The Iranian Revolutionary Bazaar

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (4)

The ongoing war in Yemen between its Army and a group of extremist Shiite Zaydis, known as the Huthists, has taken a dangerous turn, with the situation escalating and the number of victims rising at an alarming rate. As the conflict spreads reaching new areas, this "war" is the Huthists' sixth attempt to separate from the current rule in Yemen and establish an Islamic emirate based on the Shiite Zaydi faith.

The clashes mainly center in the areas that are under the Huthists' control, namely in Al-Azqul, Al-Malahiz, Harf Sufyan, Al-Maqash, Wadi Shahwan, Al-Naqah, Damaj, Jabal al-Hafur, and other areas.

The Huthists belong to the founder, Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Some reports say he belonged to the Zaydi faith and converted to the 12-imam Jafarite faith and that he studied in the city of Qom in Iran and demanded his right to the imamate.

Abdul-Malik, son of Badr al-Din, is now leading the war, and he uses a different policy in spreading the Zaydi faith, which has been known for being tolerant and supportive of coexistence. The Zaydi faith in Yemen has always been famous for its ability to absorb diverse groups without hostility.

Currently, there are unequivocal evidences that absolutely clearly show Iran's flagrant and direct involvement in triggering the war in Yemen by explicitly supporting the Huthists with ammunition, weapons, money, and military combat expertise.

This stepped up fighting in Yemen is part of a dexterous plan, prepared by the Qods Force unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, within the "Yaman khosh hal" scheme. "Yamankhosh hal" is a Persian phrase meaning happy Yemen.

This plan was prepared more than a year ago, with direct blessing from Mohammad Jafari, the most important commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. An initial amount of money exceeding $4 million was earmarked for the plan.

Among the most important components of the plan is to train the Huthists' forces on guerrilla warfare, fighting inside cities and in mountainous areas, planting explosive charges, and mobilizing the public. This is in addition to buying tribes' loyalty, opening up to and linking with the ready separatist Southern Mobility Movement in southern Yemen in order to increase the pressure on the central government from all direction while engaging in direct coordination with members of the Al-Qaeda Organization, which has clearly become an obvious tool of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

There are astonishing new facts that are being revealed, most importantly the fact that the Iranian involvement in Yemen began in 2004 under the tempting cover of a humanitarian charity work that began with the large project of building the Iranian Red Crescent Hospital in Sa'dah. The revenues of this hospital went directly to the Huthists.

The ultimate goal of the "Yaman khosh hal" plan is to set up two states. In one state, the imamate rule would return with a pro-Iranian religious regime, led by Al-Huthi. The other state would be under a separate southern rule, headed by a group of political factions that would be directly funded and run by Iran. And, of course, the two states would be a prelude to Iran's entry into the heart of the Horn of Africa.

The aim behind Iran's clandestine activity in Somalia and Kenya, an activity that is being gradually revealed, is to forcefully tighten the control of the navigation route in the Red Sea.
The world was distracted by the Iranian nuclear issue, which turned out to be a fanfare, and was preoccupied with domestic developments in Iran while the Iranian bazaar continues to expand and open destructive branches.

Autore: Hussein Shobokshi

Fonte: www.aawsat.com

Zooming in on the conflict in northern Yemen

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (3)

In mid-August, just prior to the start of Ramadan, the Yemeni government launched an all-out offensive on rebel positions in the northern governorate of Saada. Leaving no doubt as to its intentions, the government dubbed the campaign Operation Scorched Earth. The fighting between the government and the Huthis, as the rebel group is known, has been some of the fiercest since the conflict began in June 2004 when government forces attempted to arrest the founder of the movement, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi.

The conflict has created thousands of internal refugees and has spread to neighboring governorates. Repeated calls for humanitarian aid have been largely ignored by the international community even as many, most notably the United States and the EU, worry that instability in Yemen will allow a resurgent Al-Qaeda the space to plan and launch attacks.

The Huthis subscribe to a sect of Shiite Islam called Zaydism, although the Zaydis in Yemen are traditionally closer to Sunni Islam than they are to the type of Shiite Islam practiced in Iran, and are often referred to as the “fifth school” of Sunni Islam. The government has provided differing rationale for war since the fighting began, but at this point it believes that the existence of an autonomous Zaydi-governed region presents an existential threat to the survival of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. The Zaydis in Saada meanwhile view themselves as a community under attack and in danger of cultural extinction.

Since the 1980s there has been sporadic fighting between Zaydis and Wahhabi-inspired Salafis in the North, with the latter destroying sacred tombs and attempting to convert Zaydi youth. The Zaydi responded with a vigorous campaign, publishing religious material designed to shore up local support, and forming a youth organization that combines theological teaching with military training.

The government is seen as backing the Salafis against the local Zaydis. This divide-and-rule approach to governing has long been favored by Saleh as a way of keeping potential opposition groups perpetually dependent on government support. In Saada the local Zaydis were usually deemed to be more of a threat to the government than the interloping Salafis.

In 2004 the conflict shifted from periodic clashes between competing Huthi and Salafi paramilitary forces to open war.

Due to the fear that Al-Qaeda would find a safe haven in an unstable Yemen, the United States and the EU have a significant stake in a stable Yemen, and therefore a role to play in ending open military conflict. The United States, which has limited influence in Yemen, must work behind the scenes to steadily convince Saudi Arabia that the threat of a strong Al-Qaeda in Yemen takes precedence over fears of a Shiite state on its southern border. Saudi Arabia, in turn, must use its considerable influence with Sanaa to bring it to the bargaining table.

Such steps would be a significant reversal of policy for both countries, but silence has done little to encourage stability in Yemen.

The United States appears reluctant to push Yemen toward a political settlement to the crisis with the Huthis for fear that any pressure will further dissuade a reluctant ally from taking action against Al-Qaeda, which is viewed by many Yemenis as a Western problem. Some worry that if the United States does not support Yemen in what it describes as its own “war against terror,” the Yemeni government will not support the United States against Al-Qaeda.

The protracted nature of the Yemeni conflict has also led to evolving justifications for its continuation. Tribesmen have been brought into the fighting on both sides. Those backing the Huthis are doing so not out of any adherence to Zaydi theology but rather as a response to government overreaching and military mistakes. In effect, the government’s various military campaigns have created more enemies than it had when the conflict began.

There is, as five years of fighting have made clear, no military solution to this conflict. The Yemeni government has tried and failed numerous times to bomb the Huthis into submission, to no avail.

Neither side has the political capital to yield to the demands of the other, and members of both sides are benefiting financially from a thriving war economy. But the longer the fighting goes on, the greater the threat to regional security.

The United States must persuade the EU and, more importantly, Saudi Arabia to present a unified front to the Yemenis, convincing them that the military phase of the conflict is over and that it’s time for a political solution.

Autore: Gregory D. Johnsen

Fonte: www.dailystar.com.lb

Tearing Yemen apart

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (2)

As clashes revive fears of a Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy war, the US is focused on al-Qaida's presence in a troubled nation.

Renewed fighting in northern Yemen between government and rebel forces is feeding fears that a Middle Eastern proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is spreading to the ungoverned spaces of the southern Arabian peninsula. But western analysts are staring boggle-eyed at quite a different spectre: the prospect that the biggest beneficiaries of Yemeni weakness will be the fanatical jihadis of al-Qaida.

UN agencies raised the alarm last week after 55,000 people, mostly women and children, fled clashes in and around Sa'ada city in northern Yemen between the forces of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's Sunni-led government and the Zaydi Shia followers of Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. The exodus brought to 150,000 the number of people rendered homeless since July by a conflict that rekindled in 2004 but whose roots reach back to 1962.

The UN complained that its $23m emergency appeal launched on 2 September "has not yet received a single cent" despite the refugees' acute need. "Internally displaced people from Sa'ada governorate who fled to Amran arrived traumatised and exhausted, having spent three to five days walking in the desert," the UN said. Access to the remote area was hazardous and attempts were under way to open a humanitarian corridor from Saudi Arabia.

Yet according to the Houthi rebels, the Saudis are part of the problem. Claiming Riyadh is arming and supporting government forces, they issued a video last week purporting to show captured Saudi mortars. They also claim to have been bombed by Saudi jets. "We are placing before everyone the fact of direct Saudi support," a rebel statement said. "The regime has ceded sovereignty [and] delivered the country to foreign interests." Saudi Arabia denies the charges.

Saleh's government in turn accuses Iran and its Iraqi Shia ally Muqtada al-Sadr of backing the Houthis, who say they want greater autonomy. They also oppose the spread of Saudi-inspired Wahhabi teaching – an ostensibly reasonable aim given the links between Wahhabism and Sunni extremism. Saleh told al-Jazeera television that unnamed Iranians were in direct communication with the rebels and had funded secret "cells" within Yemen's security apparatus. Iran's ambassador to Yemen was recently warned of "negative consequences" should Iranian media continue "to be a tool in the hands of the subversives in Sa'ada".

Saudi Arabia's concerns about its neighbour's plight go beyond northern instability. Reviving separatist tendencies in southern Yemen are combining with shrinking national earnings (caused by declining oil revenues), high male unemployment, corruption, kidnapping and a chronic water shortage to undermine the central government's ability to hold the country together. Last month's assassination attempt on a Saudi minister was launched from Yemen.

For its part, Iran believes it has good reason to be suspicious of the Yemeni government's pro-western stance, suspicions stoked last week by a visit to Sana'a by John Brennan, the White House's counter-terrorism chief. Ignoring the complex nuances of the war in the north, Brennan delivered a letter from Barack Obama declaring that "the security of Yemen is vital for the security of the United States" – a surprisingly brash commitment – and promised increased US and international assistance. Obama stressed partnership in confronting the "common threat" posed by al-Qaida and Islamic extremism in general.

"Even if the actual foreign material support in Yemen's civil strife is minimal, the conflict is probably the newest front in a broadening proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia," said Robert Haddick of Small Wars Journal. "Lebanon is one front. Iranian attempts to gain influence over Shia populations in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Persian Gulf is another." Now Yemen must be added to the list, he said, with Saudi officials nervous that Tehran's ultimate aim was control over Red Sea shipping lanes.

All this is worrying enough for the Obama administration and allies such as Britain with its own colonial era links to Aden. But as Brennan's mission suggested, al-Qaida's ongoing, apparently successful effort to establish a regional base in Yemen, taking advantage of a weak, distracted government, remains Washington's uppermost concern.

"Only Pakistan's tribal regions rival Yemen as a terrorist Shangri-La," the Wall Street Journal commented recently. Osama bin Laden was of Yemeni extraction, while about 100 Yemenis were held in Guantánamo Bay, it noted. It went on to quote Yemen's estimate that up to 1,500 al-Qaida-linked jihadis are based in the country – including Nasir al-Wahayshi, al-Qaida's "emir of the Arabian peninsula" and Jamal al-Badawi, wanted for his role in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour. The editorial accused Saleh of double-dealing, by pursuing "a tacit non-aggression pact" with al-Qaida that allowed him to deal with other challenges.

"If left unaddressed Yemen's problems could potentially destabilise Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states," warned author Christopher Boucek in a new report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The inability of the Yemeni central government to fully control its territory will create space for violent extremists to regroup and launch attacks against domestic and international targets. The international community must be realistic about the limitations of intervention in Yemen. In the near term, however, inaction is not an option."

Autore: Simon Tisdall

Fonte: www.guardian.co.uk

Is Yemen Breaking Apart?

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (1)

Yemen may need the mediation of neighbouring countries -- including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and even Iran, to help it resolve its internal conflicts, notes Patrick Seale.

In power for more than 30 years, Field Marshall Ali Abdallah Saleh, Yemen’s veteran President, is battling for his political life. He has ruled the north since 1978, and the whole country since 1990, but the problems now assailing him on all sides are the worst he has ever had to deal with.
Like other Arab autocrats, such as President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, in power since 1981, and Muammar al-Qadhafi, the ‘Guide’ of Libya’s 1969 revolution, Yemen’s President runs a country which, in theory, has a multi-party system. In fact, his word is law -- but a law which is now being violently contested in several parts of the country.

Many of the problems he faces have roots in the key events of Yemen’s often violent past -- in particular, the overthrow of the theocratic Zaidi Imamate by a republican coup in 1962, and the union in 1990 of North Yemen, ruled by President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s People’s Conference Party, with South Yemen, then ruled by the Socialist Party. The union has not been altogether successful.

Disasters soon followed its formation, notably the expulsion in 1990 of close to a million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia, when Yemen backed Saddam Hussein in his occupation of Kuwait. This serious blow to what was already a very poor country brought widespread misery. In 1994, the South tried to break away with a war of secession. But the war ended, after much bloodshed, with the North’s victory and the occupation on 7 July of the South’s capital city of Aden. Many smouldering resentments were thus created, that are now bursting into flame.

One might say that history has caught up with the embattled Field Marshall. The South is once again clamouring to secede from the union and establish its own independent state, under the leadership of Ali Salem al-Beid, a former president of the southern region.

Heading the pressure for secession is the so-called Peaceful Southern Mobilization Movement, which is clearly not as peaceful as its name suggests. Indeed, the south appears to be arming itself in preparation for a new confrontation. This summer has seen a spate of violent demonstrations against the government in Sanaa -- and, in response, a violent crack-down by the authorities.

An enemy of the central government who is at least as dangerous is Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, leader of a rebel movement in the north of the country, which has been battling the government on and off since 2004. Abd al-Malik’s relative, Hussein al-Huthi, the first leader of the movement, was killed in the early months of the rebellion. President Ali Abdallah Saleh has vowed to crush the rebels, accusing the Huthis of wanting to destroy the Republic and restore the Zaidi Imamate.

This month, he sent his army on a punitive expedition against the northern rebels -- operation Scorched Earth -- which, according to Aboudou Karimou Adjibade, UNICEF representative in Yemen, has led to the flight, in great distress, of more than 100,000 people, many of them children. The UNHCR in Geneva says that, in the rebel stronghold of Saada -- capital of Yemen’s northernmost province on the Saudi border -- 35,000 people have fled their homes in the past two weeks alone. The UN World Food Program airlifted 40 tons of high-energy biscuits to Yemen last week to feed the refugees. But access to them is difficult because of the fighting.

Government troops, backed by aircraft and artillery, have tried to open the roads to Saada, which the rebels had managed to block. But the rebels still control the mountains overlooking the town. This is the worst outbreak of violence in Yemen since the 1994 war of secession. Casualties are said to be very great.

Although the Huthis are Zaidis -- a branch of Shi‘a Islam -- it is not clear whether they really aspire to restore the Imamate or are simply rebelling against what they consider unfair treatment and economic discrimination by Sanaa. They are certainly demanding a degree of autonomy.

In any event, the conflict is threatening to draw in outside powers. Yemen’s Information Minister Ahmad al-Lawzi has indirectly accused Iran of supporting the Huthi rebels, while the Yemeni army has claimed to have captured Iranian-made weapons -- including machine-guns, short-range rockets and ammunition. Saudi Arabia is concerned that the fighting could provide Iran with an opportunity to extend its influence to its borders. Tehran, meanwhile – always concerned for the safety of Shia communities -- has called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

These uprisings in the north and south have caught the President and his government at a difficult moment. Oil production at about 320,000 barrels daily is dwindling. The fall in oil prices has hit the country hard. A population growth rate of well over 3 per cent – the highest in the Middle East --is expected to boost the population from 18 million at present to 35 million in 2029, exacerbating the many social and economic problems.

A perennial Yemeni problem is the production of qat, a drug to which many Yemenis are addicted. It is the country’s primary cash crop, occupying an estimated 145,000 hectares of land, up from 80,000 hectares a decade ago. It is a major source of tax revenue, but also a source of great corruption, involving some of the highest officials as well as many farmers. It also contributes to Yemen’s grave water shortage.

If this were not enough, Yemen appears to have attracted Al-Qaeda cells, including the one responsible for the bombing of USS Cole in the port of Aden in October 2000, which killed 17 U.S. sailors. Many suspected Al-Qaeda operatives were rounded up and jailed, but in February 2006, 23 of them -- including those believed responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole -- managed to escape by tunnelling out of the prison to a nearby mosque.
Among those who escaped was Nasir al-Wahayshi, 33, a former secretary of Osama bin Laden, who is thought to be the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen. Reports suggest that cells in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have united to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, raising the alarm of counter-terrorist agencies in the United States and elsewhere, which fear that Yemen may become a terrorist safe haven.

Yemen may need the mediation of neighbouring countries -- including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and even Iran, to help it resolve its internal conflicts. Above all, it urgently needs help for health, education, economic development and job creation. USAID is this year providing Yemen with the paltry sum of $24million, in scandalous contrast to the billions being wasted by the United States on unwinnable and unnecessary wars.

Autore: Patrick Seale

Fonte: www.middle-east-online.com