Nuovo asse energetico e militare sino-russo nel Pacifico, verso una nuova Guerra Fredda?

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (4)

Settanta miliardi di metri cubi di gas e venticinque miliardi di dollari: questo il valore del patto siglato da Gazprom e China National Petroleum Corporation. Con questo agreement, negoziato direttamente dai due premier Wen Jabao e Wladimir Putin nel corso di colloqui ufficiali tenutisi a Pechino nei giorni scorsi, il gigante cinese corre in soccorso di un’economia russa che attraversa, ormai da alcuni mesi, una crisi produttiva profonda. Le previsioni degli economisti e le dichiarazioni dello stesso primo ministro russo Dmitri Medvedev indicano che nell’ultimo anno il paese ha prodotto il 7,5% in meno rispetto ai passati dodici mesi mentre la Cina crescerà di una percentuale variabile tra l’8,3 ed il 9%, un differenza sostanziale che potrebbe riscrivere gli equilibri geopolitici nell’area asiatica nel prossimo futuro e in prospettiva nel medio e lungo periodo.

Mosca fornirà a Pechino ogni anno 70 miliardi di metri cubi di gas ottenendo in cambio prestiti commerciali per 25 miliardi di dollari, i tecnici russi in collaborazione con quelli cinesi costruiranno una raffineria a Tianjin e gestiranno in joint venture tra le 300 e le 500 stazioni di rifornimento. Gazprom si è impegnata inoltre a fornire alla Cina gas liquido estratto da Sakhalin, ad ulteriore riprova della volontà di entrambi i paesi di stringere rapporti politico-commerciali sempre più profondi in tema di energia ed idrocarburi. Il vicepremier cinese Wang Qishan ha definito quella apertasi nei giorni scorsi come “una nuova fase di collaborazione a lungo termine” tra le due potenze, che riguarderà non solo il settore energetico ma anche quelli finanziario e militare. La Development Bank e la Agricultural Bank, entrambe cinesi, hanno infatti accordato a Vnesheconombank e a Vneshtorgbank, banche russe, un prestito da mezzo miliardo di dollari ciascuna e le Forze Armate dei due paesi si doteranno di una linea di comunicazione preferenziale per mantenere un contatto costante in caso di lanci di missili balistici contro i due paesi. Cina e Russia si candidano quindi a diventare il baricentro politico ed economico di una regione, quella del Pacifico, che sarà di fondamentale importanza per gli interessi globali. Al contempo, condividendo informazioni in campo di sicurezza militare, cercano di gettare basi comuni che possano consentire ad entrambe di affrontare eventuali sfide strategiche, in un futuro che sembra farsi ormai sempre più prossimo. Se nei prossimi quindici o venti anni il mondo assumerà sempre più una dimensione “Pacifico-centrica” non potranno essere che Pechino e Mosca a decidere di voler spostare a proprio favore gli equilibri regionali, a probabile detrimento di una posizione statunitense che sembra farsi sempre più debole nell’area asiatica.

Restano da verificare quali saranno le scelte statunitensi per la regione, sia a livello strategico che commerciale. Al momento scenari di scontro tra Washington e Pechino sembrano essere quanto mai utopici. Gli Stati Uniti sono fortemente indebitati e scatenare un conflitto di qualsivoglia tipo con la Cina rischierebbe di portare il paese verso un crollo in stile sovietico. Non è però da escludersi a priori la possibilità che, nel prossimo futuro, la Casa Bianca si trovi costretta a dover fronteggiare una Cina più potente ed arrogante sia sul versante economico che su quello strategico-militare. Come affronteranno allora a Washington la minaccia cinese? Si tornerà ad una situazione già vista, in cui due superpotenze si affrontano in una guerra congelata dalla paura? Difficile dirlo ora, ma tutto lascia pensare che in questo caso non ci troveremo di fronte a ricorsi storici, le leadership saranno quindi chiamate a scrivere una nuova pagina di politica internazionale se vorranno preservare uno dei beni più preziosi per l’umanità.

Autore: Simone Comi

Fonte: http://simonecomi.blogsome.com/

Karl Marx Predicted Collapse of US Dollar in 1857

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (3)

The great October fall of the US dollar is turning into an avalanche. On Tuesday, the American currency lost nine kopeks in Russia and reached a new minimum mark this year - 29.5 rubles per dollar. Within six months (April through September) the dollar lost over 10 percent at the world foreign exchange trading, which marked the sharpest decline since 1991. Some experts believe that the American currency is close to collapse, which may lead to a new financial crisis.

The tendency of the US dollar devaluation has been observed for a few years, but the current rate of decline is unprecedented. Some jokesters even rushed to re-read the letters of Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels written during the US financial panic of 1857 discussing the collapse of America. It would have been funny if it wasn’t so serious.

The chief economist of HSBC Bank Stephen King believes that if the US officials fail to stop the fall of American currency, it may provoke another financial crisis. “A dollar collapse would be a disaster all round… It would leave the international monetary system short of stability and long of fear. It would unleash economic upheavals on a similar scale to those seen in the 1970,” King wrote for The Independent.

American officials don’t seem to be overly concerned since nothing is being done about it. The US hasn’t done anything to support the currency since 1955. But is a collapse inevitable? From the viewpoint of macroeconomic indicators, the US state of affairs is, indeed, scary: record budget deficit of $1.4 trillion, record state debt that now exceeds $11.9 trillion, high unemployment and weak currency. Huge inflows of capital into the economy that Obama is proud of haven’t yet shown results.

But on the other hand, weak currency may be good for the US.
“The economy is supported by industrial orders based on the current weak dollar and higher prices in the future. Key players in the market are ready to support their manufacturers by weakening the currency,” says Alexander Kuptsikevich, FxPro financial analyst.

If the state debt is growing, it means that the US continues to obtain loans.

“Market participants prefer to borrow money in dollars, and dollar loans are relatively affordable. They invest into more active instruments denominated in currencies of developing countries,’ explains Yevgeny Nadorshin, chief economist of Trust Investment Bank.
This causes growth of stock index. For example, Russian Trading System increased by 34 percent within two and a half months.

World center banks, who used to be trusted American partners, also turn their backs to dollar. They reduced investments into assets denominated in American currency. According to Barclays Capital , in April, May, and June, the banks invested 63% of their gains in euro or yen. If it continues, this may lead to further devaluation of dollar.

However, central banks of the countries that depend on export try not to let it happen. For example, last week a group of Asian central banks carried out unprecedented intervention in the financial markets by actively buying American currency. Bank of Russia was not a passive observer either. According to experts’ evaluations, the bank purchased over three billion dollars.

The good thing about it is that it helped Russian manufacturers to maintain competitiveness and bank reserves. The question is whether we would have to spend much more when investors change their minds and flee the Russian market changing their rubles into dollars. Last year we paid a high price for it.

“I’m not afraid that the events of the last year will repeat. The circumstances now are different. The world touched the bottom of the crisis and revival began, so there won’t be sharp moves,” says profile manager of Pilgrim Asset Management Olga Izyumova.

Yevgeniy Nadorshin agrees with her. He also thinks that dollar will continue weakening. But many experts think that as soon as the US announces the raise of interest rates, American currency will stop falling and even start growing. When is it going to happen?

Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve evades the answer. All he says is that this will happen when the US is sure of stable growth. On Tuesday investors discussed information obtained from the US official sources that the Federal Reserve will start raising interest rates no earlier than the second half of the next year.

Fonte: english.pravda.ru

Decline of the Dollar

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (2)

Don't believe everything you read on the Drudge Report. Well into the next few decades, the global economy will still be all about the benjamins.

The greenback is looking a bit green around the gills -- and no matter where you look, the bad news for the U.S. dollar just seems to be getting worse. America's currency has been plunging in value against the euro and the Japanese yen (and the Barack Obama administration has shown little inclination to brake the slide). Dark mutterings from the world's other great powers about the need for a new global reserve currency have accelerated the trend. Rumors about plans to topple the dollar from its pedestal abound. And just in case someone might be inclined to dismiss all the dire talk as a foreign conspiracy, the (American) head of the World Bank went on the record last month with a warning: "The United States would be mistaken to take for granted the dollar's place as the world's predominant reserve currency," Robert Zoellick said in a speech. "Looking forward, there will increasingly be other options to the dollar."

Some onlookers cite the dollar's decline as yet one more bit of evidence that the long period of American global dominance is coming to an end. The greenback's function as the world's leading reserve currency has been one of the key features of Washington's privileged place in the world since World War II. For decades the dollar has been the currency the world's countries tend to use when they do business with each other. Most central banks around the world have held the lion's share of their foreign exchange reserves in dollars, while most globally traded commodities (like oil) have been priced in the U.S. currency, too. It's an arrangement that translates into many benefits for the United States, most notably lower borrowing costs (because there's always more demand for the reserve currency than others). And then there are the myriad political and cultural knock-on effects -- the power and the prestige -- that accrue to the currency at the top of the economic pecking order. So it should come as no surprise that predictions about the impending "demise of the dollar" tend to go hand in hand with the expectation that America's hyperpower days are numbered.

There's just one problem with this picture: It ain't necessarily true. Or not yet, at least. The creation of the euro and the rise of new economic heavyweights like China are indeed opening up prospects for a global monetary system that is much less dollar-centered than today's. For that to happen, though, will require myriad changes that are likely years, if not decades away. And in the meantime, Benjamin Cohen of the University of California-Santa Barbara, points out, "It's clear that the dollar is still the leading currency in almost every category."

Overall, he notes, the dollar continues to remain well out in front of the pack in foreign exchange trading, trade, and international banking markets. Although most countries have been adding euros to their reserves since the European currency was introduced in 1999, the amount of reserves held in dollars is 2½ times greater -- "and in terms of absolute magnitude, the amount of dollars held in reserves is still on the increase," Cohen says. In fact, he points out, the dollar's share of the world's global currency reserves is actually much higher than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990 the dollar accounted for just 45 percent of reserves; today the figure is 65 percent. (For what it's worth, Cohen adds, the dollar's share peaked at 71.5 percent in 1999, the year of the euro's introduction. So sure, the euro has made a dent.)

Cohen and other economists -- including those who are less sanguine about the dollar's future -- point out that much of the current hysteria (or, depending on where you stand, euphoria) about the greenback's role tends to confuse two things: present volatility in the foreign exchange markets and the dollar's medium- to long-term structural role in the global economy. Take a look at history, in fact, and the present aura of uncertainty about the dollar appears, well, historical. Some dollar doomsayers have been claiming of late, for example, that the world's oil-producing countries are contemplating a wholesale switch to pricing oil in euros rather than dollars -- a move that, the pessimists claim, would mark the virtual death knell of America's economic dominance.

That was the thrust, for example, of a much-ballyhooed recent article, "The Demise of the Dollar," by British journalist Robert Fisk, who darkly points out that the United States invaded Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein started pricing Iraqi oil in euros. Fisk's piece, despite presenting minimal detail to back its claims, triggered something of a run on the dollar when it was published -- a good example of the degree of the current jitteriness. In response, Harvard University economist Richard Cooper points out that the OPEC countries traditionally bring up the idea of junking the dollar pricing system periodically every time the dollar gets weak. The idea, for example, of jettisoning dollars in favor of SDRs (special drawing rights, a sort of IMF pseudo currency) that is making the rounds again has been brought up repeatedly over the years. And if they did? "I don't think it's a big deal one way or the other," he says.

And that brings us to the biggest question that potential dollar-dumpers find themselves compelled to answer: If not the dollar, then what's the alternative? The most obvious candidate would seem to be the euro. Back in pre-euro days, the deutsche mark and the French franc never really posed a serious alternative to the dollar, given their comparatively small reach back then. The economic heft of the euro-area countries, by contrast, is about the same as that of the United States; both sides account for about one-quarter of global GDP. And European financial markets are relatively deep and liquid (though still not quite on the scale of the United States'). Skeptics argue that European economic growth in the decades to come is likely to remain tepid, given Europe's rigid labor markets, dense regulation, and graying populations. And then there's that little detail that the political underlay of the euro is an international treaty rather than a nation-state.

Still, given the rising financial problems faced by the United States -- like its miserable current account deficits and exploding national debt -- economists like Harvard's Jeffrey Frankel and the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Menzie Chinn speculate that the euro could well make a go of it, perhaps surpassing the dollar's share of overall reserves as soon as 2015. Still, one wonders whether even this scenario really represents the fundamental transformation of the global order that some would predict. So what about, say, the Chinese renminbi or the Japanese yen? Although the latter is still widely held as a reserve currency in some parts of the world, its attractiveness has been diminished by the lackluster performance of Japan's economy since the 1990s. As for the renminbi, even the biggest China boosters acknowledge that it will take years before China's economy takes on the attributes needed for a global reserve currency -- particularly the deep, transparent, and liquid financial markets that still attract overseas investors to the United States. Oh, yes, and moving toward genuine convertibility might not hurt, either. (Meanwhile, it should be noted, China's dollar reserves continued to grow in the third quarter of this year.)

Another idea making the rounds involves the aforementioned SDRs. The idea has been gaining currency (forgive the pun) ever since March 23, when Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, proposed that central banks shift more of their foreign exchange reserves from dollars to SDRs. Far from ordering someone in the CIA to zap Zhou with a poison dart, though, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner actually welcomed the suggestion. (Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that the need for greater international reliance on SDRs has been the official policy of the IMF since 1978.) At April's G-20 meeting in London, the assembled countries then approved a massive issuance of $250 billion worth of SDRs -- the first in years.

There's just one problem, though. As Barry Eichengreen, a leading economist at the University of California-Berkeley, writes in a recent article, "[S]keptics question whether the SDR could ever replace the dollar as the world's leading reserve currency, for the simple reason that the SDR is not a currency. It is a composite accounting unit in which the IMF issues credits to its members." Based on a basket of four currencies (the dollar, euro, pound, and yen), the SDR can only be used right now by central banks and a few international institutions like the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements -- and not, it should be noted, by companies or consumers. Expanding the role of SDRs beyond their present function and into that of a genuine global currency would entail an amount of political and economic re-engineering that few of the major powers would seem to have the stomach for as things stand now.

And that, in turn, drives home another important point: Although politics do play a major role in deliberations about the future reserve currency, they do so rather differently from the simplistic ways evoked in public discussion. The University of California's Cohen scoffs at the notion, for example, that Gulf Arabs might be blithely prepared to toss the dollar aside for the sake of dimly defined commercial advantage. Saudi Arabia, he points out, has a long-standing agreement with the United States to refrain from actions that might seriously destabilize the dollar; in return the United States promises to guarantee Saudi security in a region that offers myriad threats. "The Saudis have much more important issues to worry about than earning a few more percentage points on their currency reserves," Cohen says. The same applies, he points out, to Japan, still bound to the United States in a military alliance as well as through an intricate web of commercial relationships. Although China has surpassed the United States as Japan's No. 1 trading partner, that fact alone is hardly enough to compel Tokyo to shift all of its reserves to renminbi.

In short, the dollar's continued global predominance is not a sure thing; it's just that it looks a lot more likely than just about any of the other options. "To seriously dislodge the dollar in its international role would actually require concerted action around the world," says Harvard's Cooper. Does he see any signs of that? "No."

Autore: Christian Caryl

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com

The demise of the dollar

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (1)

In a graphic illustration of the new world order, Arab states have launched secret moves with China, Russia and France to stop using the US currency for oil trading.

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars.

The plans, confirmed to The Independent by both Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources in Hong Kong, may help to explain the sudden rise in gold prices, but it also augurs an extraordinary transition from dollar markets within nine years.

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China's former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. "Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable," he told the Asia and Africa Review. "We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security."

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region's conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy. China uses more oil incrementally than the US because its growth is less energy efficient. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold. An indication of the huge amounts involved can be gained from the wealth of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who together hold an estimated $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves.

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations," he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China's extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America's power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.

Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East.

China imports 60 per cent of its oil, much of it from the Middle East and Russia. The Chinese have oil production concessions in Iraq – blocked by the US until this year – and since 2008 have held an $8bn agreement with Iran to develop refining capacity and gas resources. China has oil deals in Sudan (where it has substituted for US interests) and has been negotiating for oil concessions with Libya, where all such contracts are joint ventures.

Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region now account for no fewer than 10 per cent of the imports of every country in the Middle East, including a huge range of products from cars to weapon systems, food, clothes, even dolls. In a clear sign of China's growing financial muscle, the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, yesterday pleaded with Beijing to let the yuan appreciate against a sliding dollar and, by extension, loosen China's reliance on US monetary policy, to help rebalance the world economy and ease upward pressure on the euro.

Ever since the Bretton Woods agreements – the accords after the Second World War which bequeathed the architecture for the modern international financial system – America's trading partners have been left to cope with the impact of Washington's control and, in more recent years, the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. "The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies," a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. "The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won't be able to use the US dollar."

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years' time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.
The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

"These plans will change the face of international financial transactions," one Chinese banker said. "America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate."

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

Autore: Robert Fisk

Fonte: www.independent.co.uk

L'articolo di Robert Fisk si puo leggere tradotto in italiano su Internazionale Nr. 816, 9/15 ottobre 2009.