‘He’s Human After All’

Wirepullers: l'Europa incontra Robert Mugabe, uno dei dinosauri africani, cioè quei leader che sono al potere da decenni e non mostrano la minima intenzione di andarsene (anzi...). L'obiettivo è quello di instaurare un confronto con colui che guida lo Zimbabwe dal 1980 (impensabile per una democrazia) e che in questi 29 anni ha trasformato il "granaio d'Africa" in uno dei paesi più poveri e instabili del mondo. Lo scontro frontale (con tanto di sanzioni) non ha dato risultati e probabilmente questa l'unica è strada percorribile al momento per non lasciare solo Morgan Tsvangirai, attuale Primo Ministro e avversario storico di Mugabe, nella ricostruzione di un paese che, se lasciato alla deriva, potrebbe diventare l'ennesima pustola in una regione già abbondantemente infetta. (3)

L'intervista a Morgan Tsvangirai

For more than a decade, Morgan Tsvangirai has fought to unseat Africa's last Big Man, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. The effort nearly killed him. Tsvangirai was beaten, tried for treason, and jailed repeatedly. Then, last March, after elections most credit Tsvangirai with winning, Mugabe was pressured to make him his prime minister, and the two entered into an uneasy power-sharing arrangement. Tsvangirai spoke to NEWSWEEK's Scott Johnson. Excerpts:

You must have a sense of achievement.

There are significant developments: the signing of an agreement, the formation of the inclusive government.

You're working with people who have wanted to kill you.

I'm aware of that. The political divide has turned opponents into enemies. The polarization was unhelpful.

Has your image of Mugabe changed? You called him a tyrant.

He behaved like one.

Mugabe's work over the last few years is indefensible, but ever since the agreement, we've agreed to work together.

Is he serious about making this work?

I have no doubt that he wants to see this through. He's got his own political constituency, which he feels is a restraining factor.

As you get more into this coalition, do you feel you're running up against a wall?

The constitutional process is started. The national healing process has been kick-started. The economic free fall has been arrested. The business community is feeling more confident. Production is increasing. There's peace in the country.

Western diplomats say they won't continue funding unless there's more change.

I can't force anyone to support Zimbabwe, but this is where we are and this is where we are going.

Do you think sanctions should go?

What we have here are travel bans. It's an imposition coming out of the circumstances of the time, informed by the fact that there was violence committed by the state against defenseless people. That is unforgivable. [But] it's now time to reengage the EU, the Americans, and to ask: can we normalize relations?

What have your interactions with Mugabe been like over these last months?

It doesn't matter how I explain it, because you won't be able to experience it. [Laughs] We meet once a week, talk about government business. I supervise all his ministers. But you don't just say, "Mr. President, I'm coming here, I'm talking about what's happening in electricity." You have to, over time, engage in personal relations. It's a progressive thing.

How have you engaged with him on a personal level?

I went through a very bad tragedy myself [Tsvangirai's wife was killed in a car crash a week after the election]. And he showed nothing but compassion.

Was he really concerned?

Absolutely. But you cannot stand up and say, you know, me and Robert Mugabe are bosom buddies.

Have you been surprised by anything?

He's human after all.

Do you think he's controlled by others?

He's in full control. Don't be fooled. He may be old and frail, but he's very astute.

Do you ever feel intimidated by him?

I've never been intimidated by anybody; otherwise how would I have stayed in this struggle for the last 10 years?

Is Mugabe worried about prosecution?

No. I think his main motivation is about legacy. It's not about outsiders. We all want to be loved, even when we don't do things to cause that love. But in the end, people want to remember us for the good things we have done, not the bad things.

Autore: Scott Johnson

Fonte: www.newsweek.com

Mugabe, il sanguinario

Wirepullers: l'Europa incontra Robert Mugabe, uno dei dinosauri africani, cioè quei leader che sono al potere da decenni e non mostrano la minima intenzione di andarsene (anzi...). L'obiettivo è quello di instaurare un confronto con colui che guida lo Zimbabwe dal 1980 (impensabile per una democrazia) e che in questi 29 anni ha trasformato il "granaio d'Africa" in uno dei paesi più poveri e instabili del mondo. Lo scontro frontale (con tanto di sanzioni) non ha dato risultati e probabilmente questa l'unica è strada percorribile al momento per non lasciare solo Morgan Tsvangirai, attuale Primo Ministro e avversario storico di Mugabe, nella ricostruzione di un paese che, se lasciato alla deriva, potrebbe diventare l'ennesima pustola in una regione già abbondantemente infetta. (2)

Profilo di un dittatore senza scrupoli

Il resto del mondo lo considera un dittatore sanguinario e senza scrupoli. Ma in Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe e il suo partito sono appena stati riconfermati alla guida del Paese, dopo un quarto di secolo di potere pressoché incontrastato. Il tutto nonostante le numerose accuse dell’opposizione e degli attivisti per i diritti umani, che hanno denunciato irregolarità di ogni genere, compresi brogli elettorali e attacchi non solo verbali ai loro sostenitori. Nulla da fare, persino i seimila osservatori giunti dal vicino Sudafrica per verificare che tutto si svolgesse nella norma hanno confermato che Mugabe e i suoi hanno vinto regolarmente, ma anche impedendo alla stampa locale di avvicinare qualsiasi membro dell’opposizione.

Ora il dittatore dello Zimbabwe e lo Zanu Pf, forti della maggioranza di due terzi dei deputati in parlamento, possono decidere di cambiare la costituzione, limitando ancora di più i movimenti del già imbrigliato Movimento per il Cambiamento Democratico (Mdc) di Tsvangirai e consolidando il potere dell’ottuagenario leader in vista di un suo ritiro dalla scena politica.

Profilo di un dittatore

Per i suoi sostenitori, Robert Mugabe è una sorta di eroe nazionale, capace di cacciare a più riprese gli odiati coloni bianchi in quella che fino a pochi anni fa si chiamava Rhodesia meridionale. Nato nel 1924, l’attuale presidente dello Zimbabwe frequenta le scuole missionarie e l’università sudafricana di Fort Hare. Dopo alcuni anni passati a insegnare, Mugabe torna in Rhodesia negli anni ’60, dove comincia la sua attività politica, ispirato dall’ideologia marxista. Inizialmente si aggrega al partito Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu), guidato da Joshua Nkomo, per fondarne uno tutto suo, lo Zanu, pochi anni dopo. Negli anni ’70, Mugabe è in Mozambico a coordinare una guerriglia contro il governo coloniale di Ian Smith, e contro il white rule, il dominio bianco. Dopo una lunga guerra civile Londra è costretta ad ammettere la sconfitta, e il 18 aprile del 1980 lo Zimbabwe è uno stato indipendente. L’eroe della resistenza diventa primo ministro e nel giro di qualche anno forma un partito con l’amico-rivale Nkomo, che si chiamerà Zanu Patriotic Front. Lo stesso che lo scorso 31 marzo sarebbe (il condizionale, è d’obbligo viste le irregolarità nelle elezioni) stato scelto dalla maggioranza degli elettori. Dal 1987 Mugabe è presidente dello Zimbabwe, che nel frattempo sprofonda, anno dopo anno, in una crisi economica in cui si trova ancora oggi. L’ex professore e paladino della liberazione dal colonialismo punta molto sulla lotta all’analfabetismo: oggi il Paese ha il più alto tasso d’istruzione di tutto il continente africano. Ma l’economia ristagna, fame e povertà dilagano nelle campagne, la disoccupazione è padrona delle città e il malcontento cresce. Gli oppositori vengono picchiati, rinchiusi in carcere, torturati, uccisi o condannati all’esilio. I giornali troppo critici verso il governo vengono chiusi, gli attivisti per i diritti umani perseguitati.

Guerra ai white farmers

Mugabe è sempre lì: amato, odiato, ma soprattutto temuto. Fa promulgare leggi contro gli omosessuali e limita la libertà di stampa, minaccia le comunità dissidenti nelle aree rurali di lasciarle morire di fame. E nel 2000, in piena crisi economica, decide che ne ha abbastanza dei quasi 80mila discendenti dei coloni bianchi proprietari, come in diverse zone dell’Africa meridionale, di vasti terreni a discapito dei neri, spesso costretti a cercare lavoro come semplici braccianti. Il presidente chiama a raccolta veterani di guerra, giovani aitanti e criminali comuni, generalmente impiegati per minacciare o far sparire i dissidenti, e li lancia verso le campagne. Nel giro di pochi mesi la maggior parte dei proprietari terrieri bianchi viene cacciata con la forza e le terre vengono ridistribuite. Ma non al popolo, bensì agli amici intimi o ai soci in affari del presidente.

Elezioni nel sangue

Nel 2002 lo Zimbabwe torna alle urne per scegliersi un presidente. Ma Mugabe è pronto a tutto, pur di essere rieletto: bande di giovani sostenitori dello Zanu Pf seminano il terrore tra gli abitanti della capitale Harare e delle province di tutto il Paese. I sostenitori del giovane partito Mdc, nato tre anni prima, subiscono una lunga serie di soprusi, denunciati a più riprese dalle organizzazioni internazionali. Lo Zimbabwe viene allontanato dal Commonwealth e fioccano le sanzioni. Ma Mugabe resta dov’è, padre-padrone di un Paese sempre più isolato e povero che nel gennaio di quest’anno gli Stati Uniti hanno incluso nella lista nera degli ‘avamposti della tirannia’. Ora, con la possibilità di cambiare la costituzione, Mugabe potrebbe diventare ancora più forte di prima. All’opposizione, fiaccata e indebolita dalla politica aggressiva del presidente, non resta che rassegnarsi. Forse, data l’età, l’unico a poter fermare Mugabe è il tempo.

Autore: Pablo Trincia

Fonte: http://it.peacereporter.net

EU meets Mugabe to ease tension with Zimbabwe

Wirepullers: l'Europa incontra Robert Mugabe, uno dei dinosauri africani, cioè quei leader che sono al potere da decenni e non mostrano la minima intenzione di andarsene (anzi...). L'obiettivo è quello di instaurare un confronto con colui che guida lo Zimbabwe dal 1980 (impensabile per una democrazia) e che in questi 29 anni ha trasformato il "granaio d'Africa" in uno dei paesi più poveri e instabili del mondo. Lo scontro frontale (con tanto di sanzioni) non ha dato risultati e probabilmente questa l'unica è strada percorribile al momento per non lasciare solo Morgan Tsvangirai, attuale Primo Ministro e avversario storico di Mugabe, nella ricostruzione di un paese che, se lasciato alla deriva, potrebbe diventare l'ennesima pustola in una regione già abbondantemente infetta. (1)

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe welcomed a high-level EU delegation "with open arms" on Saturday as Brussels and Harare began their first talks in seven years in a bid to ease diplomatic tensions.

"We welcome you with open arms. We hope our talks will be fruitful with a positive outcome," said a jovial Mugabe before entering his meeting with the European Union delegation.

His tone displayed a marked difference in his attitude to the West who he lashed out at on Thursday for sanctions imposed against him and his allies which he blames for his country's economic woes.

The meeting at the state house in Harare comes amid a controversy over these penalties which the European bloc is refusing to lift, despite calls by southern African leaders for it do so.

"In these bilateral discussions between the European Union and Zimbabwe, we want to see how the diplomatic tension can be addressed, especially the issue of sanctions, how they can be removed," a government official said on condition of anonymity.

The EU delegation is fresh from a visit to regional heavyweight South Africa, where both parties called for Zimbabwe's political rivals to make their fragile unity government work.

Despite South Africa's lobbying for sanctions to be lifted, the EU stood firm in its demand for greater reforms in Zimbabwe, where accusations of human rights abuses and power struggles hamper a year-old unity accord.

Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, a longtime political rival, joined a unity government in February a year after disputed polls pushed Zimbabwe into a deep political and economic crisis.

The unity government has acted to steer the country's return to stability and rebuild the hyperinflation-ravaged economy and basic services that collapsed under Mugabe's three decades of rule.

But the government has been plagued by power struggles over key posts and claims of continued persecution of Tsvangirai's supporters, with Western states so far proving reluctant to give direct aid without proof of more reforms.

Several lawmakers from Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change party have been arrested, including its choice for deputy agriculture minister.

Mugabe, 85, who has ruled since independence in 1980, was typically defiant ahead of the EU visit, saying he would not brook outside interference in Harare's affairs.

"Who said the British and the Americans should rule over others? That's why we say down with you. We have not invited these bloody whites. They want to poke their nose into our own affairs. Refuse that," he said.

"We have stood stood firm and we have refused to let go. Zimbabwe, sanctions or no sanctions, Zimbabwe remains ours," he told a gathering of his ZANU-PF party's youth wing Friday.

Mugabe also said he would not back down from his controversial land reforms launched nine years ago, which saw white-owned farms resettled with blacks in a bid to redress colonial-era inequities.

The chaotic reforms were accompanied by political violence, while agricultural production plunged, leaving the nation dependent on food aid.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, whose country holds the EU presidency, said Thursday that penalties will remain and that mismanagement and poor human rights record and not sanctions were behind the country's problems.

The EU team will meet Tsvangirai on Sunday in Bulawayo where his party is holding a rally to celebrate the anniversary of the unity deal.

Fonte: www.alarabonline.org

Militias, gangs and vigilantes in Kenya: the consequences of abandoning the reform agenda

Wirepullers: il Kenya, uno dei paesi più prosperi dell'intero continente nero in passato, potrebbe essere sull'orlo del baratro. Lo scoppio delle violenze dopo le elezioni del 2007, abilmente trasformate dalla classe politica in un confronto di carattere etnico, avevano messo a serio rischio la stabilità del paese. Solo l'intervento dell'ex segretario generale dell'ONU, Kofi Annan, e la creazione della Grande Coalizione, che dava ai due grandi contendenti, Mwai Kibaki e Raila Odinga, il ruolo di presidente, al primo e di primo ministro, al secondo, sembravano aver chiuso uno dei capitoli più insanguinati della storia kenyana. In realtà si era semplicemente messo un coperchio su una pentola che ha continuato a bollire. Gli ingredienti: milizie, gang, vigilanti. Oggi è arrivato il momento di togliere quel coperchio e giudicare i colpevoli delle violenze del post-elezioni. Tribunali locali o internazionali? E' questa la grande questione intorno alla quale ruota il futuro di questo paese e di tutta la regione, considerata la velocità sistemica con cui, a sud del Sahara, i conflitti interni di un paese si trasmettono a quelli vicini . Per evitare un'altra Somalia. (2)

Kenya's coalition having failed to deliver promised reforms, the country is returning to social unrest, and political violence from militias, gangs and vigilantes.

The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process (KNDR) led by Kofi Annan brought together the political parties disputing Kenya's 2007 presidential election, reaching an historic agreement to form a coalition government on 28 February 2008. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 that was subsequently passed to amend the constitution and facilitate power sharing - with Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister - was internationally acclaimed, and appeared to begin a new era of progressive consensus politics in Kenya. Nicholas Daniels is a freelance writer living and studying in Nairobi, Kenya. The arguments in this article are informed by fieldwork and research undertaken March - August 2009.

Hope soon faded however with the creation of the largest cabinet in the history of post-independence Kenya. In order to satisfy Kenya's array of tribal communities, whilst also accommodating diverse political alliances and vested commercial interests, the spirit of reconciliation soon gave way to a realization that the government would be unable to deliver on all its promised KNDR reforms.

Whilst some progress has been made towards key reforms, the coalition has been unable to deliver an appropriate criminal justice mechanism to prosecute suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence. The activity of militias, vigilantes, and gangs supported by leading politicians playing a game of divide and rule as they vye for political supremacy makes this all the more worrying.

Kenya urgently needs progress on all four agendas agreed under the KNDR process if the threat of further militia activity is to be reduced. Political leaders in the government coalition who fail to support the direction given by the president and prime minister should resign or face the sack. All efforts, whether in parliament, cabinet, civil society or the media need to be focused on championing the reform agenda, rather than debating the 2012 presidential election.

Militias are seeking to fill the void created by a failure to repair Kenya's economy and rule of law. Unless post-election violence suspects are prosecuted, a feeling of impunity will further embolden unscrupulous leaders and in the absence of a united political direction, social unrest and the threat of organized violence will worsen.

With parts of the country blighted by militias and inter-ethnic clashes, there can be little hope that Kenya will avoid politically-driven unrest before the next presidential election. This is likely to manifest itself in a return to nationwide fighting and further humanitarian crises - as happened so suddenly in 2007.

Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process At the ‘Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: One Year Later' meeting in March 2009, Kofi Annan commented that ‘there was confidence in the mediation process, yet this mirrors, inversely, the overwhelming lack of confidence in the public institutions in Kenya as a cause of the crisis. The Accord is a platform to begin these reforms, but greater political will is needed to see this through'.

Some criticized the idea of power sharing in Kenya on the basis that ‘while the principals have stood tall to steer the country towards seeking justice and reform, they have also failed to give leadership at some key points'. Others point to Kenya's constitution as perpetuating the risk of political violence in the future, a barrier that would undermine the Accord even before it was signed. Recent submissions to the Panel of Experts on Constitutional Review show that Kenya's main political factions - President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) - do not disagree very much on what a draft new constitution should contain, but there are clear signs that political divisions are ready to emerge.

There is a real risk that a constitutional referendum would present an opportunity to return to divisive politics. Intractable and longstanding national grievances over, amongst other things: land ownership; access to jobs (particularly amongst those aged 18 to 30); distribution of wealth; and ethnic stereotypes, cannot be underestimated. With political disputes over the interpretation of the Accord reflecting long-held views that have been put on hold, constitutional, economic, and land reforms have given way to partisan politics.

In February 2009 parliament sought to legislate for a constitutionally entrenched domestic ‘Special Tribunal', to try those suspected of crimes against humanity following the 2007 elections. Despite unanimous government backing, the number of MPs required to vote in favour of the constitutional amendment was insufficient, and the legislation failed. When the coalition consulted again in July 2009 in a second attempt to bring the legislation before parliament, the lack of support in cabinet resulted in a resolution to avoid domestic criminal justice altogether.

A strong feeling exists amongst Kenyan civil society that a domestic tribunal could be subject to political interference, and that Kenya's best option to achieve justice for victims of the 2007 election violence is for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute suspects. A hybrid solution involving a domestic Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission alongside ICC investigations is a more likely outcome. However the ICC's inability to act promptly and indict all but a few leading suspects has almost certainly given succour to planners and instigators of political violence in Kenya.

The indecision created by the coalition sends a message that politicians in Kenya can continue using violence as a means to an end. Militias in Kenya have long played a role in supporting candidates who hire them. Without targeting known individuals who are adept at masterminding political violence, a return to instability of this nature is only a matter of time as future generations await a call-to-arms.

Prosecuting high, middle and low ranking suspects through a local tribunal would have forced prospective offenders to reconsider their involvement in tribal and militia violence. With no criminal justice mechanism to follow up on the 2007 election chaos - despite the cogent recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) - Kenya will continue to experience cyclical instability during elections and other times of political significance.

Militias, Vigilantes and Gangs
The objectives of militias and their links to political elites are difficult to uncover. Nonetheless, credible reports continue to emerge that armed groups are preparing for renewed violence across Kenya. Uncertainty about how Kenya's post-election violence will be addressed, combined with lack of leadership, an upsurge in criminal and gang violence and increasing ethnic polarisation and corruption, leaves an irate public fearful of the future. Leaflets warning of future violence are circulating in the Rift Valley, while the criminal Mungiki gangs are said to be rearming their supporters. Without a resolution of the legal and political crisis, politicians are preparing for a worsening confrontation in the run-up to the 2012 elections.

In Rift Valley Province (RVP) the notion of organized Kalenjin militias is often refuted. But when Kalenjin males undergo circumcision, they learn a vernacular rich in the language of warfare and the need to defend their community when called upon, and this can easily be tapped into in order to mobilize a large group of young men.
Since the departure of Daniel Arap Moi as president in 2002, the Kalenjin community has been on the search for a new leader who will promote their interests in the national political arena. In William Ruto, Agriculture Minister since 2008, who has long been associated with the politics of the region, they have found their man. Kalenjins in Rift Valley assert that if Ruto were tried for his alleged involvement in the 2007/08 post-election violence, they would resume expelling Kikuyu and Luo from the province.

The prospect of Kikuyu militias in Rift Valley cannot be discounted either, with grievances still strongly felt after the mass displacement of thousands of Kikuyu families following the 2007 elections and the threat of further reprisals. The lack of any meaningful peace building and reconciliation in RVP is evident in the trenchant attitudes still held by many who oppose the return of Kikuyus to farms from which they were displaced.

The outlawed organisation Mungiki has continued to murder, extort and create a climate of fear in rural and urban areas. Despite efforts to crackdown on their activities, Mungiki's continued existence proves that the group has continued recruiting and expanding its criminal network. Mungiki benefits from a wealthy base of supporters and is funded by protection money demanded from residents of Central Province, as well as the slums and other more affluent parts of Nairobi.

High-level support from prominent members of Kenya's political establishment seeking to hire Mungiki was identified by CIPEV. On 21 April 2009 approximately 30 people were killed in Nyeri East District. Local residents suspected Mungiki was avenging the killing of 15 members in neighbouring Kirinyaga District by recently formed vigilante groups the week before.

What might therefore be seen in Central Province is a regional conflict between Mungiki and vigilante groups supported by Kenya's security services. After a great deal of criticism for its punitive campaign in 2007 to reign in Mungiki, vigilante groups are seen as a proxy of the police to enhance its work in the region and combat local crime.

This should be of great concern given the prospect that such vigilantes could evolve into criminal entities in their own right, morphing into militias able to exert power over communities and gain influence on local political proceedings.

Such a phenomenon can be observed in the gangs that exist in and around Nairobi, who often act as vigilantes in areas where the police fail to provide protection. Their involvement during elections suggests a tendency for them to behave as ‘foot soldiers', coming together when hired to do so and forming groups to take care of the interests of local politicians and businesspeople.

Inter-gang fighting and clashes have occurred in Nairobi, with fighting in 2006 between Mungiki and an ethnic Luo gang called Taliban causing several deaths and displacing at least 9,000 in a dispute over control of a lucrative illicit brew market in Mathare. The Kenyan government banned 18 such groups in 1992. In Kisii District, Nyanza Province, residents have long suffered the activities of militias, with Sungu Sungu particularly notorious for its summary executions and political violence. The group, which started by helping fight crime as a community policing, has now become a militia for hire. This is hardly surprising given the appeal of such work for otherwise unemployed young men.

Institutional Weaknesses
Martha Karua's resignation as Minister for Justice in April 2009 reflected a widely shared frustration at the slow pace of reform. Hostile divisions in the coalition subsequently became even more public when President Kibaki appointed Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka as Leader of Government Business and Chair of the House Business Committee. Amid Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) complaints that Prime Minister Raila Odinga should fill both roles the stalemate was temporarily ended when Speaker Kenneth Marende himself took charge.

President Kibaki's health and ability to carry out his duties has been a source of discussion ever since he took office in 2002. The effects of a car accident during the 2002 election campaign have been compounded by failing health, strokes and possible signs of dementia. This inevitably fuels speculation about who his successor will be. Prime Minister Raila Odinga continues to enjoy wide national support and he is viewed by a cross section of Kenyans as the best candidate to remove power from a wealthy, largely Kikuyu group surrounding President Kibaki.

The problem remains, however, that members of both ODM and the Party of National Unity (PNU) are determined to advance their own personal and community interests, and are prepared to revert to tribal politics to do so. One example has been the alleged meetings between Agriculture Minister William Ruto and Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, who come from opposite sides of the coalition and were both implicated as leaders in the 2007 post-election violence as principals of the Kalenjin and Kikuyu respectively.

Other possible presidential aspirants include Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi, Internal Security Minister George Saitoti and former Minister for Justice Martha Karua. With such an array of individuals jostling for position, the dynamics that hold the coalition together have become complicated, greatly weakening momentum behind the national reform agenda and the ability of the Kibaki and Odinga to show leadership.

Given the animosity between ethnic groups in Kenya, violence could easily be fomented as a means to an end. Social unrest could arise out of frustration with the performance of the coalition, with unemployment, famine and broken promises driving people to extremes. There can be little hope of laying the foundations for inter-ethnic cohesion so long as self-interested community-based politicking trumps socio-economic development.

On 28 May 2009, UN Special Rapporteur Professor Philip Alston published a report calling for the sacking of Police Commissioner, Major General Hussein Ali, and the resignation of Attorney General, Amos Wako. Detailing his findings on extrajudicial killings in Kenya, Alston accused the Police Commissioner, the Attorney General and the judiciary of perpetrating, aiding and abetting impunity.

The brutal tactics of Kenya's security forces have long been criticized. With a police hit squad known as the Kwekwe formed to combat the emergence of Mungiki, secret police killings of more than 500 youths were reportedly sanctioned by the government. State aggression on a similar scale was widely documented during the 2007 post-election violence and in 2008 in Mt Elgon district, where as many as 220 people were allegedly killed in a campaign to end the activities of the Sabaot Land Defence Force militia group.

With violence routinely used by Kenya's security forces under the guise of law and order, there can be little hope of restoring faith in the state as a protector of people's rights so long as police officers and other security agents are able to kill with impunity. The prospect looms of a cycle of violence that pits the state against local militias and gangs, disconnected with the government and its inability to deliver for all citizens.

As in the former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, so too in Kenya in the absence of impartial agents of the state, fear grows. Citizens rely on ethnic militias to protect them, adopting their ethnic identities as a means of survival. Inevitably, all groups will arm themselves to prepare for the worst, which makes the worst more likely.

As long as the state resorts to force to resolve its problems, governments in Kenya will have little incentive to grapple with the root cause of the gangs and militias. Social unrest will go on as long as the government, police and security services remain unaccountable, opting for conflict over conciliation.

Autore: Nicholas Daniels

Fonte: www.opendemocracy.net

Kenya: The Hague or Local Tribunal

Wirepullers: il Kenya, uno dei paesi più prosperi dell'intero continente nero in passato, potrebbe essere sull'orlo del baratro. Lo scoppio delle violenze dopo le elezioni del 2007, abilmente trasformate dalla classe politica in un confronto di carattere etnico, avevano messo a serio rischio la stabilità del paese. Solo l'intervento dell'ex segretario generale dell'ONU, Kofi Annan, e la creazione della Grande Coalizione, che dava ai due grandi contendenti, Mwai Kibaki e Raila Odinga, il ruolo di presidente, al primo e di primo ministro, al secondo, sembravano aver chiuso uno dei capitoli più insanguinati della storia kenyana. In realtà si era semplicemente messo un coperchio su una pentola che ha continuato a bollire. Gli ingredienti: milizie, gang, vigilanti. Oggi è arrivato il momento di togliere quel coperchio e giudicare i colpevoli delle violenze del post-elezioni. Tribunali locali o internazionali? E' questa la grande questione intorno alla quale ruota il futuro di questo paese e di tutta la regione, considerata la velocità sistemica con cui, a sud del Sahara, i conflitti interni di un paese si trasmettono a quelli vicini . Per evitare un'altra Somalia. (1)

Africa’s first female Nobel laureate ponders on whether the masterminds of Kenya’s 2008 post-election violence should be tried locally or extradited to the International Criminal Court(ICC).

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his team of Eminent Persons finally decided to hand over the Waki envelope to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo. They did so because they gave up on the willingness of Kenyan political leadership to establish a local tribunal to try the perpetrators of the country’s 2008 post-election violence.

Until then they believed, just like I do, that a local tribunal would have provided the better option. The Hague option was their last resort.Although I have argued for a local tribunal all along, it is increasingly clear that most Kenyans prefer The Hague option. This is because many Kenyans believe that, left to them, the politicians will not arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of the post-election violence because it amounts to arresting and prosecuting themselves. Kenyans argue that the country has a history of impunity that stretches back to the colonial days. The culture of impunity is so entrenched that perpetrators of serious crimes have always escaped unpunished. For example, those who perpetrated tribal clashes in 1991, 1992 and 1997 have never been punished, and the youth of those days matured to commit the same crimes in 2008. Such criminals escaped punishment because they were largely in the government.

In recent times, even those responsible for extrajudicial killings of hundreds of youths, or those associated with the infamous “Goldenberg” and “Anglo-leasing” corruption scandals are largely in government and have escaped punishment. As long as the government is perceived to provide cover for such criminals - because they are a part of the same government - the public loses trust in the government’s capacity to arrest and prosecute those who committed the 2008 crimes. For sure, the Kenya Government can arrest and prosecute the “small fishes” who committed murder, rape, arson and destroyed property. These were mostly neighbours who turned on fellow citizens after being incited and funded. Calling them to account for their crimes while letting the “big fish” off the hook would be a gross misadministration of justice. Unfortunately for us, those who incited and funded militias are now government ministers, members of parliament and senior civil servants. Quite obviously, they cannot be expected to arrest and prosecute themselves!

That is why many Kenyans vouch for the The Hague option as opposed to the local tribunal. Kenya does not have leadership that can confront its own demons and deal with them fairly and justly. The current government is both divided and divisive. As we approach the next general elections in 2012, nothing could stop the recurrence of the same mayhem between the same ethnic communities, which still view each other suspiciously, and with much pain, fear and frustration. If we had the right leadership, a local tribunal would be best. This is because the entire process of trials, judgments and punishment would help Kenya strengthen the judicial system, affirming that it is not a failed state, rekindling faith in systems of justice and providing a chance for truth, justice and reconciliation.

Peaceful co-existence between the different communities will only be realized when justice becomes the defender and fellow citizens realize that crimes against humanity carry penalties, not rewards. It would have been valuable for Kenya to experience the administration of justice within the country, so that its citizens can see that they live in a country where law and order are respected and all citizens are subjected to the same law. Carrying out the process within our borders will also send a message that the country will not tolerate impunity - especially from its leaders. It will also show that Kenya will not need The Hague or the international community every time its leaders commit serious crimes.

There is need to develop confidence in ourselves and our institutions to deal with all crimes within our borders. Only if the country were to fail completely, with all its institutions collapsing, should Kenya surrender to international institutions. Such confidence would also nurture a sense of unity and belonging. Once the country deals with the perpetrators of crimes, the country will have a more conducive environment for truth, healing, reconciliation and restitution.

Autore: Wangari Maathai

Fonte: www.newsfromafrica.org

Think Twice on Bashir

Wirepullers: il 4 marzo 2009 è una data a suo modo storica. La corte penale internazionale spicca infatti un mandato d'arresto per un capo di stato in carica. Si tratta di Omar-al-Bashir, presidente del Sudan. L'accusa: crimini di guerra e contro l'umanità, per quanto sta succedendo da anni in Darfur, regione occidentale del Sudan. Ma arrestare e processare al-Bashir non è così facile. Intorno alla sua figura infatti s'impernia uno scontro che vede confrontarsi silenziosamente Cina, Russia, Unione Africana e Lega Araba, contrarie all'arresto, da un lato e ONU e Unione Europea dall'altro. Questo scontro rifletterebbe soprattutto divisioni economiche e geopolitiche, più che questioni di giustizia. E qualcuno parla di neocolonialismo. (3)

Throwing Sudan's president in jail would bring a measure of justice. It would also be a disaster for Darfur.

Should the president of Sudan, the notorious Omar al-Bashir, go to jail? This week the International Criminal Court at The Hague issued a warrant to arrest the Sudanese president for his role in the death of 300,000 people and the displacement of millions more during the six-year conflict in Darfur. It is the first time the court has charged a sitting head of state, and given the vile crimes committed in Darfur, a conviction would at last give the victims and their families some measure of justice.

But policymakers ought to think twice before following through on the ICC's decision. While the warrant sends a clear signal to Bashir and others with blood on their hands that justice will be served, it has already halted further progress at the Darfur peace talks that have been underway in Qatar between Khartoum and the most powerful rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement. While these talks have to date yielded little more than a good-will agreement to end the conflict, it appears that thearrest warrant for Bashir has shattered even these fragile gains, as the rebel group announced in the wake of the ICC warrant that it is pulling back from further negotiations. Bashir too may now see little to gain from them.

The warrant could also endanger the United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian workers who have done so much to reduce the suffering in the region. Although the horrors continue in Darfur, they are nowhere near the level that existed before these workers were allowed to operate. Soon after the ICC ruling, Sudan announced that it was expelling many aid groups, which will clearly jeapordize the delivery of much-needed humanitarian assistance. The UN could be next.

Finally, and most ominously, the warrant could undermine the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between northern and southern Sudan, which brought to an end a civil war that lasted 20 years and cost more than 2 million lives. This landmark deal is fraying badly already. Elections scheduled for 2009 are behind schedule, and implementation of wealth and power-sharing provisions have stalled. Bashir fought many in his party to sign the CPA, and leaders in the south now worry that the indictment will jeopardize the 2011 referendum giving it the right to secede from Sudan. Collapse of the CPA would almost certainly lead to renewed conflict between north and south, with fragmentation and bloodshed that could rival the violence of Darfur at its worst.

So what to do? Africa's regional leaders may provide the answer. The African Union has for some time been pushing to have the indictment deferred by the U.N. Security Council, which it has the authority to do under Article 16 of the ICC charter. Support for deferral is widespread among African leaders, many of whom view the court with some suspicion because every ICC indictment handed down since its inception in 2002has been against Africans. The Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the semiautonomous government of Southern Sudan have also voiced support for a deferral.

Getting this deferral will require at least nine votes on the U.N.'s 15-member Security Council. It would also need to survive a veto from the five permanent members. U.S. support—or, at the very least, acceptance—would be crucial for the measure to pass, and after earlier declaring its support for the ICC's indictment, the Obama administration is now reportedly reconsidering its stance.

That might be unpalatable to many of Obama's supporters and the human-rights community. But deferring the warrant would be contingent upon concessions from Bashir and his party—namely, agreements to work to hasten the implementation of the CPA, hold elections this year and work with the UN and international mediators toward peace in Darfur, starting immediately with a ceasefire. Backed by strong U.S. leadership, a conditional deferral must also be accompanied by a reinvigorated peace effort in Sudan, refocusing the international community on the CPA and pressing all parties for a negotiated settlement in Darfur.

There are valid concerns that Bashir would renege on his agreements. As the Bush administration discovered with Sudan, matching words with deeds can be a constant source of frustration and disappointment. But if this happens, the United States could always push to reinstate the indictment and use the warrant as leverage to compel Khartoum to act and honor its commitments.

This is not the perfect solution—foreign policy rarely offers them. But clear priorities and tough compromises will be necessary to prevent the worst from happening in Sudan. A conditional suspension of the ICC's warrant for Bashir is the best way to prevent a collapse of the CPA, protect those still in need and force Khartoum to act toward ending the conflict in Darfur.

Autori: Paul Stares eAlexander Noyes

Fonte: www.newsweek.com

Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC

Wirepullers: il 4 marzo 2009 è una data a suo modo storica. La corte penale internazionale spicca infatti un mandato d'arresto per un capo di stato in carica. Si tratta di Omar-al-Bashir, presidente del Sudan. L'accusa: crimini di guerra e contro l'umanità, per quanto sta succedendo da anni in Darfur, regione occidentale del Sudan. Ma arrestare e processare al-Bashir non è così facile. Intorno alla sua figura infatti s'impernia uno scontro che vede confrontarsi silenziosamente Cina, Russia, Unione Africana e Lega Araba, contrarie all'arresto, da un lato e ONU e Unione Europea dall'altro. Questo scontro rifletterebbe soprattutto divisioni economiche e geopolitiche, più che questioni di giustizia. E qualcuno parla di neocolonialismo. (2)

The International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against President Bashir for atrocity crimes in Darfur has brought Sudan to a new decision point. The long-ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has defied the court, gained African Union (AU) and Arab League pressure on the Security Council to suspend the case and restricted humanitarian aid in Darfur, putting several million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and others at risk. Darfur rebels have been emboldened, reducing prospects for diplomatic progress. Simultaneously, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the North-South civil war is unravelling. As a new U.S. special representative begins to make his mark, the international community may be ready to sacrifice the justice issue for a quick-fix deal that would ensure elections in 2010. But Sudan will have peace only when its impunity system is dismantled. The right course is to build leverage by strongly backing the ICC so as to persuade the NCP that it will only secure the deferral of Bashir’s case by adopting and implementing serious reforms.

In 2005, the Security Council gave the ICC jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur. The prosecutor eventually obtained arrest warrants against one mid-level official and one militia commander and then applied in July 2008 for a warrant against the president. The NCP sought to mobilise African, Arab and Islamic help by charging that the court, and its prosecutor in particular, was an instrument of a Western campaign against its Islamic discourse and for regime change. Domestically, it launched the Sudan People’s Initiative (SPI), advertised as a broad-based national consultation to come up with Darfur solutions, but it tightly controlled proceedings and has not carried out its recommendations.

Violence intensified in Darfur from September 2008 onwards, with deadly attacks on aid workers and the peacekeepers of the joint UN/AU mission (UNAMID). Inter-tribal clashes and fighting between government and rebel forces continued unabated, creating new civilian displacements. On 4 March 2009, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the arrest of Bashir, upon which the NCP retaliated by expelling thirteen international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that had been providing vital food and health services. Perceiving Bashir to be weakened by the arrest warrant, opposition and rebel groups hardened their positions and became even more reluctant to engage genuinely with the government. Though the Darfur rebel group JEM signed a “good will” agreement to pursue further talks with the government in February 2009, fighting continued on the ground, and the mediation process set up by Qatar in Doha appears stymied.

Attention has turned increasingly to the overarching threat in Sudan: possible collapse of the CPA, which could mean a return to wider civil war. The NCP has held back the key concessions required for the democratic transformation that agreement appeared to promise, including repeal of repressive laws and restoration of basic freedom of association and expression, and it has blocked the actions necessary for a peaceful referendum, such as a credible census, demarcation of the border, fuller wealth-sharing and de-escalation of local conflicts in the transitional areas of Abyei, South Kor­do­fan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It appears to have decided to allow neither the secession of South Sudan nor meaningful political reforms in the North. The South’s goal is now to maintain its 2011 self-determination referendum.

The international community, including the Obama administration and its new special envoy, Scott Gration, who shows welcome signs of activism, is right to make saving the CPA a priority. But the temptation is to accept a humanitarian, political and security quick-fix on Darfur in order to preserve chances to hold the 2010 general elections on time and move on to the 2011 referendum. Justice for the crimes committed in Darfur would be in danger of disappearing from that kind of peace process, just as it was dropped from the CPA negotiation itself in 2005 and later from the Eastern Sudan and Darfur Peace Agreements.

That would be a mistake. Justice and peace are closely connected in Darfur. Judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms leading to reconciliation and a culture of accountability are essential to the success and sustainability of the peace process there. Nor will there be sustainable peace in northern Sudan if the system of impunity is not done away with and genuine change of governance promoted. If the NCP is allowed to relegitimise its rule and close the door to political accommodation with Darfur rebels through a fraudulent electoral process in 2010, northern Sudan will likewise face increased turmoil. That turmoil and the failure to deal with census, border and military redeployment issues will also undermine the conditions for a peaceful referendum in the South on the future of that region.

The U.S. and other international partners of the Sudan peace process should increase pressure on the NCP in order to create a chance for meaningful policy changes. The best way to do so is to reconfirm their support for execution of the ICC arrest warrants and to deliver a firm message in Khartoum that they will only consider a Security Council resolution suspending execution (via the procedure for one-year renewable deferral provided in Article 16 of the Rome Statute that established the ICC) if the NCP first takes a series of specific and irreversible steps, including but not limited to acceptance of judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms as key elements of a Darfur settlement.

What is needed is not to sacrifice peace in Darfur to save the CPA – in any event a self-defeating proposition – but to strengthen peacebuilding throughout Sudan by taking aim at the system of impunity that has led to and prolonged the country’s multiple conflicts.

Recommendations

To the National Congress Party:
1. Implement legal and judicial measures to end impunity in Darfur, such as:
a) appointing non-partisan judges, including in the special courts;
b) ensuring the independence of courts, reviewing police investigation, arrest and prosecution procedures and replacing the chief justices and police commanders in the three Darfur states;
c) holding all government forces and associated militias accountable for their violations of international humanitarian law, such as attacks on civilians; destruction of property, livelihoods and means of sustenance, including wells and granaries; murder; forcible transfer of populations; and inhumane acts such as torture and rape; and
d) amending the provisions in the police law, the criminal law and the criminal procedural law that give the police and security personnel immunity.

2. Review the security management committee in each Darfur state and allow UNAMID to participate in it.

3. Replace the governors and their deputies by technocrats to administer the three Darfur states until elections.

4. Persuade President Bashir to step down as soon as possible, and in any event before the general elections.

5. Nominate another presidential candidate and agree with the GNU to postpone the election to 2011, so as to give time for Darfur’s stabilisation and allow fair Darfuri participation in the process.

6. Engage genuinely with the ICC.

7. Prosecute officials for whom the ICC has issued arrest warrants, by first suspending Ahmed Haroun, governor of Southern Kordofan state, and then bringing him and militia commander Ali Kushayb to trial in a credibly independent Sudanese court for the alleged crimes that are the subject of the ICC proceedings.

8. Suspend application of any court decisions on political and military prisoners in Darfur pending a final peace agreement there.

9. Establish a Transitional Darfur Task Force (TDTF), a high-level committee comprised of the president, first vice president, special envoy of the UN/AU, chief commander of UNAMID and the justice, interior and humanitarian affairs ministers, to monitor implementation of the above judicial and accountability measures.

10. Accept and implement a comprehensive ceasefire in the three Darfur states through the Doha peace process.

To all Darfur Rebel Movements:
11. Participate in the UN/AU/Qatar-supported Doha peace process and accept and implement a comprehensive ceasefire in Darfur, as well as judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms, as key components for settlement of the conflict.

To the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, particularly the U.S. and China:
12. Affirm their support for the ICC and insist that Sudan and other countries cooperate with the execution of the arrest warrants, unless or until the Security Council defers the prosecutions in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute.

13. Agree to deferral on the basis of Article 16 only on condition that the Government of Sudan first implements the measures set out above.

14. Recommend to the UN/AU special envoy in charge of the Darfur peace process that judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms be included as key components of any settlement.

To the UN and AU Special Envoy, Djibrill Bassolé:
15. Put judicial reforms and transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission and vetting procedures prominently on the Doha agenda.

To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court:
16. Proceed with investigations into crimes allegedly committed by other senior Sudanese officials and rebel leaders in Darfur and consider seriously the option of sealed arrest warrants where appropriate.

To the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD):
17. Request the NCP to demonstrate progress in national investigations into the policies that drove the crimes and support the inclusion of judicial reforms, lifting of instituationalised immunities and the establishment of credible transitional justice mechanisms as key elements of the Darfur peace process.

18. Recommend practical measures for transforming the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights into a court able to conduct trials for atrocity crimes on the continent.

Fonte: http://www.crisisgroup.org/

Se l’Unione Africana si oppone all’arresto del dittatore del Sudan

Wirepullers: il 4 marzo 2009 è una data a suo modo storica. La corte penale internazionale spicca infatti un mandato d'arresto per un capo di stato in carica. Si tratta di Omar-al-Bashir, presidente del Sudan. L'accusa: crimini di guerra e contro l'umanità, per quanto sta succedendo da anni in Darfur, regione occidentale del Sudan. Ma arrestare e processare al-Bashir non è così facile. Intorno alla sua figura infatti s'impernia uno scontro che vede confrontarsi silenziosamente Cina, Russia, Unione Africana e Lega Araba, contrarie all'arresto, da un lato e ONU e Unione Europea dall'altro. Questo scontro rifletterebbe soprattutto divisioni economiche e geopolitiche, più che questioni di giustizia. E qualcuno parla di neocolonialismo. (1)

Nel corso di un vertice svoltosi a Sirte (in Libia) all’inizio di luglio, l’Unione Africana (UA) ha dichiarato di non voler cooperare con la richiesta di arresto del Presidente del Sudan Al-Bashir, emessa dalla Corte Penale Internazionale (Cpi) lo scorso marzo.

Le motivazioni e le reazioni in Sudan

La decisione è giunta al termine di un periodo in cui l’UA aveva più volte chiesto il differimento dell’iniziativa contro Bashir, appellandosi all’art. 16 dello Statuto della Corte, che prevede la possibilità, su richiesta del Consiglio di Sicurezza Onu, di sospendere per un anno (rinnovabile) la procedura della Cpi. L’UA aveva espresso il timore che la richiesta di arresto potesse indebolire gli sforzi per il processo di pace in Darfur; per questo , secondo il presidente del Ghana John Atta Mills, la decisione dell’UA rappresenta “il meglio per l’Africa”: “Abbiamo bisogno di una soluzione durevole per il Darfur e il presidente del Sudan è una parte importante della soluzione. Con lui fuori, sarebbe molto difficile raggiungere una soluzione al conflitto nella regione. Per questo abbiamo richiesto il differimento della procedura della Corte”.

Diversi commentatori hanno sottolineato la “frustrazione” dei paesi africani per il rifiuto del Consiglio di Sicurezza ONU di sospendere la procedura. Tale frustrazione ha giocato un ruolo fondamentale nella decisione assunta dall’Unione Africana. Il presidente della Commissione dell’UA Jean Ping ha dichiarato che l’UA “sta dimostrando alla comunità internazionale che, se si rifiuta di ascoltare il continente africano, se non vuole tenere conto delle proposte degli stati africani, questi sono disposti ad agire in maniera unilaterale”. La reazione delle autorità sudanesi è stata ovviamente di grande soddisfazione (consente fra l’altro a Bashir di recarsi negli altri paesi africani senza timore di essere arrestato); il portavoce del ministero degli esteri del paese Ali Al-Sadiq ha dichiarato che “la decisione dell’UA ci fa capire che non siamo soli e che la gente è con noi”. I movimenti di opposizione hanno invece criticato aspramente la decisione. Abdel Wahid, figura di riferimento del Sudan Liberation Army (Sla) ha parlato di “perdita di legittimità morale e legale da parte dell’UA” e il Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) ha reagito rifiutando di portare avanti il dialogo con il panel di esperti promosso dall’UA nel febbraio di quest’anno e presieduto dall’ex presidente sudafricano Thabo Mbeki.

Le voci dissenzienti

Nonostante l’approvazione della risoluzione, nel vertice UA si sono registrate diverse manifestazioni di dissenso, soprattutto del Botswana e del Chad (a cui, nei giorni successivi, si è unita anche l’Uganda), che tuttavia sono state rapidamente messe a tacere. Nei mesi scorsi il Botswana e il Sud Africa avevano dichiarato che, nel caso in cui il leader sudanese Bashir si fosse trovato nel loro territorio, avrebbero eseguito la richiesta di arresto della Corte Penale Internazionale; per questo motivo Bashir non aveva partecipato alla cerimonia di insediamento del nuovo presidente sudafricano Jacob Zuma.

Neanche le organizzazioni umanitarie hanno lesinato critiche alla decisione dell’UA. Erwin van der Borght, direttore della sezione africana di Amnesty International, ha sottolineato che la decisione “dimostra il disprezzo nei confronti di quanti in Darfur soffrono delle violazioni dei diritti umani e ridicolizza il ruolo dell’UA come organizzazione internazionale”. Il procuratore della Cpi, Ocampo da parte sua ha evidenziato che la decisione dell’UA non è stata una vittoria per il Sudan o per Bashir, in quanto “nessuno ha detto che è innocente” e che “ognuno dei 30 stati africani che hanno firmato il trattato di Roma istitutivo della Corte deve decidere da sé se arrestare il presidente sudanese”.

L’azione dell’UA nel Darfur

La decisione dell’UA giunge al termine di un periodo di intensa attività dell’organizzazione nei confronti del conflitto in Darfur, sia a livello militare che diplomatico. La missione militare dell’UA nella regione - African Unione Mission in Sudan (Amis) - costituisce il primo importante banco di prova per la nuova organizzazione africana (sorta nel 2002 sulle ceneri dell’Organizzazione dell’Unità africana iniziata nel 2004), la missione ha mostrato da subito diversi punti deboli: un mandato non adeguato rispetto alle esigenze reali del Darfur, la mancanza di risorse e la scarsa disponibilità del governo di Khartoum a cooperare. Per questo motivo, nel 2007, la missione è stata sostituita da una missione “ibrida” Onu/UA, l’African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, la più ampia forza di peacekeeping mai dispiegata, con oltre 30.000 uomini tra militari, polizia e personale civile. Purtroppo anche questa missione è stata caratterizzata da forti difficoltà in seguito a ritardi nella dislocazione delle truppe, una preparazione non adeguata dei militari e l’insufficienza delle risorse logistiche e finanziarie.

Anche per quanto riguarda l’attività diplomatica il bilancio dell’UA presenta molte ombre. L’organizzazione ha coordinato i colloqui di pace del biennio 2004-2006 culminati nel Darfur Peace Agreement. L’accordo, firmato dal governo e dalla fazione Sla di Minni Minawi, è stato però duramente criticato non solo dagli altri movimenti di opposizione (che hanno ritenuto insufficienti le misure di carattere economico, politico e amministrativo), ma anche da molti commentatori internazionali.

Ragioni della decisione e possibili sviluppi

La decisione dell’UA assume una particolare rilevanza in quanto sottoscritta dai leader di oltre 30 paesi africani firmatari dello statuto della Corte Penale Internazionale. In precedenza altre organizzazioni (Lega Araba, Movimenti dei non-allineati, Organizzazione della conferenza islamica e Consiglio per la Cooperazione nel Golfo) avevano preso posizione contro la richiesta di arresto di Bashir. Nonostante anche l’UA avesse espresso forti perplessità sulla sentenza, non aveva però adottato decisioni chiaramente contrarie alla richiesta della Corte.

A indurre l’UA ad adottare la risoluzione sono state innanzitutto le pressioni di Gheddafi (denunciate anche da alcune organizzazioni umanitarie, es. Human Rights Watch). La posizione di Gheddafi sulla Corte e sulla vicenda Bashir, del resto, è nota: per il leader libico la Corte rappresenta una “nuova forma di terrorismo mondiale”. Nei giorni precedenti la richiesta di arresto Gheddafi aveva minacciato di far ritirare tutti gli stati africani firmatari dallo Statuto della Corte, mostrando poi particolare solerzia sia nell’esprimere solidarietà al presidente sudanese che nel riceverlo in visita dopo la richiesta di arresto. Ma, a parte Gheddafi, c’è un altro motivo, dietro alla decisione dell’AU: molti leader africani sono poi preoccupati che l’iniziativa contro Bashir possa essere solo la prima di una serie di iniziative simili contro di loro.

La decisione dell’UA infligge un duro colpo al ruolo di mediazione svolto fino ad oggi dall’organizzazione in Sudan. D’ora in poi sarà molto difficile per l’UA proporsi come terzo neutrale nei colloqui di pace tra il governo sudanese e le forze di opposizione. La decisione è un pericoloso precedente, che potrebbe minare la credibilità della stessa Corte: sancendo una presunta “negoziabilità dei diritti umani”, essa mette in secondo piano le responsabilità di Bashir per le persecuzioni dei civili, che potrebbero continuare anche grazie al “clima” di impunità creatosi. La decisione, infine, colpisce la credibilità di iniziative “parallele”, come ad es. il panel di esperti presieduto da Mbeki che mira a trovare meccanismi giudiziari alternativi alla Cpi in grado di garantire la punizione dei responsabili delle violazioni dei diritti umani in Darfur. Per questo motivo Mbeki, nei giorni precedenti l’incontro di Sirte, ha tentato con ogni mezzo di evitare che l’UA compisse questa scelta.

Autore: Stefano Cera

Fonte: www.affarinternazionali.it

Travel Advisory: the real reasons for Hillary Clinton's trip to Africa

Wirepullers: Hillary Clinton é in missione in Africa. Visiterà sette paesi, in un viaggio che dovrebbe rappresentare, agli occhi delle popolazioni locali, una dichiarazione di impegno e una promessa di aiuto da parte dell'amministrazione Obama nei confronti del continente nero. Questo viaggio però potrebbe anche essere una prima contromossa americana, nella partita che vedrà gli USA sempre più impegnati in futuro ad arginare il montare della marea rossa cinese. E non si poteva certo ignorare quello che, da alcuni anni ormai, è il supermercato di Pechino per le materie prime. (3)

A single scene in the movie Dave, a political comedy about an imposter in the White House, probably does the best job of summing up most American political trips to Africa. In his first appearance, halfway through the movie, a dour-looking Ben Kingsley, playing the vice president, appears in the Oval Office bearing fertility beads from Togo and a giant hat from the people of Burundi. He had been sent on an extended tour through the continent by a president determined to strip him of all power and influence. "They know hats in Burundi," the president responds. Africa is a punch line. It may be a place where do-gooders can make a difference; it's just not where the big dogs make their mark.

But the Obama administration is putting Africa front and center this summer, hoping to demonstrate that the continent will no longer be sidelined in American foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton touched down in Nairobi on Tuesday night, kicking off a seven-country tour of Africa's major capitals. That comes on the heels of Obama's address last month in Ghana, which, as administration officials keep telling us, marks the earliest and biggest commitment of U.S. diplomatic attention to the region of any modern presidency.

On the surface, there's reason to take them at their word; Hillary Clinton has long been outspoken on causes like development, health, poverty, and gender violence. Plus, far from doing a diplomatic happy tour, she has chosen to visit some of the region's most volatile hotspots. But will words translate to actions, or is this just about image control for the administration? Here is an unscientific survey of Clinton's objectives at each stop on the trip.

Country: Kenya

Purpose: Strategy

The United States has an interest in keeping Kenya stable, so Clinton has a good deal on her plate in Nairobi. For one, it's an important base from which to watch war-on-terror investments in the Horn of Africa, where U.S. and Kenyan forces jointly guard the Indian Ocean coastline. While in Nairobi, Clinton is meeting with Somalia's beleaguered transitional government, giving her an opportunity to address the most terror-prone area on the continent. But the biggest thing Clinton will be tackling there is a continentwide economic conference, which puts the spotlight on the African Growth and Opportunity Act, legislation passed under Bill Clinton that expanded the number of tariff-free goods sub-Saharan countries could export to the United States. Kenya is an economic engine in eastern Africa, even if its industries are not world-class, which means its political and economic success matters to Clinton. The country has already exploded once in recent years; unless its two-sided government of unity—jokingly called the government of impunity—learns to work together (Clinton admonished it to cooperate yesterday), it could do so again.

Country: South Africa

Purpose: Strategy

This is a getting-to-know you venture. South Africa is the top superpower on the continent, but relations were strained between Washington and Johannesburg under the country's former president, Thabo Mbeki, and it's still unclear how closely the new president, Jacob Zuma, will hew to his predecessor's line. One of the biggest splits was over Zimbabwe; American officials wanted Mbeki to take a more pro-active role, while Mbeki wanted the United States to stay out of his backyard. Clinton will probably try to bring up Zimbabwe, but it remains a touchy subject under Zuma. Instead, he'll want to talk about South Africa's economy, which is in its first recession in more than a decade. With riots on the streets over his failure to deliver on promises to the country's poor, Zuma may hope to capitalize on improved relations with the United States. That bodes well for Clinton.

Country: Angola

Purpose: Pure strategy

After years of bitter distance (prompted by Ronald Reagan's intervention during the civil war on behalf of anticommunist forces), Washington has developed a budding relationship with Angola this decade, spurred mostly by the discovery of massive unexploited oilfields. Angola is now the top oil exporter in Africa, with all the familiar trappings: concentrated oil wealth, trouble with democracy, and a 48 percent unemployment rate. With American oil companies set up there, the U.S. is now investing in the country in the form of business and military support. But that calculation might be hurting America's image in the rest of Africa, where criticism has mounted over the American friendship with President José Eduardo Dos Santos, who has held power for more than 30 years. President Bush's oft-stated concern for human rights and democracy in Angola was seen on the continent as little more than a pretense, since he never followed up his words with actions. That may differ under Obama, but it probably doesn't rank high on Clinton's list of objectives for this particular trip.

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Purpose: Strictly public relations

There's no doubt that the issues Clinton will address in the DRC are near and dear to her—and, in fact, there's probably no one better qualified to address them. She is obviously offended enough by the abysmal human rights and sexual abuses around Goma to speak forcefully about the need to combat them. But, in the end, the issues surrounding Congo's decade-long civil war are much too big to be tackled with a good speech. For one, even though the U.N. force in the Congo is the largest in the world, it's never been adequate to contain a grab for power that has pulled in forces from at least two neighboring countries and countless militias. With $27 trillion worth of goodies under the ground in the Congo, unless she's willing to put a fortune on the line, Clinton won't be able to make President Joseph Kabila do anything.

Country: Nigeria

Purpose: Strategy, but we'll only hear the PR

It would be impossible for Clinton to go to Nigeria without at least mentioning the country's endemic corruption problem (which landed it at the bottom of Transparency International's global ranking) and the increasing unrest in its oil-rich Niger Delta region. In public, she'll talk about investment opportunities, emphasizing Nigeria's importance as a regional partner to soothe relations (Nigerian officials claim they were snubbed during President Obama's Ghana trip). But an important reality remains: of the $38 billion worth of goods the United States imported from Nigeria last year, all but $70 million was in oil. While Clinton's pressure on the corruption, good governance, and development fronts is likely sincere, she knows it will likely fall on deaf ears. This, like with Angola, is essentially another oil-state visit.

Country: Liberia

Purpose: Strictly PR

This is the one real feel-good stop on the tour. Liberia has been an ally of Washington more or less since it was settled by American freedmen in 1822. Clinton will celebrate the first female president on the continent, although the world's honeymoon with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is ending as corruption in her administration becomes apparent. Still, Clinton is looking to bolster the continent's only female leader, and hammering home a complaint about corruption probably won't rank high on Clinton's to-do list.

Country: Cape Verde

Purpose: Strategy

This one was generally off the beaten path, seen as a stable, democratic success story in Africa—as evidenced by its recent upgrade from the least-developed to a medium-developed ranking on the U.N.'s development index. Mostly it's known as a stopover point on shipping routes. But it is also a good strategic spot from which to watch the Gulf of Guinea, where trouble spots like Nigeria are located. Clinton will likely just ratify her relationship with President Pedro Pires.

Autore: Katie Paul

Fonte: www.newsweek.com