Afghan elections: What might happen next

Wirepullers: pochi giorni fa si è votato in Afghanistan e la cosa di per sé è già un piccolo risultato. Ce lo ha ricordato lo stesso presidente Karzai, definendo questo voto un successo. Basta non pensare a tutti i morti che ci sono stati per arrivarci. Adesso aspettiamo l'esito, consapevoli che il sangue tornerà a scorrere anche una volta che avremo la nuova guida afghana, dato che non è un voto a risolvere i problemi dell'Afghanistan. Il motivo è semplice: già si parla di brogli (e a ragion veduta probabilmente), mentre le divisioni tra etnie e tribù che vivono nel paese, sulle quali si innerva quella tra filo-taliban e anti-taliban, rendono questo paese di 650.000km² una vera e propria polveriera, sulla quale la politica internazionale gioca a scacchi. Se vince Karzai perdono i taliban, se vince Abdullah perdono i pashtun (l'etnia più numerosa), se si va al ballottaggio si allunga l'agonia per tutti. Ma per questa terra è ormai un leit motiv quello di non avere vincitori, soprattutto tra i civili. (4)

With President Hamid Karzai's rivals crying foul, the incumbent may win by solid margins but lose legitimacy – which could hamper counterinsurgency efforts.

Reports of fraud continue to pile up in Afghanistan's presidential election, causing Afghan experts to suspect that President Hamid Karzai will win by solid margins without legitimacy.

On Saturday, presidential candidate Mirwaiz Yasini walked into the retro-chic Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and dumped hundreds of ripped up ballots in the lobby – discarded votes for the opposition, he said. Journalists on a break between optimistic press conferences from international monitoring groups and the election commission rifled through the sheets.

They contained votes for candidates other than Mr. Karzai and bore a stamp from polling station workers. Mr. Yasini said his campaign workers found these scattered around the southern city of Spin Boldak after his observers were barred from polling stations by border police.

Karzai's main challenger, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, added to the allegations of fraud Sunday, saying ballots marked for Karzai were coming in from volatile southern districts where no vote was held, and that turnout was being reported as 40 percent in areas where only 10 percent of the people voted.

"This is a sign or evidence of widespread rigging," Abdullah said, adding that he has no faith in the chief of the country's Independent Election Commission, a Karzai appointee.

Official vote tallies – legitimate or not – are not expected until Sept. 7, while some preliminary figures may be released Tuesday. With Karzai's rivals accusing the incumbent of committing fraud to win without a runoff, the vote count leaves open the possibility for four scenarios. All hold pitfalls for Afghanistan's Western backers.

A big Karzai win
If Mr. Karzai manages to win handily, many Afghans will believe the election was stolen.
"I will congratulate Mr. Karzai on his successful coup," says Afghan analyst Waheed Muzdja in Kabul.

This result spells serious trouble for NATO's counterinsurgency effort here. Security experts emphasize that it's extremely difficult to defeat an insurgency when coalition forces are supporting a government with no legitimacy. Support back home for the war may also fade faster.

One solution – declaring the election invalid – appears nearly impossible.
An independent body called the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) has been set up to adjudicate fraud complaints. But its mandate is limited to investigate specific incidents – not to determine whether they may add up to a thrown election.

"We're not talking about outcomes in terms of the ranking of the candidates and who's going to be the winner," says Maarten Halff, an ECC commissioner. "It's impossible to tell from each incident how many votes would be involved."

Their findings go to the Independent Election Commission, which has the power to certify the results, but was appointed by the president with no outside oversight.
The international community could cry foul, but may be disinclined to do so.

"The international community has no choice – it has to come out at the end saying it was reasonably fair," says Marvin Weinbaum, scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington. "We gave this election such a critical status, we really imbued it with such importance that to say it failed is to suggest there's no legitimate government."

Nor do many here expect an Iranian-style popular uprising in the streets. Karzai's main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, says he rules out encouraging civil disobedience, saying it would be "too risky."

A close win for Karzai
Many Western stakeholders are seeing a 51 percent win for Karzai as the best-case outcome, says an international election monitor barred from speaking openly during the election process. Such a result would avoid a messy run-off but perhaps appear credible.

However, it would also rob Karzai of much claim to a popular mandate. He would emerge more dependent on controversial warlords who backed him during the election in exchange for positions at the table.

A runoff
If no candidate emerges with a majority of the votes, a runoff between the top two vote getters is scheduled for Oct. 1. Privately, some educated Afghans in Kabul speak with dread about this outcome. They worry the country remains too weak to organize a run-off so soon and keep supporters – and their passions – in check.

For those officials whose job security depends on Karzai's return, a run-off could come as a surprise – and a fright.

"Ministers, governors, members of Parliament, police chiefs – if they see that their jobs are really at risk, of course they will do their best to keep it," says Fahim Dashty, editor of the local newspaper Kabul Weekly.

Abdullah, the candidate, says that the international community is committed to a run-off and that it can be arranged. He says his campaign is ready as well, but may need to raise more funds to pay to transport voters to the polls on Oct. 1.

Abdullah eventually wins
An Abdullah victory would be historic: Afghanistan has never witnessed a peaceful transition of power. It would mark an important step toward democracy.

It would also ignite hope for a changed government.
"Whether he is able to bring these changes or not, is another issue," says Mr. Dashty. "I think if he gathers a professional team, honest, and committed, then it can be better than the current government."

Karzai's campaign has argued that an Abdullah presidency could cause further unrest among Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns, who historically have chafed at being ruled by leaders who are not fully Pashtun. Abdullah is half Tajik, half Pashtun. The Taliban insurgency rises from the Pashtun regions.
Many Afghan analysts reject this.

"There is still an uprising now with a Pashtun president," says Wadir Safi, a professor of law at Kabul University. The Taliban movement does not feed off ethnic Pashtun nationalism, he adds, meaning that the election of a half-Pashtun leader will probably not add to their momentum.

Autore: Ben Arnoldy

Fonte: http://www.csmonitor.com/

Afghanistan: enjeux et périls d'une élection

Wirepullers: pochi giorni fa si è votato in Afghanistan e la cosa di per sé è già un piccolo risultato. Ce lo ha ricordato lo stesso presidente Karzai, definendo questo voto un successo. Basta non pensare a tutti i morti che ci sono stati per arrivarci. Adesso aspettiamo l'esito, consapevoli che il sangue tornerà a scorrere anche una volta che avremo la nuova guida afghana, dato che non è un voto a risolvere i problemi dell'Afghanistan. Il motivo è semplice: già si parla di brogli (e a ragion veduta probabilmente), mentre le divisioni tra etnie e tribù che vivono nel paese, sulle quali si innerva quella tra filo-taliban e anti-taliban, rendono questo paese di 650.000km² una vera e propria polveriera, sulla quale la politica internazionale gioca a scacchi. Se vince Karzai perdono i taliban, se vince Abdullah perdono i pashtun (l'etnia più numerosa), se si va al ballottaggio si allunga l'agonia per tutti. Ma per questa terra è ormai un leit motiv quello di non avere vincitori, soprattutto tra i civili. (3)

L'élection présidentielle en Afghanistan ne suffira pas à faire de ce pays une démocratie au sens où nous l'entendons. Elle ne marquera pas la défaite des talibans. La précarité de la situation militaire et les erreurs du gouvernement Karzaï rendent le scrutin et ses suites très périlleux. Malgré tout cela, le vote d'hier est crucial parce qu'il représente un moment-clé dans le combat qui est mené en Afghanistan contre l'obscurantisme.

Les talibans ne s'y trompent pas. Ils ont jugé l'enjeu suffisamment grave pour jeter leurs forces dans la bataille. Leurs menaces de couper les doigts, marqués à l'encre indélébile, des électeurs, avaient de quoi en dissuader plus d'un. Elles ont contribué, sans aucun doute, à baisser le taux de participation.

Malgré cela, la journée d'hier a montré qu'une élection, plus sérieusement disputée que prévu, pouvait avoir lieu dans un pays où l'on dit souvent que l'insurrection dicte sa loi et que l'insécurité s'aggrave, après huit ans de présence des forces occidentales.

Pour la nouvelle stratégie américaine cette élection est un test majeur parce qu'elle arrive au moment-même où les Etats-Unis ont compris qu'ils ne disposeront jamais d'assez de troupes pour vaincre militairement, mais, qu'il leur faut remporter, avant tout, une victoire politique en jetant les fondements d'un Etat moderne dans un pays qui n'a connu que la guerre depuis trente ans.

Nous en sommes très loin. C'est la raison de tous les périls. Et le plus grave serait de croire que le vote peut, en lui-même, résoudre tous les problèmes, ou bien, au contraire, que ses imperfections nous condamnent à l'échec.

Quel que soit le prochain président afghan, qu'il s'agisse à nouveau d'Ahmed Karzai ou d'un autre, les problèmes de la corruption, du clientélisme, du trafic d'opium, resteront entiers. Il faudra s'y atteler avec bien plus de conviction que cela n'a été le cas jusqu'ici.

Si le scrutin est si important, c'est parce qu'il peut donner une légitimité aux institutions gouvernementales, seule garantie de stabilité politique et d'efficacité administrative. Sans cela qui empêchera al-Qaida et les talibans de recruter ? La participation semble avoir été décevante. A-t-elle été suffisante pour assurer cette légitimité ? Pour en juger, il ne faut pas minimiser le risque pris en organisant le scrutin en pleine insurrection. Qu'il ait pu avoir lieu sans incident majeur est déjà, en soi, un succès.

Dans l'attente des résultats et dans l'hypothèse où un second tour serait nécessaire, la période qui s'ouvre est lourde de menaces. Il ne faudrait pas que s'installe un vide du pouvoir propice à toutes sortes de rumeurs, de contestations et d'incertitudes, dont les talibans seraient les seuls bénéficiaires. L'ennemi n'est pas sur le point d'entrer dans Kaboul, mais, tapi dans l'ombre, il attend que sonne l'échec de l'effort entrepris pour faire de l'Afghanistan un Etat viable. Les prochaines semaines seront décisives.

Autore: Pierre Rousselin

Fonte: http://blog.lefigaro.fr/

Karzai, the Pashtuns, and the Taliban

Wirepullers: pochi giorni fa si è votato in Afghanistan e la cosa di per sé è già un piccolo risultato. Ce lo ha ricordato lo stesso presidente Karzai, definendo questo voto un successo. Basta non pensare a tutti i morti che ci sono stati per arrivarci. Adesso aspettiamo l'esito, consapevoli che il sangue tornerà a scorrere anche una volta che avremo la nuova guida afghana, dato che non è un voto a risolvere i problemi dell'Afghanistan. Il motivo è semplice: già si parla di brogli (e a ragion veduta probabilmente), mentre le divisioni tra etnie e tribù che vivono nel paese, sulle quali si innerva quella tra filo-taliban e anti-taliban, rendono questo paese di 650.000km² una vera e propria polveriera, sulla quale la politica internazionale gioca a scacchi. Se vince Karzai perdono i taliban, se vince Abdullah perdono i pashtun (l'etnia più numerosa), se si va al ballottaggio si allunga l'agonia per tutti. Ma per questa terra è ormai un leit motiv quello di non avere vincitori, soprattutto tra i civili. (2)

The prospects for Afghanistan's election on Thursday are murky, at best.

The Taliban are threatening to disrupt the vote in areas south and east of Kabul, where they are strong, and say that they will take reprisals against anyone who votes. "Afghans must boycott the deceitful American project and head for the trenches of holy war," said a communique from the Taliban. The Taliban, which is overwhelmingly Pashtun, is apparently counting on its ability to persuade or intimidate Pashtuns to stay away from the polls, which could doom or weaken Karzai. An excellent analysis in the New York Times by Dexter Filkins notes that the Pashtun vote is critical to Karzai's chances on Thursday:

"Five years ago, Mr. Karzai rode to an election victory on a wave of support from his fellow Pashtuns, who make up about 40 percent of Afghanistan's population."

Karzai, who is himself a Pashtun from Kandahar, the Taliban's stronghold, is working hard to get Pashtuns to the polls. Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president's brother and the wily head of the Kandahar provincial council, told Al Jazeera in an interview: "Pashtun votes are extremely important, because Pashtuns are the majority in Afghanistan. I don't think, without the Pashtun votes, no one can win."

But are the Taliban truly opposed to the election? It isn't clear. According to Amrullah Saleh, Afghanistan's intelligence chief, deals have been made with Taliban commanders in "lots of provinces," the Times says, to allow the vote to proceed -- and, presumably, with Taliban-leaning and Taliban-influenced Pashtuns voting for Karzai. Saleh says that this "diplomatic effort" and "softer approach" allows the Karzai regime to appeal to the Taliban's low-level commanders and sympathizers without using violence, and he said that the accords that have been struck "show that cohesion in the command of the Taliban is broken."

Hard to tell if that's true or, on the contrary, if the Taliban can muster the cohesion to oppose the elections in the 45 percent of the country they're said to control. Personally, I have no idea. In a brilliant op-ed today, "Afghanistan's Tyranny of the Minority," Selig Harrison points out that Afghanistan's Pashtun majority is extremely unhappy with the Karzai administration because -- despite the fact that Karzai is a Pashtun -- it is dominated by non-Pashtun ethnic minorities, especially Tajiks, who control the armed forces, the intelligence service, counter-narcotics forces, and more. It's the remnants of the old Northern Alliance that control Afghanistan, Harrison reminds us, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and other minorities who hated the Taliban's rule during the 1990s through 2001. (The NA, you'll recall, was supported by Russia, India, and Iran, while Pakistan's ISI supported the Taliban.)

Karzai may be trying to appeal to the Pashtuns, but he's not helping his case by showering favor on thuggish, anti-Taliban warlords. His Tajik running mate, a former defense minister named Mohammad Fahim, is intensely disliked by Pashtuns. And yesterday he allowed the violence-prone Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord, to return from exile in Turkey; in 2001, Dostum was responsible for the murders of hundreds of Taliban prisoners in northern Afghanistan. By positioning himself so closely to Fahim and Dostum, Karzai is blatantly appealing for the non-Pashtun minority votes from Kabul and the northern half of the country. It's ugly ethnic politics at its worst.

Yesterday, in the only campaign debate in which Karzai took part, he took the occasion to reiterate his calls for negotiation with the Taliban, a position that seems to reflect Amrullah Saleh's comments. And Karzai, despite his Tajik and Uzbek allies, has consistently called for talks with the top Taliban leadership, not just its mid-ranking commanders and tribal leaders. Despite such calls, however, it's hard to pull off while Karzai (a) remains in thrall to the Northern Alliance and (b) seems prisoner of the US counterinsurgency effort. In the debate, Karzai said: "Afghanistan ... was totally lost. I saved it."

That, at least, is an exaggeration.

Autore: Robert Dreyfuss

Fonte: www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss

We insult Afghans by calling their election a real success

Wirepullers: pochi giorni fa si è votato in Afghanistan e la cosa di per sé è già un piccolo risultato. Ce lo ha ricordato lo stesso presidente Karzai, definendo questo voto un successo. Basta non pensare a tutti i morti che ci sono stati per arrivarci. Adesso aspettiamo l'esito, consapevoli che il sangue tornerà a scorrere anche una volta che avremo la nuova guida afghana, dato che non è un voto a risolvere i problemi dell'Afghanistan. Il motivo è semplice: già si parla di brogli (e a ragion veduta probabilmente), mentre le divisioni tra etnie e tribù che vivono nel paese, sulle quali si innerva quella tra filo-taliban e anti-taliban, rendono questo paese di 650.000km² una vera e propria polveriera, sulla quale la politica internazionale gioca a scacchi. Se vince Karzai perdono i taliban, se vince Abdullah perdono i pashtun (l'etnia più numerosa), se si va al ballottaggio si allunga l'agonia per tutti. Ma per questa terra è ormai un leit motiv quello di non avere vincitori, soprattutto tra i civili. (1)

The west's rose-tinted view of the events in Afghanistan on polling day threatens to undermine the democratic process and alienate locals

In the excitement of Afghanistan's elections last Thursday, there was a moment of clarity for me. At lunchtime, the news came that the UN was declaring the day a success. "I am pleased," said Kai Eide, the UN's secretary-general's special representative here. "In general, it seems to be working well." This was despite the fact that in Kabul alone there had been seven bomb attacks, two gun battles, the first allegations of fraud and a city-wide scandal about the so-called indelible ink used to ensure no one could double vote. And there were still four hours of voting to go.

It became clear to me that whatever the outcome, whatever events unfolded, the UN, the EU, the US, the west in general, would declare the day an unmitigated success. The fact that reports were only just filtering in from the rest of the country, rockets were falling across the south and turnout was incredibly low clearly meant nothing to those in their bulletproof, dark-glass fortresses.

This is insulting to Afghans and incredibly short-sighted. In their desperation to report a success to their superiors, the Afghan UN mission is undermining the fragile checks and balances that so need their support. It is undermining the process of democracy itself, adding to the perception that we are propping up a corrupt and ineffective government in Kabul and threatening to alienate huge numbers of Afghan voters for the future.

There is huge unemployment here and an extraordinary demographic; 60% are under 21 and "next time" many more of those will be of voting age. If those kids do not feel part of the system, or feel that the system is irrelevant to them, who knows where they will turn. If we are truly looking for a stable Afghanistan, then we should be seeking that for 10 years' time, not just on election day. And really, we should be able to make sure the ink is indelible.

It is in no way melodramatic to say that many, many Afghans risked their lives to engage in this election, to take part in the process. People such as Feroza, a young women volunteering for the IEC (Independent Election Commission) Public Outreach. In the build-up to Thursday, she handed out visually explanatory leaflets, put up posters and persuaded people on the street to vote. "Your vote is your destiny," she told people, "it is a gift you cannot ignore." With 80% illiteracy, such work is vital if people are to understand the process. Feroza was terribly upset if someone threw away her leaflet and I saw her arguing passionately on the street: "Afghanistan has to vote," she said with tears in her eyes.

People, too, such as Ali Farhad, the 25-year-old in charge of President Hamid Karzai's main rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah's international press campaign. He juggled 150 international news organisations, learning on the job that the Wall Street Journal was not some small-town old rag. Furious with the corruption he sees within the government, he is dedicated to Dr Abdullah and desperate for change for his people. One of the few that accompanied the doctor on his rallies, he travelled across the country to increasingly dangerous areas to seek out voters. On his last trip – by car to Ghazni on a dreadfully dangerous road – every foreign journalist bailed out. The risk of Taliban attack was just too much.

Add to that the brilliant local journalists who covered every story, debated every policy and analysed every point, despite the possible dangers (on election day, Tolo TV people were quietly afraid they would be closed down) and the voters who did defy the Taliban to cast their ballot on the day and you have a seriously impressive electorate, one that surely deserves a transparent, free and fair election. We in the west are investing billions into Afghanistan; shouldn't we be supporting them rather than the "state"?

By now, 11 IEC officials have been "martyred" and two of Dr Abdullah's campaign team have been murdered. While the actual casualties of Taliban violence on the day were lower than expected (26 at last count), psychological intimidation was a contributing factor to the low voter turn-out, estimated to be around 30% in Kabul, 40% across the country. But voter apathy and disillusionment with the democratic government "we" support were just as important. It's a big change from the approximately 70% seen in the 2004 election.

A family we have filmed with summed it up. There are two daughters of voting age – one decided excitedly she must vote and the other refused to get a card. "This is a just a drama for you people in the west. Karzai will win and there will be no change." she said. In the end, neither of them voted; a gun battle erupted outside their house.

The buzz "question" of this election among the international community is just how much fraud is acceptable. Everyone knows there will be some, everyone wants the process to work, but can the bar keep rising? The argument from the EU, for example, is that this is a young democracy. It takes people time to learn the system, for candidates to stand for policies, for people to feel safe enough to vote independently; it will be better next time. And in a war zone, there will obviously be areas (10% in the end) where it was just too dangerous to open polling stations. But that does not mean you can just gloss over the problems. It doesn't mean you can just not mention them.

Which brings me to the ink. While not as cynical as ballot-box stuffing (which has also been reported), dipping one's finger into the indelible ink was heralded as the ultimate way to stop double voting. When it became apparent last week that the problems of voter registration cards was so big (an estimated 3 million fakes are in circulation), Kai Eide went on TV –widely on the Afghan news – and stated that the ink would save the day.

By 9am on Thursday, young men were bleaching their fingers and voting twice. We filmed a cafe full of young men laughing and deciding who they would vote for the second time. "I'm voting for Karzai because of General Dostum," said one, referring to the Uzbek warlord who had aligned himself with the president, "and Abdullah because he wears great clothes."

Afghans are not naive. They expect bombs and they expect scandal. The ink debacle isn't enough to cancel the election. But it provoked real anger on the streets, fury from young men who had made an effort to take part.

All is not lost. There is a very high chance the election could go to a second round. If that does happen then the west must be seen to care about the system, not just who they can deal with as president. The UN/EU etc must not send out press releases declaring it a success to the international media before anyone has a moment to breathe and certainly not before they have spoken to Fefa, the Afghan body set up to check for a free and fair election. Fefa have announced that they have serious concerns about the process – they did, indeed, before election day and had a list of recommendations of things that needed to be improved. Did anyone listen to them? Is anyone listening to them now?

This is a complicated, fragile and intriguing time. Many Afghans are dealing with it with intelligence, with analysis and with realistic expectations. We should too.

Autore: Havana Marking

Fonte: http://www.guardian.co.uk

videocarta: la crisi AfPak tra Usa e Iran

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. La videomappa di limes. (4)

La guerra in Afghanistan diventa prioritaria per il presidente Obama. Ma il problema principale è impedire il collasso del Pakistan nucleare.

Più dell'Iran Obama teme il Pakistan e il rischio che i terroristi islamici mettano le mani sul nucleare pakistano.

Lo scenario afghano-pakistano che i generali Usa hanno illustrato al presidente è più che allarmante. Se la tendenza non venisse invertita, gli Stati Uniti rischierebbero di perdere la guerra in Afghanistan e, peggio, il controllo del Pakistan.

Obama ha dunque ridefinito l’obiettivo della guerra: sconfiggere la galassia jihadista in Pakistan e Afghanistan più che l’insurrezione talibano-pashtun.

E' dal Pakistan, inventore dei taliban che nasce il caos afghano. Frutto dell’insanabile rivalità con l’India, per cui Islamabad concepisce l’Afghanistan in chiave di “profondità strategica”: un retroterra contro un attacco indiano.

Il nucleo centrale delle crisi va dalla frontiera irano-afghano-pakistana fino al Kashmir conteso e ritorno. Qui la minaccia più grave per Obama sono il Punjab e il Balucistan.

Negli ultimi due anni la pressione jihadista dalle aree tribali e dalla Provincia del Nord-Ovest si è rivolta verso il Punjab, il cuore pulsante del Paese, quartier generale delle forze armate e dei centri nucleari più importanti. La cooperazione tra militari e jihadisti in Pakistan sembra finita.

L'altra area strategica è il Balucistan, a cavallo di Pakistan e Iran, dove sono presenti movimenti separatisti e jihadisti, dediti a ogni tipo di traffico. Di qui dovrebbe poi passare l’importante gasdotto Iran-Pakistan - estendibile all’India e forse alla Cina.

Per Teheran gli attentati nella parte iraniana non sono solo opera dei movimenti separatisti ma un'aggressione di Pakistan, Stati Uniti e Israele e minaccia di marciare contro Islamabad.Tratto dal volume di Limes 4/2009 "La rivolta d'Iran nella sfida Obama-Israele

Autori: Alfonso Desiderio - carte di Laura Canali

Fonte: www.limesonline.it

Our Man in Afghanistan

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. Vediamo un ritratto di Richard Holbrooke, inviato speciale dell'amministrazione Obama per l'Afghanistan e il Pakistan. (3)

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is a man in a hurry, working in a land that can seem to defy time. His mission, as special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is to achieve some measure of success in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to prevent a nuclear-armed country from collapsing. He feels that he's under pressure to achieve something positive by next summer. If he can't, he says, political support in the United States will slip away. The question is whether Holbrooke's relentlessness—his sheer force of -personality—will make a real difference in countries that can seem immune to progress.

"Impatience will not solve this problem," says journalist Ahmed Rashid, who has written three respected books on the region. "And Holbrooke is an impatient guy." At least one Pakistani official has felt that firsthand. "He'll call you up, and after two minutes he'll say, 'I've got to go, I've got to go,' " recalls the official, who did not want to be named discussing personal interactions. "He's always got nine other things he's working on at the same time, texting people in the middle of a conversation." One of Holbrooke's close advisers, speaking in confidence about his boss, doesn't disagree: "Yes, he does kick Pakistan's ass, and they don't like it." Holbrooke's particular head-knocking skills may not be perfectly cast for this job, the hardest of his life. On the other hand, who else has the right mixture of grandiosity and smarts to even try?

Holbrooke doesn't look anything like an ornately costumed diplomat as he pads, barefoot, around his government jet, wearing yellow pj's, and eating a banana. Still, in some ways, he is a throwback to the old days of the ambassador plenipotentiary—the type of envoy whose word was imperial writ in far-flung places. True, Holbrooke is encumbered by a ubiquitous, buzzing cell phone and required to work with about eight different government agencies (State, Defense, Treasury, CIA, FBI, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and USAID). But he has a way of making everyone work for him. Last week The New York Times reported that the Defense Department had a plan to reform Afghanistan's prisons. The idea (as Holbrooke is not shy about admitting) came from him. Holbrooke had been appalled to discover that jihadists were allowed to keep their cell phones in the local jails. Upon taking his assignment last winter, Holbrooke decided that eradicating poppy crops in Afghanistan to stop the opium trade was futile and only hurt poor farmers. It was only a matter of time before USAID, intelligence, and the military changed their strategy to target only big-time opium dealers.

Holbrooke has been studying great envoys "all my life," he says. In high school, he wrote a paper on Lord Kitchener, the much-beribboned proconsul sent to Sudan by Victorian Britain. "He was a pompous windbag," jokes Holbrooke. At 21, fresh out of Brown, Holbrooke joined the Foreign Service. This was 1962, during the "twilight struggle" of the Cold War, when American hubris was peaking. As a young State Department officer in the Mekong Delta, Holbrooke encountered the CIA's Col. Edward Lansdale—the model for Colonel Hillandale in the novel The Ugly American. He says today we would describe Lansdale as "sort of a successful con man."

Holbrooke learned from watching failure. He notes that one of his heroes and role models, Ambassador Averell Harriman, whom Holbrooke admiringly describes as "tenacious," failed to get a peace treaty with the North Vietnamese. He dislikes Vietnam analogies to Afghanistan but keeps coming back to them in conversation. Choosing his words carefully, he says, "I don't feel burned by Vietnam. I feel informed by it."

The clearest lesson Holbrooke took from Vietnam is that military success is useless without winning the hearts and minds of the population. He is obsessed with the problem of civilian casualties in Afghanistan—it is "the big issue," he says, "which could cost us the war." Of the hour and a half he recently spent with Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new ground commander, most of the time was consumed by Holbrooke hammering away at "civ cas," as Holbrooke calls them, using the military acronym. (An Air Force general who declined to be identified says that McChrystal was sensitive to the issue before he talked to Holbrooke.)

Holbrooke still has a bit of New Frontier swagger, and he loves the aura of power and glamour. The late columnist Joseph Alsop, an arch-hawk on Vietnam, once described Holbrooke as one of the "Young Lords of the Delta." Holbrooke's friend and fellow Young Lord, Frank Wisner Jr., introduced Holbrooke to the fancy dinner parties of his mother, Polly. A middle-class suburban kid from Scarsdale, N.Y., Holbrooke still sounds like a boy with his nose pressed against the window when he describes his first dinner party at the Wisners'. "I sat next to Teddy Roosevelt's daughter!" he exclaims. Years later, as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Holbrooke and his wife began running elegant salons for movers and shakers, showbiz types, and the occasional journalist. Generally speaking off the record, Holbrooke is unusually open with journalists, whom he alternately scolds and shamelessly flatters.

Officials in Pakistan were at first wary of Holbrooke, reports NEWSWEEK's correspondent in Islamabad, Ron Moreau. The new special representative was an admitted neophyte in the region, and his reputation for heavy arm-twisting preceded him. But the Pakistani officials interviewed by Moreau give him high marks for persuading Congress to provide billions in aid, and they say he has been deft at engaging Nawaz Sharif, the popular opposition leader. The Bush administration had treated Sharif as a dangerous Islamist and did not deal with him. As we flew into Islamabad last week, Holbrooke called Sharif by phone to schmooze—but then he was careful to make sure that President Asif Ali Zardari knew that he had placed the call. "I don't go behind Zardari's back," he says.

In March, a million people had filled the streets in Pakistan, as Sharif and Zardari squared off in a power struggle. For a tense moment, it seemed likely that the military would take over the government. But Holbrooke, furiously working the phones, mobilized President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen to lean on the Pakistani leadership to step back from the brink.

Since then, an uneasy truce has prevailed. When we arrived in Islamabad, the streets had been cleared so Holbrooke's armored convoy could career between government offices. Meeting with Pakistan's hostile, conspiracy-minded press, he was firm without getting sucked into debate (he may have learned a lesson from an earlier trip, when he made headlines by chastising a Pakistani news network for -anti--American reports). At another gathering with a group of Pakistanis who had been driven from their homes by the Taliban, he was polite, patient, even gentle with a 12-year-old girl whose school had been destroyed.

That evening, on the ride to have dinner with Zardari, I asked Holbrooke if he was patient enough for the job. "It isn't me that's impatient," he replied. "It's Congress. They want results." At the president's house, Holbrooke, who is 6 feet 2, gave the dapper, coiffed Zardari a big bearhug. "Every time I see you, things are a little better," said Holbrooke. Zar-dari beamed. "It's the karma. You send good stars to us," he said. I asked Zardari if he agreed that things were better, and he launched into a speech that Pakistan needed a $50 billion Marshall Plan. Holbrooke interjected that he agreed, but didn't think the United States should have to pay for it.

When Holbrooke was negotiating with Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic to end the Balkan war in the mid-'90s, he earned his nickname, "the Bulldozer," by threatening to bomb Serbia if Milosevic did not come to the bargaining table. Now he's pushing the Pakistanis to expand military pressure on the Taliban. But Holbrooke's bluster is largely gone. "You have to suit your method to the moment, and your style to the situation," he says. Holbrooke "feels the pressure" to succeed in "AfPak," as he calls the region. But he doesn't seem all that burdened. His staffers say they've heard the stories of his bullying but that he never tries that with them. "He's the easiest man I've ever worked with," says his chief of staff, Rosemarie Pauli, who has been with Holbrooke off and on for more than 15 years. (She laughs as she says this.)

"This is my last job in government," says Holbrooke, who is 68. Maybe, but Holbrooke, who doesn't hide his disappointment that he was never appointed secretary of state, doesn't seem like the retiring type. In David Halberstam's Vietnam chronicle, an anonymous government official is quoted as saying that Averell Harriman is "the only ambitious seventy-seven-year-old I've ever met." Holbrooke told me he was the anonymous source. In about 10 years, that's probably what they'll be saying about him.

Autore: Michael Hirsh

Fonte: www.newsweek.com

America’s new-old military thinking

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. (2)

From Somalia to Iraq, Afghanistan to Lebanon, an emerging global landscape of variable security threats is provoking United States military analysts into an intense process of reflection.

The centre of the wars that the western powers, principally the United States and Britain, are involved in has moved east. Afghanistan, where the "war on terror" was launched in October 2001, has replaced Iraq as the site of their principal military effort. But as the campaign there becomes increasingly mired in difficult local terrain, a larger effort is being made to use this shift in the major theatre of war to think about the fundamental purposes of what these powers are engaged in.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001Bradford's peace-studies department now broadcasts regular podcasts on its work, including a regular commentary from Paul Rogers on international-security issues. Listen/watch here

What are the wars and local insurgencies the United States and Britain are seeking to win, manage or contain now about? How are the different "small" conflicts around the world related to each other? How do military analysts now understand the current security threats faced by western states? Such questions shadow the increasingly fraught atmospherics of the anti-Taliban effort in Afghanistan.

The Afghan dilemma
A tough summer campaign by British forces in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand is incurring almost daily casualties that are widely reported by the media. There is a fairly even split of public opinion between those supporting and those opposing a continued presence in the country; while overall backing for the troops is often accompanied by doubts over their mission and military strategy. What is most striking about mid-2009 is that these doubts and concerns have been voiced by senior military and political figures (see "Afghanistan's lost decade", 16 July 2009).

The British government has been on the defensive in a controversy over equipment limitations. This itself can become a diversion from the reality on the ground, namely the unexpectedly strong resistance that the Taliban and other paramilitaries are offering in Helmand. Moreover, in many ways the experience of the British troops is little different to that of the other national contingents (Canadian, Dutch or American) that have been heavily involved in direct combat. All forces in southern Afghanistan have been struggling with the same problem: how to bring in larger numbers of heavily armoured vehicles and helicopters, as they face paramilitaries adept at disrupting road patrols.

A view that has quickly acquired the status of an orthodoxy is that the answer is "more helicopters". This too is misleading, on two counts. The first is that any enduring presence by western forces, intended as a medium-term prelude to a handover to a rebuilt Afghan national army, requires numerous small units entrenched in towns across the province and able to conduct frequent foot-patrols. This presence cannot be provided by helicopters, and even robust armoured road vehicles have limited relevance.

The second point is that any greater reliance on helicopters will be met by paramilitary attempts to acquire shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. It was the introduction of these weapons that inflicted so much damage on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, even arguably creating a military turning-point in the war. They could once again become a major threat.

Turn, and turn again
A wider view of the evolving conflict entails recognition that the war in Afghanistan is closely linked both with what has happened in Iraq and current developments in Somalia. The impact of the "insurgency knowledge" gained by paramilitaries in Iraq is clear enough, as is its translation into both countries. What has happened is that Iraq has been a six-year combat-training zone for young paramilitaries from across the middle east and north Africa, a process that will have an enduring impact (see "Iraq's gift to Afghanistan", 20 November 2008).

In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click herePaul Rogers's books include Why We're Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm is needed. A third edition of his Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 2009) is forthcoming
These trends are part of a more general change in military circumstances, as a worldwide security environment emerges that is markedly different to what was anticipated as recently as 2000. This evolving environment is provoking intense rethinking within the US armed forces - though to some extent what they are engaged is less new thinking than a recovery of ideas that were common currency in the 1990s but receded to the background when George W Bush came to power in January 2001.

For example, a notion that was common in the US navy in the early 1990s was that its post-cold-war function would be to "keep the violent peace" and protect US interests across the world (see Paul Rogers & Malcolm Dando, A Violent Peace: Global Security After the Cold War[Brasseys, 1992]). A more colourful way of expressing the same point was used in 1993 by Bill Clinton's first CIA director James Woolsey, when he said that the United States had slain the dragon (the Soviet Union) but now lived in a jungle full of poisonous snakes.

This perspective was embodied in the mid-1990s in an emphasis on special forces and amphibious-warfare capabilities, but their moment passed when the Bush administration's neo-conservative agenda revealed itself to have other priorities. The idea of "taming the jungle" was essentially defensive; now, in 2001, a much more aggressive and proactive project - creating the "new American century", in which global security is guaranteed by a single, unrivalled superpower - came to the forefront.

This worldview regarded 9/11 with utter shock and dismay. It reacted with fury and the appearance of certitude, and prepared its military for what was intended to be a definitive and awesome demonstration of unchallengeable military might. But the outcomes of this policy choice - two bitter and lengthy wars, the risk of deep instability in Pakistan, and the continuing risk of al-Qaida attacks - only deepened its predicament and exposed its inner fragility.

The response has been a bout of serious reflection within the US military as to its future direction. The debates that are occurring are made even more sombre by the spreading acknowledgment that the routinely huge increases in military budgets under the Bush administration cannot be maintained in an era of more constrained American power (see "The costs of America's long war", 8 March 2007).

The militant mix
A conventional digest of these debates sees them in terms of two broad views: arguing that the United States's main military emphasis should either be on preparation for counterinsurgency campaigns, or on conventional wars (most likely involving Iran, or in the longer term China or a renewed Russia).

A recent study concludes that this is too much of a simplification (see Frank G Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict", Strategic Forum, April 2009 [Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington]).

Frank G Hoffman identifies four, rather than two, schools of thought:

* Counterinsurgents - who focus heavily on irregular forces as the main threat

* Traditionalists - who are concerned very much with conventional warfare

* Utility infielders - who say the answer is to create forces that are sufficiently agile and well-trained to handle any threat

* Division-of-labour people - who want forces divided into different categories to meet the different threats.

These varied currents tend to be complicated by inter-service rivalry, with the army and the marines emphasising counterinsurgency and the air force and navy much more geared to conventional war. These divisions are not absolute, and there is certainly some overlap; but they still run deep. They are also accentuated by the sheer costs and timescales involved in expensive projects such as aircraft-carriers and new strike-aircraft, as well as the need for senior officers to protect their own careers.

There is nonetheless a sense in which military analysts are going beyond these institutional limitations to focus on what are increasingly being termed "hybrid threats". This approach recognises that in the reasonably near future the the United States and its allies will face opponents - non-state movements, and possibly states - that according to circumstances employ a combination of guerrilla tactics and conventional war. These opponents may be all the more challenging in their versatile capacity to recognise the overwhelming conventional military power available to the United States and its allies without being in any way cowed by it.

Thus, Hizbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 used a complex mix of strategies - ranging from sophisticated anti-ship missiles acquired from Iran to guerrilla tactics close to the Israeli border. In Iraq, the conventional forces of the special republican guard (SRG) military units were the backbone of the military units that initially fought the US after 2003. These rapidly evolved into effective guerrilla forces; in turn, they attracted young paramilitaries from across the region, and the tactics and weapons developed in Iraq have since turned up in other war-zones.

Frank G Hoffman cites intelligence sources suggesting that several middle-eastern states, most likely including Iran and Syria, are purposely developing irregular units on a substantial scale while retaining conventional forces. The latter may have a defensive function; they may be no match for the US military, but could combine with irregular warfare in any future confrontation to create real damage.

Hoffman concludes that the United States:
"must maintain the ability to wage successful campaigns against both large, conventionally armed states and their militaries and against widely dispersed terrorists - and against everything in between. We must be smart about our force posture and lean towards agile, rigorously multipurpose forces capable of being adaptive in approach to the unique conditions each conflict poses."

The far horizon
In its own way, such thinking is typical of the intelligent analysis being conducted in some of the United States's military-research centres. It is all a long way from the immediacy of Washington's politics, and all the more interesting for that. But it also remains limited by a basic premise: that the world is a jungle and that jungle has to be tamed.

This analysis thus says very little about the underlying causes of conflict; and still less about why states and sub-state groups may be antagonistic to US interests in particular and western power in general. Moreover, it shows no recognition of any wider understanding of security, one that could raise awareness of the need to address two major global issues: the widening socio-economic divide and the likely impact of climate change (see "A tale of two paradigms", 25 June 2009).

But it does at least recognise what the eight years since 9/11 have made unavoidably clear: that the world is changing. The best military analysts have the habit of thinking long term. It is as good a reason as any for engaging with them on these much wider and more fundamental security issues.

Autore: Paul Rogers

Fonte: www.opendemocracy.net

We should not be afraid to talk to the Taliban

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. (1)

Is it credible to expect elements within the Afghan Taliban to beat their weapons into ploughshares? David Miliband certainly believes so. The Foreign Secretary gave a speech at Nato headquarters in Brussels yesterday urging Afghanistan's leaders to reach out to more moderate Taliban insurgents. This echoes sentiments expressed earlier this year by Barack Obama and his top general, David Petraeus, suggesting that there is scope for offering an amnesty to less committed fighters if it helps to end the insurgency.

Taking the fight to the militants of Afghanistan while simultaneously offering truce terms appears contradictory, but it makes sense given the incoherent nature of the Taliban. The insurgents are not a solid bloc, but rather a motley mixture of hardcore Islamists, mercenaries, drug traffickers and others who fight the Afghan government in the belief that the Taliban will ultimately prevail.

It is sensible to attempt to split off the moderates from the hardcore elements with offers of amnesty and incorporation into Afghanistan's conventional security forces. Indeed, it seems that Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul is already cutting such deals. Yesterday it announced the signing of a truce with insurgents in Badghis province in the north-west of the country.
Yet such overtures remain politically sensitive. Two Western diplomats (one working for the United Nations, the other for the European Union) were expelled by the Karzai government in late 2007 for engaging in informal contacts with the Taliban. There is a danger that Western governments, in pushing for engagement, will make Karzai look like a puppet ruler. Such a perception would be the kiss of death, not only for President Karzai, but also Western hopes of stabilising Afghanistan.

There is no shortage of reasons to dislike the Karzai regime. In recent years it has proven itself corrupt, incompetent and soft on human rights abuses. President Karzai has made one brutal Tajik warlord, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, his running mate for next month's elections. But if Nato is to have any chance of convincing ordinary Afghans that it is working in their interests, rather than its own, it has no alternative but to work with Karzai's administration. Any initiative to talk with insurgents must be seen to come from Kabul.

This flurry of peacemaking gestures comes as the first stage of the Afghan "surge" comes to a close. The British Army announced an end to Operation Panther's Claw yesterday, with claims that a sizeable area of northern Helmand province has been cleared of militants. This has come at a price. Twenty British soldiers have been killed this month. And, as our poll shows today, that has damaged British public confidence in the Afghan mission. But we ought not to overlook the fact that Afghan civilian casualties have also risen drastically in recent weeks as the Taliban has increased its attacks to destabilise the country. Protecting those civilians is still a worthy and honourable mission. And while the Taliban remains unpopular it is still a feasible one.

Success will depend on political resolve – and leadership. There was a somewhat worrying tone in Gordon Brown's comments yesterday. The Prime Minister seemed to be suggesting that the worst is now over. This idea is a dangerous delusion. The truth is that the project of stabilising Afghanistan is only beginning. And we need our leaders to be clear-eyed and open about the sacrifices to come.

Fonte: www.independent.co.uk

Afghanistan: troppe potenze per un paese

Wirepullers: nel pieno della crisi finanziaria mondiale crescono le spese militari americane, proseguendo un trend iniziato dopo l'11 settembre. In Medio Oriente la guerra si fa sempre più sofisticata e internazionale, nuovi soggetti molto ben addestrati fanno la loro comparsa sul campo di battaglia e mentre le nostre truppe in Afghanistan sono sempre più sotto pressione, il teatro di guerra sembra diventare sempre più vasto. (2)

Si combatte nella zona sotto responsabilità italiana in Afghanistan. I taliban cercano di prendere il controllo del ring, la strada circolare che collega le principali città. Troppi grandi attori internazionali giocano la partita afghana. Il Cuneo degli Stan.

Siamo a giugno, il pieno della stagione di guerra ed è chiaro che, in attesa di un picco di schieramenti statunitensi, tutti gli attori del micidiale circo afghano cercano di prendere le posizioni migliori in vista delle elezioni d’agosto.

Il fatto che le truppe italiane siano maggiormente nel mirino non può sorprendere: da un lato la pressione dei gruppi ribelli si estende, dall’altro non bastano le reti di buone relazioni per difendere la neutralità e la collaborazione dei capi tradizionali se vengono minacciati da bande armate e forse dall’altro ancora si sente da Roma una maggiore urgenza a dimostrare il peso del contributo italiano per tacitare sterili polemiche tra chi è impegnato nella caccia aggressiva ai gruppi d’insorti e chi invece tutela la solidità delle retrovie.

Da poco è stato costituito un raggruppamento politico-militare all’interno di ISAF che mette insieme le forze effettivamente impegnate a Sud (Australia, Canada, Danimarca, Estonia, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Regno Unito e Stati Uniti) e che si coordina a parte e prima delle riunioni ISAF. È facile capire come questi paesi non sempre possano comprendere che non esiste una prima linea d’attacco, se le retrovie non sono efficacemente protette dalle infiltrazioni.

Ciò comunque, se esprime efficacemente la frustrazione di questi otto paesi, non può bastare a risolvere il problema di fondo: dal 2005 al 2009 le aree ad alto rischio sono cresciute del 30-50% annuo. Si tratta di un deterioramento costante e sinora senza appello.

Il risultato è che, secondo le stime dell’ICOS (International Council On Security and development), il 72% del territorio vede una pesante presenza talebana, il 21% con una notevole presenza e solo il 7% con una presenza leggera. Forse è utile aggiungere che la zona italiana tra Herat e Farah è fortemente infiltrata dalle forze nemiche.

Dal punto di vista della logistica la via di Peshawar, quella più importante, è sotto continuo attacco e tutta la parte meridionale della Ring Road (l’unica grande strada che collega circolarmente tutto il paese) da Farah a Kandahar a Kabul è resa costantemente insicura dall’attività delle guerriglie.

La prossima mossa delle opposizioni armate sarà di risalire costantemente la Ring Road da Farah ad Herat in modo da strangolare un altro importante nodo logistico. In questo modo l’insieme delle operazioni ISAF/OEF, non importa quanto riunite di fatto sotto un unico cappello, resterebbe appeso alle due linee logistiche che portano a Mazar-e-Sharif ed a Kunduz, creando una situazione peggiore di quella vissuta dal contingente sovietico più di un quinto di secolo fa.

In effetti, guardando la logistica del paese, ci sia accorge sia della reale portata della scommessa degli USA e degli alleati, sia della complicata partita che si sta giocando e che vede troppi cuochi intorno al calderone afghano.

Ci sono voluti 31 anni dall’invasione sovietica dell’Afghanistan (1978) per capire che il teatro di guerra afghano era inestricabilmente collegato a quello pakistano (2009, creazione del concetto statunitense di AFPAK), ma gli usuali strabismi della visione strategica standardizzata ancora non riescono ad inquadrare la regione in modo funzionalmente organico nemmeno per il più limitato obbiettivo di uscire onorevolmente dalla guerra contro i talebani.

Nemmeno le difficoltà logistiche sperimentate lungo la linea Peshawar-Khyber Pass e dunque la necessità di trovare linee alternative in Asia Centrale, hanno indotto a gettare uno sguardo meno convenzionale: si parla di Northern Route e di basi aeree alternative a quella di Manas (Kyrgyzstan), da cui gli USA sono stati estromessi nel marzo 2009, ma non dei cinque stati che sono parte del problema e della soluzione.

Il Cuneo degli stan si può individuare all’interno del triangolo fra Ust-Kamenogorsk (Oskemen, Kazakhstan), Ural’sk (Oral, Kazakhstan) e Karachi (Pakistan). Esso include da Nord a Sud: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan e Pakistan. Stretto geograficamente fra quattro stati egemoni, più o meno fortemente colpiti dalla crisi globale (Iran, Russia, Cina, India), il Cuneo degli stan non è necessariamente un’area cardinale degl’interessi geostrategici del mondo, ma da otto anni gli è stata conferita una poco invidiabile importanza per quattro contingenze politiche:

1. La nascita del movimento neojihadista a lungo raggio di al-Qa’eda, dopo l’estinzione del movimento jihadista antisovietico con la fine dell’invasione dell’Afghanistan (1978-1989);

2. La competizione nel vicino estero russo centrasiatico tra USA, Cina, India, Iran sull’onda della guerra al terrorismo;

3. La fame di risorse energetiche da parte di vecchi (Europa) e nuovi consumatori (India, Cina);

4. L’esplosione della produzione afghana d’oppio. Invece bisogna concepire questa profonda striscia triangolare come la fragile linea di faglia che subisce la pressione tettonica non solo delle quattro grandi potenze continentali, ma anche degli Stati Uniti come agente di pressione esterna che carica la sua pressione dal mare.

Non è un caso che quel che accomuni il Cuneo degli stan siano forme di governo autoritario (o di democrazia recente e fragile), patrimoniale, corrotto, basato fortemente sull’organizzazione di famiglie ed etnie estese, con profonde infiltrazioni mafiose che dominano i traffici illegali da Karachi a Celyabinsk e Samara, le porte d’accesso ai ricchi mercati al di qua degli Urali.

La minaccia per l’intero cuneo, e dunque anche per il successo eventuale della coalizione a mandato ONU in Afghanistan, è data molto dalla crisi economica globale e dagli effetti che ha su economie e società simultaneamente ingessate e fragili, e meno dal jihadismo regionale o globale.

Con ogni probabilità la crisi dura per tutto il 2010 e forse nel 2012 vi sarà un ciclo di ripresa e quindi i prossimi tre anni sono quelli che decideranno per tutti e sette i paesi del Cuneo degli stan se sopravviveranno o si disintegreranno a differenti velocità. L’Afghanistan sarà il paese più sostenuto, Turkmenistan ed Kazakhstan possono contare sulle risorse energetiche ed il resto è francamente un’incognita.

Intorno, oltre agli Stati Uniti, vi sono gl’interessi di Iran, India, Pakistan, Cina e Russia. Quest’ultima vuole, insieme alla Cina, completare l’espulsione degli USA dall’Asia Centrale e negoziare il libero passaggio dei rifornimenti nel suo vicino estero. La Cina, meno sul nucleare e più sull’incerto futuro del proprio cliente pakistano, è in relativa competizione con l’India, che ha aumentato considerevolmente la propria presenza a Kabul. Ovviamente la presenza indiana crea tensioni nell’élite pakistana, già impegnata nella difficile soluzione del Kashmir, e tutt’altro che intenzionata a perdere quel che considerava un proprio retroterra (strategicamente inutile, ma politicamente conveniente).

Ultimo viene l’Iran, impegnato in un gioco a tutto campo con gli USA e che ha tutto l’interesse ad espandere il più possibile la sua influenza in Afghanistan in modo da negoziare al meglio una pace con il Grande Satana, rinunziando il meno possibile alle proprie carte.

In una situazione del genere Kabul rischia di fare la fine della carcassa di capra contesa da una frotta di cavalieri, un tipico sport locale. Sinora gli Stati Uniti punteranno sul nuovo schieramento di mezzi e uomini per assestare un serio colpo alla guerriglia ed ai terroristi. È l’ora dei cacciatori d’uomini, dei rastrellamenti, degli Jagdkommando e di un serio programma d’“eliminazioni mirate”.

Poi, se le cose dovessero volgere al peggio, Obama sarà pronto a giocare sporco pur di chiudere la causa. Suonerà l’ora dei diplomatici balcanizzanti, il momento di riconoscere l’autodeterminazione dei pashtoon e di liberare Afghanistan e Pakistan del peso di un’altra bieca divisione coloniale europea. Three candles and a prayer..

Autore: Alessandro Politi

Fonte: www.limesonline.it