore: William Underhill

Taxe carbone : un moment historique

Wirepullers: tra pochi mesi, a dicembre, i grandi della Terra si riuniranno a Copenhagen per la revisione del Protocollo di Kyoto. Sembra molto difficile che questo appuntamento possa entrare nella storia come un momento di rottura e di cambiamento della politica mondiale rispetto ai temi legati all'ambiente, ma la presenza dell'amministrazione Obama, o forse l'assenza dell'amministrazione Bush, lascia sperare che qualche passo avanti possa essere fatto. Saranno soprattutto americani, cinesi e le grandi economie emergenti (Brasile e India su tutti) a dover fare qualcosa per trovare gli accordi più utili (o meno dannosi) al pianeta. mentre in Europa qualcosa si è già iniziato a fare. (2)

Ingénieur de formation, expert en questions énergétiques et climatiques, l'auteur plaide pour ce qu'il considère comme un moindre mal comparé à ce qui nous menace.

«Une taxe carbone ? Pouah, une taxe !» Ainsi aurait sûrement parlé Jacquouille dans «Les Visiteurs à Bercy», tellement cette idée semble particulièrement incongrue dans la conjoncture actuelle. En fait, le débat a surtout particulièrement mal démarré dans une classe politique encore trop peu à l'aise avec les enjeux.

Il est évident que les apparences sont trompeuses : pourquoi diantre Nicolas Hulot irait-il risquer sa réputation d'homme le plus sympathique du pays s'il n'était profondément convaincu que c'est avec la promotion de cette fameuse taxe qu'il méritera le mieux - peut-être avec retard ! - l'estime que la population lui porte ?

Au début de l'affaire, il y a un constat simple : l'énergie est par définition la grandeur qui accompagne tout changement dans le monde physique. Il n'y a donc pas d'activité humaine - et a fortiori d'activité économique - sans énergie, dont l'histoire montre qu'elle joue un rôle central dans l'évolution des peuples. La crise de 2009 n'est que la conséquence logique de la hausse du pétrole entre 2000 et 2008, qui est venue faire vaciller un endettement qui autrement serait passé comme une lettre à la poste. Dans le monde, cette énergie vient essentiellement du pétrole (35 %), du gaz (20 %), et du charbon (25 %). Or selon Shell, Total ou l'Agence internationale de l'énergie, le plus probable pour les vingt prochaines années est un approvisionnement pétrolier et gazier de plus en plus incertain : le déclin de la production pétrolière commencera d'ici cinq à quinze ans et il en ira de même pour le gaz cinq à dix ans après (et le charbon quarante ans après). Tout notre système socio-économique reposant aujourd'hui sur l'énergie abondante et à bas prix, une telle évolution dans un monde non préparé menace du premier au dernier lecteur de ce journal, du Lillois au Marseillais, du chômeur au cadre : ce n'est pas juste un problème de riches.

Puis vient le climat. 5 °C d'élévation de la moyenne planétaire, c'est ce qui s'est passé lors du passage de l'ère glaciaire (France incultivable, Grenoble sous la glace, mer plus basse de 100 mètres) à l'époque que nous connaissons actuellement. Sauf qu'en provoquant une telle transition en un siècle au lieu des dix mille ans au moins que cela prend «naturellement», nous appliquerons à 9 milliards d'hommes sédentaires une telle déstabilisation (pénuries alimentaires, maladies, destructions d'infrastructures, exodes, guerres, etc.) que la démocratie, l'espérance de vie et la paix n'y résisteraient probablement pas.

Éloigner cette double menace, probablement un peu plus gênante que de payer son essence ou son gaz plus cher, là est toute la finalité de la taxe carbone, ou contribution climat-énergie. La hausse de prix délibérée permettra d'éviter ou d'anticiper les difficultés qui nous attendent. Le mécanisme n'est pas nouveau : augmenter le prix des cigarettes fait baisser la consommation, et majoritairement les Français le comprennent.

Mais ce que mes concitoyens sous-estiment encore, c'est la gravité et l'imminence du problème. Ainsi, 2/3 des Français pensent qu'ils font déjà assez d'efforts pour économiser l'énergie. Or l'objectif à atteindre, tant pour des raisons climatiques qu'énergétiques, est de diviser par 4 la consommation de pétrole et de gaz par individu en vingt à quarante ans. À l'évidence, cet objectif ne sera pas atteint en se limitant aux efforts actuels, ou en taxant juste les «riches». Par contre, ne pas l'atteindre fera d'abord souffrir les moins riches, au travers des crises et déstabilisations qui en seront la conséquence.

Tous ceux qui ont pris le temps de se pencher en détail sur le problème convergent sur la solution. En quinze jours - du jamais-vu ou presque sur un sujet fiscal - les membres de la commission Rocard, mêlant experts, représentants d'entreprises, syndicalistes, consommateurs, pouvoirs publics, politiques, qui avaient tous en commun une connaissance minimale du contexte pétrolier et climatique, ont débouché de manière unanime sur la préconisation d'une mesure (la fiscalité), d'un horizon de temps (dire ce que l'on va faire sur vingt ans), d'une progressivité (passer de 32 à 100 euros la tonne de CO2, voire plus s'il le faut), et d'une règle de gestion (n'exonérer personne et aider les plus touchés autrement). Seule l'affectation est restée en débat. Elle n'est pas toute la mesure, mais pourtant elle conditionne son acceptabilité sociale : 2/3 des Français sont opposés à la taxe carbone… sauf en cas de restitution partielle aux ménages (dont la forme peut se discuter), auquel cas plus de la moitié devient favorable ! C'est bien le signe qu'il y a moyen de trouver un chemin, pour le plus grand bénéfice de tous.

Une solution serait de pérenniser une forme de commission Rocard, pour garantir dans le temps qu'il n'y aura pas de dévoiement. L'irruption du carbone dans la fiscalité ordinaire est un rendez-vous historique. Ne le ratons pas.

Autore: Jean-Marc Jancovici

Il percorso ad ostacoli verso Copenhagen

Wirepullers: tra pochi mesi, a dicembre, i grandi della Terra si riuniranno a Copenhagen per la revisione del Protocollo di Kyoto. Sembra molto difficile che questo appuntamento possa entrare nella storia come un momento di rottura e di cambiamento della politica mondiale rispetto ai temi legati all'ambiente, ma la presenza dell'amministrazione Obama, o forse l'assenza dell'amministrazione Bush, lascia sperare che qualche passo avanti possa essere fatto. Saranno soprattutto americani, cinesi e le grandi economie emergenti (Brasile e India su tutti) a dover fare qualcosa per trovare gli accordi più utili (o meno dannosi) al pianeta. mentre in Europa qualcosa si è già iniziato a fare. (1)

Dal 7 al 18 dicembre si svolgerà a Copenhagen la conferenza mondiale per la revisione del Protocollo di Kyoto, in scadenza nel 2012. I lavori preparatori del summit si sono tenuti nel corso di tutto il 2009, ma non sono stati in grado di mettere d’accordo i rappresentanti dei 190 Paesi che nel 1997 firmarono il Protocollo. Le divergenze più importanti si manifestano fra le principali potenze mondiali (Cina, India, Ue, Usa), prime responsabili per le emissioni di CO2.

L’Unione europea è ancora leader nella lotta al cambiamento climatico, grazie all’approvazione nel mese di dicembre 2008 della cosiddetta direttiva 20-20-20. Si tratta di un insieme di atti legislativi che prevedono entro il 2020 non solo una riduzione delle emissioni del 20% rispetto al 1990, ma anche l’aumento del 20% nell’utilizzo delle energie rinnovabili. Tuttavia, molti analisti dubitano della reale capacità dell’Ue di raggiungere tali obiettivi.
L’attuale crisi economica ed il conseguente crollo dei consumi, associato ad un prezzo del petrolio e del gas relativamente basso, hanno ridotto notevolmente gli utili delle società energetiche. Di conseguenza molti gruppi energetici sono stati costretti a rivedere i loro investimenti in tecnologie meno inquinanti, mettendo in dubbio il raggiungimento degli obiettivi della direttiva.

Inoltre l’Ue appare spaccata al suo interno sulla definizione delle misure comunitarie per la lotta al cambiamento climatico a sostegno dei paesi in via di sviluppo. Nelle negoziazioni sulla revisione del Protocollo, alcune economie emergenti (Brasile, Filippine, Malesia, etc.) hanno infatti chiesto, a fronte del loro impegno a ridurre le emissioni, “know how” e sostegno finanziario da parte dei paesi industrializzati per progetti a favore della mitigazione del cambiamento climatico. Alcuni paesi europei sembrano propensi a finanziare solo in minima parte questi progetti, preferendo fornire solamente tecnologie e "know how". Tale posizione è giustificata dai timori di molti governi europei sull’effettivo utilizzo dei fondi da parte delle èlites governative dei paesi in via di sviluppo.

Nel corso di tutto il 2009, prima la Presidenza ceca, poi quella svedese dell’Ue, hanno cercato, in sede negoziale, di convincere Usa e Cina ad accettare obiettivi vincolanti di riduzione simili a quelli europei. I risultati sono stati tuttavia scarsi, a causa delle diverse posizioni che gli altri Paesi partecipanti ai lavori hanno dimostrato nel corso dei negoziati.

Le difficoltà di Obama al Senato
Se l’amministrazione Bush era decisamente critica verso il Protocollo di Kyoto e l’introduzione di limiti alle emissioni di CO2, l’elezione di Obama ha determinato un nuovo approccio per gli Stati Uniti. Nel corso dei lavori preparatori della conferenza di Copenhagen la nuova amministrazione americana si è dichiarata disponibile ad impegnarsi affinché gli Usa riducano entro il 2020 le proprie emissioni del 17% rispetto ai livelli del 2005. Questo sforzo è tuttavia considerato insoddisfacente sia dall’Ue, sia dalle lobby ambientaliste americane, secondo le quali tale impegno porterebbe ad una riduzione delle emissioni solo del 4% rispetto al 1990: percentuale ben lontana dall’obiettivo del 20% proposto dall’Ue.

Sebbene al Congresso siano in discussione diverse iniziative legislative per la lotta al cambiamento climatico, molti analisti mostrano scetticismo sulla reale capacità dell’amministrazione americana di adottare misure effettive per la riduzione delle emissioni. L’opinione pubbica americana è decisamente meno sensibile, rispetto a quella europea, alle problematiche climatiche e questo costituisce sicuramente un problema importante per l’attuale amministrazione. Diversi sondaggi dimostrano infatti che la maggioranza degli americani considera il rischio del cambiamento climatico solo come un pericolo per il livello occupazionale nel paese. Tali considerazioni si ripercuotono inevitabilmente sul Congresso, dove la maggioranza democratica sta incontrando serie difficoltà nel far approvare l’American Clean Energy and Security Act (Aces) Si tratta di una serie di atti legislativi che oltre a prevedere l’aumento del 20% dell’utilizzo di energia da fonti rinnovabili entro il 2020 (misura peraltro già approvata dall’Ue), mirano anche a sviluppare su ampia scala impianti per la cattura e lo stoccaggio del carbonio per le centrali elettriche (responsabili del 40% delle emissioni).

Sebbene l’Aces sia stato approvato, non senza difficoltà, dalla Camera dei Rappresentanti il 26 giugno scorso, molti deputati appaiono scettici sulle effettive possibilità di farlo approvare al Senato, ove la maggioranza democratica necessaria ad evitare l’ostruzionismo (filibustering) dei repubblicani è molto a rischio. Nonostante le difficoltà di politica interna appaiano determinanti, il problema fondamentale è rappresentato dall’ostilità dei paesi in via di sviluppo (Brasile, Cina e India) all’introduzione di obblighi di riduzione vincolanti.
Questo rifiuto è stato utilizzato dalle lobby industriali fin dal luglio 1998, quando il Senato statunitense approvò la “Byrd-Hagel Resolution” che dichiarava l’impossibilità per l’esecutivo di siglare qualunque tipo di accordo internazionale che potesse ridurre la competitività delle imprese statunitensi o che non prevedesse obiettivi di riduzione obbligatori per i paesi in via di sviluppo. Alla luce dei numerosi problemi dell’amministrazione Obama, esiste la possibilità che gli Usa non aderiscano ad un nuovo accordo internazionale, per evitare possibili ostruzionismi al Congresso in sede di ratifica, preferendo invece la sigla di un accordo diretto con Cina, India e Ue. Tale approccio andrebbe tuttavia contro il nuovo corso multilaterale intrapreso sia dal presidente americano che dal Segretario di stato negli ultimi 9 mesi, ed appare dunque non facilmente perseguibile.

Cina, India e il gruppo dei 37
Sebbene Cina e India si siano sempre opposte all’introduzione di obiettivi vincolanti per la riduzione dei gas serra, al recente summit Onu di New York i governi di Pechino e Nuova Delhi hanno dato cenni di apertura alla possibilità di contenere le emissioni, pur senza proporre impegni precisi. Il presidente cinese Hu Jintao ha infatti dichiarato che entro il 2020 la Cina ridurrà le emissioni in misura consistente rispetto ai valori registrati nel 2005. Hu Jintao ha inoltre dichiarato che al 2020 il 15% dell’energia consumata in Cina sarà prodotta da fonti rinnovabili.

Nonostante l’apertura delle due potenze asiatiche, c’è grande scetticismo sulla reale volontà cinese e indiana di sottoscrivere un accordo internazionale che vincoli le loro economie a tetti massimi per le emissioni. Secondo molti diplomatici, infatti, India e Cina preferiscono verificare la reale volontà dei paesi occidentali di ridurre le proprie emissioni prima di prendere in considerazione la possibilità di adottare piani di riduzione, causando in questo modo una sostanziale paralisi dei negoziati. Contemporaneamente un gruppo di 37 paesi, costituiti per lo più dalle economie in via di sviluppo (fra le quali rientrano Brasile e Cina), si sono dichiarati disponibili a ridurre le loro emissioni del 40% rispetto ai valori del 1990, a fronte però di un notevole sostegno finanziario da parte dei paesi industrializzati.

Mesi infuocati
La firma di un nuovo accordo internazionale sul cambiamento climatico appare tanto importante quanto difficile da raggiungere. Sebbene i principali leader mondiali dichiarino la necessità di raggiungere un accordo entro la metà di dicembre, gli ostacoli appaiono, ad oggi, quasi insormontabili. Le difficoltà interne di Obama (la risicata maggioranza al Congresso e lo scarso sostegno dell’opinione pubblica), le paure di Cina e India per i propri settori industriali e la debolezza della diplomazia ambientalista europea lasciano presagire che, molto probabilmente, a Copenhagen non si riusciranno a raggiungere gli obiettivi largamente auspicati.

Autore: Antonio Dai Pra

giovedì 27 agosto 2009

Seven Myths About Alternative Energy

Wirepullers: quanto tempo resta da vivere all'uomo sulla terra? 50 anni? Forse 100? Fossero anche di più, è abbastanza probabile che la presenza della vita sul nostro pianeta sia comunque a tempo determinato. Stiamo consumando il nostro pianeta e non potremo andare avanti così molto a lungo. Dobbiamo fare tutto il possibile per promuovere le energie alternative, dobbiamo incrementare l'utilizzo di biocarburanti, unica soluzione alla nostra dipendenza dal petrolio, dobbiamo dare inizio a una rivoluzione tecnologica che salvi il mondo. In sostanza dobbiamo trasformare completamente i nostri comportamenti in termini di consumi. E se fosse tutto falso? I sette miti sull'energia alternativa secondo Foreign Policy.

1. "We Need to Do Everything Possible to Promote Alternative Energy."

Not exactly. It's certainly clear that fossil fuels are mangling the climate and that the status quo is unsustainable. There is now a broad scientific consensus that the world needs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more than 25 percent by 2020 -- and more than 80 percent by 2050. Even if the planet didn't depend on it, breaking our addictions to oil and coal would also reduce global reliance on petrothugs and vulnerability to energy-price spikes.

But though the world should do everything sensible to promote alternative energy, there's no point trying to do everything possible. There are financial, political, and technical pressures as well as time constraints that will force tough choices; solutions will need to achieve the biggest emissions reductions for the least money in the shortest time. Hydrogen cars, cold fusion, and other speculative technologies might sound cool, but they could divert valuable resources from ideas that are already achievable and cost-effective. It's nice that someone managed to run his car on liposuction leftovers, but that doesn't mean he needs to be subsidized.

Reasonable people can disagree whether governments should try to pick energy winners and losers. But why not at least agree that governments shouldn't pick losers to be winners? Unfortunately, that's exactly what is happening. The world is rushing to promote alternative fuel sources that will actually accelerate global warming, not to mention an alternative power source that could cripple efforts to stop global warming.

We can still choose a truly alternative path. But we'd better hurry.


2. "Renewable Fuels Are the Cure for Our Addiction to Oil."
Unfortunately not. "Renewable fuels" sound great in theory, and agricultural lobbyists have persuaded European countries and the United States to enact remarkably ambitious biofuels mandates to promote farm-grown alternatives to gasoline. But so far in the real world, the cures -- mostly ethanol derived from corn in the United States or biodiesel derived from palm oil, soybeans, and rapeseed in Europe -- have been significantly worse than the disease.

Researchers used to agree that farm-grown fuels would cut emissions because they all made a shockingly basic error. They gave fuel crops credit for soaking up carbon while growing, but it never occurred to them that fuel crops might displace vegetation that soaked up even more carbon. It was as if they assumed that biofuels would only be grown in parking lots. Needless to say, that hasn't been the case; Indonesia, for example, destroyed so many of its lush forests and peat lands to grow palm oil for the European biodiesel market that it ranks third rather than 21st among the world's top carbon emitters.

In 2007, researchers finally began accounting for deforestation and other land-use changes created by biofuels. One study found that it would take more than 400 years of biodiesel use to "pay back" the carbon emitted by directly clearing peat for palm oil. Indirect damage can be equally devastating because on a hungry planet, food crops that get diverted to fuel usually end up getting replaced somewhere. For example, ethanol profits are prompting U.S. soybean farmers to switch to corn, so Brazilian soybean farmers are expanding into cattle pastures to pick up the slack and Brazilian ranchers are invading the Amazon rain forest, which is why another study pegged corn ethanol's payback period at 167 years. It's simple economics: The mandates increase demand for grain, which boosts prices, which makes it lucrative to ravage the wilderness.

Deforestation accounts for 20 percent of global emissions, so unless the world can eliminate emissions from all other sources -- cars, coal, factories, cows -- it needs to back off forests. That means limiting agriculture's footprint, a daunting task as the world's population grows -- and an impossible task if vast expanses of cropland are converted to grow middling amounts of fuel. Even if the United States switched its entire grain crop to ethanol, it would only replace one fifth of U.S. gasoline consumption.

This is not just a climate disaster. The grain it takes to fill an SUV tank with ethanol could feed a hungry person for a year; biofuel mandates are exerting constant upward pressure on global food prices and have contributed to food riots in dozens of poorer countries. Still, the United States has quintupled its ethanol production in a decade and plans to quintuple its biofuel production again in the next decade. This will mean more money for well-subsidized grain farmers, but also more malnutrition, more deforestation, and more emissions. European leaders have paid a bit more attention to the alarming critiques of biofuels -- including one by a British agency that was originally established to promote biofuels -- but they have shown no more inclination to throw cold water on this $100 billion global industry.


3. "If Today's Biofuels Aren't the Answer, Tomorrow's Biofuels Will Be."
Doubtful. The latest U.S. rules, while continuing lavish support for corn ethanol, include enormous new mandates to jump-start "second-generation" biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol derived from switchgrass. In theory, they would be less destructive than corn ethanol, which relies on tractors, petroleum-based fertilizers, and distilleries that emit way too much carbon. Even first-generation ethanol derived from sugar cane -- which already provides half of Brazil's transportation fuel -- is considerably greener than corn ethanol. But recent studies suggest that any biofuels requiring good agricultural land would still be worse than gasoline for global warming. Less of a disaster than corn ethanol is still a disaster.

Back in the theoretical world, biofuels derived from algae, trash, agricultural waste, or other sources could help because they require no land or at least unspecific "degraded lands," but they always seem to be "several" years away from large-scale commercial development. And some scientists remain hopeful that fast-growing perennial grasses such as miscanthus can convert sunlight into energy efficiently enough to overcome the land-use dilemmas -- someday. But for today, farmland happens to be very good at producing the food we need to feed us and storing the carbon we need to save us, and not so good at generating fuel. In fact, new studies suggest that if we really want to convert biomass into energy, we're better off turning it into electricity.

Then what should we use in our cars and trucks? In the short term … gasoline. We just need to use less of it.

Instead of counterproductive biofuel mandates and ethanol subsidies, governments need fuel-efficiency mandates to help the world's 1 billion drivers guzzle less gas, plus subsidies for mass transit, bike paths, rail lines, telecommuting, carpooling, and other activities to get those drivers out of their cars. Policymakers also need to eliminate subsidies for roads to nowhere, mandates that require excess parking and limit dense development in urban areas, and other sprawl-inducing policies. None of this is as enticing as inventing a magical new fuel, but it's doable, and it would cut emissions.

In the medium term, the world needs plug-in electric cars, the only plausible answer to humanity's oil addiction that isn't decades away. But electricity is already the source of even more emissions than oil. So we'll need an answer to humanity's coal addiction, too.


4. "Nuclear Power Is the Cure for Our Addiction to Coal."
Nope. Atomic energy is emissions free, so a slew of politicians and even some environmentalists have embraced it as a clean alternative to coal and natural gas that can generate power when there's no sun or wind. In the United States, which already gets nearly 20 percent of its electricity from nuclear plants, utilities are thinking about new reactors for the first time since the Three Mile Island meltdown three decades ago -- despite global concerns about nuclear proliferation, local concerns about accidents or terrorist attacks, and the lack of a disposal site for the radioactive waste. France gets nearly 80 percent of its electricity from nukes, and Russia, China, and India are now gearing up for nuclear renaissances of their own.

But nuclear power cannot fix the climate crisis. The first reason is timing: The West needs major cuts in emissions within a decade, and the first new U.S. reactor is only scheduled for 2017 -- unless it gets delayed, like every U.S. reactor before it. Elsewhere in the developed world, most of the talk about a nuclear revival has remained just talk; there is no Western country with more than one nuclear plant under construction, and scores of existing plants will be scheduled for decommissioning in the coming decades, so there's no way nuclear could make even a tiny dent in electricity emissions before 2020.

The bigger problem is cost. Nuke plants are supposed to be expensive to build but cheap to operate. Unfortunately, they're turning out to be really, really expensive to build; their cost estimates have quadrupled in less than a decade. Energy guru Amory Lovins has calculated that new nukes will cost nearly three times as much as wind -- and that was before their construction costs exploded for a variety of reasons, including the global credit crunch, the atrophying of the nuclear labor force, and a supplier squeeze symbolized by a Japanese company's worldwide monopoly on steel-forging for reactors. A new reactor in Finland that was supposed to showcase the global renaissance is already way behind schedule and way, way over budget. This is why plans for new plants were recently shelved in Canada and several U.S. states, why Moody's just warned utilities they'll risk ratings downgrades if they seek new reactors, and why renewables attracted $71 billion in worldwide private capital in 2007 -- while nukes attracted zero.

It's also why U.S. nuclear utilities are turning to politicians to supplement their existing loan guarantees, tax breaks, direct subsidies, and other cradle-to-grave government goodies with new public largesse. Reactors don't make much sense to build unless someone else is paying; that's why the strongest push for nukes is coming from countries where power is publicly funded. For all the talk of sanctions, if the world really wants to cripple the Iranian economy, maybe the mullahs should just be allowed to pursue nuclear energy.

Unlike biofuels, nukes don't worsen warming. But a nuclear expansion -- like the recent plan by U.S. Republicans who want 100 new plants by 2030 -- would cost trillions of dollars for relatively modest gains in the relatively distant future.

Nuclear lobbyists do have one powerful argument: If coal is too dirty and nukes are too costly, how are we going to produce our juice? Wind is terrific, and it's on the rise, adding nearly half of new U.S. power last year and expanding its global capacity by a third in 2007. But after increasing its worldwide wattage tenfold in a decade -- China is now the leading producer, and Europe is embracing wind as well -- it still produces less than 2 percent of the world's electricity. Solar and geothermal are similarly wonderful and inexhaustible technologies, but they're still global rounding errors. The average U.S. household now has 26 plug-in devices, and the rest of the world is racing to catch up; the U.S. Department of Energy expects global electricity consumption to rise 77 percent by 2030. How can we meet that demand without a massive nuclear revival?

We can't. So we're going to have to prove the Department of Energy wrong.


5. "There Is No Silver Bullet to the Energy Crisis."
Probably not
. But some bullets are a lot better than others; we ought to give them our best shot before we commit to evidently inferior bullets. And one renewable energy resource is the cleanest, cheapest, and most abundant of them all. It doesn't induce deforestation or require elaborate security. It doesn't depend on the weather. And it won't take years to build or bring to market; it's already universally available.

It's called "efficiency." It means wasting less energy -- or more precisely, using less energy to get your beer just as cold, your shower just as hot, and your factory just as productive. It's not about some austerity scold harassing you to take cooler showers, turn off lights, turn down thermostats, drive less, fly less, buy less stuff, eat less meat, ditch your McMansion, and otherwise change your behavior to save energy. Doing less with less is called conservation. Efficiency is about doing more or the same with less; it doesn't require much effort or sacrifice. Yet more efficient appliances, lighting, factories, and buildings, as well as vehicles, could wipe out one fifth to one third of the world's energy consumption without any real deprivation.

Efficiency isn't sexy, and the idea that we could use less energy without much trouble hangs uneasily with today's more-is-better culture. But the best way to ensure new power plants don't bankrupt us, empower petrodictators, or imperil the planet is not to build them in the first place. "Negawatts" saved by efficiency initiatives generally cost 1 to 5 cents per kilowatt-hour versus projections ranging from 12 to 30 cents per kilowatt-hour from new nukes. That's because Americans in particular and human beings in general waste amazing amounts of energy. U.S. electricity plants fritter away enough to power Japan, and American water heaters, industrial motors, and buildings are as ridiculously inefficient as American cars. Only 4 percent of the energy used to power a typical incandescent bulb produces light; the rest is wasted. China is expected to build more square feet of real estate in the next 15 years than the United States has built in its entire history, and it has no green building codes or green building experience.

But we already know that efficiency mandates can work wonders because they've already reduced U.S. energy consumption levels from astronomical to merely high. For example, thanks to federal rules, modern American refrigerators use three times less energy than 1970s models, even though they're larger and more high-tech.

The biggest obstacles to efficiency are the perverse incentives that face most utilities; they make more money when they sell more power and have to build new generating plants. But in California and the Pacific Northwest, utility profits have been decoupled from electricity sales, so utilities can help customers save energy without harming shareholders. As a result, in that part of the country, per capita power use has been flat for three decades -- while skyrocketing 50 percent in the rest of the United States. If utilities around the world could make money by helping their customers use less power, the U.S. Department of Energy wouldn't be releasing such scary numbers.


6. "We Need a Technological Revolution to Save the World."
Maybe
. In the long term, it's hard to imagine how (without major advances) we can reduce emissions 80 percent by 2050 while the global population increases and the developing world develops. So a clean-tech Apollo program modeled on the Manhattan Project makes sense. And we do need carbon pricing to send a message to market makers and innovators to promote low-carbon activities; Europe's cap-and-trade scheme seems to be working well after a rocky start. The private capital already pouring into renewables might someday produce a cheap solar panel or a synthetic fuel or a superpowerful battery or a truly clean coal plant. At some point, after we've milked efficiency for all the negawatts and negabarrels we can, we might need something new.

But we already have all the technology we need to start reducing emissions by reducing consumption. Even if we only hold electricity demand flat, we can subtract a coal-fired megawatt every time we add a wind-powered megawatt. And with a smarter grid, green building codes, and strict efficiency standards for everything from light bulbs to plasma TVs to server farms, we can do better than flat. Al Gore has a reasonably plausible plan for zero-emissions power by 2020; he envisions an ambitious 28 percent decrease in demand through efficiency, plus some ambitious increases in supply from wind, solar, and geothermal energy. But we don't even have to reduce our fossil fuel use to zero to reach our 2020 targets. We just have to use less.

If somebody comes up with a better idea by 2020, great! For now, we should focus on the solutions that get the best emissions bang for the buck.


7. "Ultimately, We'll Need to Change Our Behaviors to Save the World."
Probably. These days, it's politically incorrect to suggest that going green will require even the slightest adjustment to our way of life, but let's face it: Jimmy Carter was right. It wouldn't kill you to turn down the heat and put on a sweater. Efficiency is a miracle drug, but conservation is even better; a Prius saves gas, but a Prius sitting in the driveway while you ride your bike uses no gas. Even energy-efficient dryers use more power than clotheslines.

More with less will be a great start, but to get to 80 percent less emissions, the developed world might occasionally have to do less with less. We might have to unplug a few digital picture frames, substitute teleconferencing for some business travel, and take it easy on the air conditioner. If that's an inconvenient truth, well, it's less inconvenient than trillions of dollars' worth of new reactors, perpetual dependence on hostile petrostates, or a fricasseed planet.

After all, the developing world is entitled to develop. Its people are understandably eager to eat more meat, drive more cars, and live in nicer houses. It doesn't seem fair for the developed world to say: Do as we say, not as we did. But if the developing world follows the developed world's wasteful path to prosperity, the Earth we all share won't be able to accommodate us. So we're going to have to change our ways. Then we can at least say: Do as we're doing, not as we did.

Autore: Michael Grunwald

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com