Cerca nel blog

Visualizzazione post con etichetta Gas. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta Gas. Mostra tutti i post

domenica 4 ottobre 2009

L'Iran tra nucleare, gas e petrolio

Wirepullers: è il Grande Gioco dei giorni nostri. Al tavolo Iran, Stati Uniti e Israele, impegnati in una serie di scaramucce, minacce, simulazioni e dissimulazioni. In realtà al Gioco partecipano in molti e per scoprire chi sono gli altri partecipanti basta seguire le vie del gas. Si parte dai nuovi test missilistici iraniani, si passa ai dossier dell'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia Atomica, che ci dicono che Teheran è sempre più vicina al possesso della bomba e si arriva alla politica estera di Obama il quale, tendendo la mano ad Ahmadinejad, sta mettendo il leader iraniano in seria difficoltà. Per il presidente iraniano la crisi politica sembra alle porte (si sta già parlando della nomina di un suo successore). Ecco allora che serve un nuovo (vecchio) nemico: Israele. E' Tel Aviv che, sotto la minaccia dei nuovi test nucleari iraniani, può rappresentare la via d'uscita di Ahmadinejad dall'impasse che sta affliggendo la Repubblica iraniana. Provocare il più possibile Israele, dato che Obama sembra imperturbabile e saldamente ancorato alla via della non belligeranza e porsi nuovamente come l'uomo forte, che sa tenere testa all'odiato nemico. Una crisi tutta interna quindi, se non fosse che l'Iran è uno dei protagonisti della grande corsa al gas che caratterizzerà la politica energetica mondiale dei prossimi decenni. Nabucco contro South Stream, Obama contro Putin, tutti contro tutti. (5)

Gli Stati Uniti hanno difficoltà nel gestire il "dossier iraniano" fin dai tempi di Khomeini. Allora la strategia americana si basava sull'estremismo idealista di Jimmy Carter, e sul "realismo ingenuo" dei suoi consiglieri. Gli USA prima cercarono di contenere l'espansione sovietica in Iran (dove sciiti e comunisti erano alleati contro lo scià), e poi in Afghanistan (supportando la nascente armata internazionale jihadista). L'Italia entrò in maniera indecorosa nella vicenda della liberazione degli ostaggi americani, ottenenuta anche con operazioni finanziarie della BNL del bolognese Nerio Nesi, poi costretto alle dimissioni. La guerra fredda fu vinta facendo leva sul prezzo del petrolio, che Reagan e gli alleati sauditi fecero scendere a un livello tale da togliere ogni entrata alle dissanguate finanze sovietiche.Proprio il petrolio in questi anni fornisce nuova linfa alla Russia di Putin.

L'Iran si muove su due linee: il "fronte nucleare" e quello del petrolio e del gas (è il secondo paese al mondo per riserve). In entrambi i contesti Ahmadinejad gioca di sponda con la Russia. E' un gioco finora vincente: se il programma atomico viene bloccato, in cambio si ottiene il monopolio mondiale di petrolio e gas, in condominio con i sunniti arabi, ma in alleanza economica con Cina, Venezuela e Algeria. E' di questo che si tratta, né più né meno.

L'embargo dell'ONU è legato a petrolio e gas, anche se riguarda il nucleare. Ieri Tom Casey, portavoce del Dipartimento di Stato USA, ha riferito che i rappresentanti di Stati Uniti, Russia, Cina, Regno Unito, Francia, Germania, dopo essersi incontrati a Washington, richiederanno nuove sanzioni. L'ultimo rapporto della AIEA sostiene che il programma iraniano "potrebbe" essere andato avanti anche dopo il 2003. Ma il Consiglio di Sicurezza ONU rimane diviso, visto che Africa del Sud, Indonesia, Libia e Vietnam (membri non permanenti) restano ostili a questa opzione. La contromossa non si è fatta attendere: l'ayatollah Ali Khamanei si è congratulato col presidente Ahmadinejad per la "grande vittoria," ottenuta sul dossier nucleare. Non ha tutti i torti.

Una terza arma di pressione dell'Iran è quella delle minacce contro Israele. Di conseguenza, Gerusalemme è molto sensibile a quanto succede nel paese dei Parsi (dove vi sono combattive minoranze curde, mentre gli azeri sono più di 20 milioni). Secondo il generale Amos Yadlin, del Servizio di informazioni dell'esercito israeliano (IDF), l'Iran può arrivare all'arma nucleare in due anni. Secondo il quotidiano Ha'aretz entro il 2010 Teheran potrebbe essere in grado di trasportare una bomba su obiettivi israeliani. I vettori disponibili sono i missili di matrice cinese Shihab 3 (raggio di azione 1300 km), di cui si sta sviluppando una versione aggiornata con un raggio di 2000 km.. Dopo questo rapporto, anche Ehud Olmert ha chiesto l'adozione di nuove sanzioni. L'Iran intanto ha siglato un contratto con la China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC). I cinesi gestiranno il giacimento Pars. L'accordo prevede la fornitura di tecnologia cinese (l'embargo colpisce la possibilità per l'Iran di estrarre da sé petrolio e gas), in cambio di gas liquido, per 16 miliardi. Teheran è il secondo produttore di gas dopo la Russia. Le sanzioni hanno favorito la stessa Russia, visto che l'Iran non si è potuta dotare di impianti di liquefazione e di gasdotti, tanto che il suo export è limitato a Turchia e Armenia. E' a questo punto che intervengono i cinesi e i russi. Anche la russa Gazprom ha ottenuto lo sfruttamento di due "blocchi" del giacimento Pars meridionale (condiviso col Qatar), il più esteso al mondo. Il gas potrebbe partire dall'Iran e arrivare in Europa attraverso la russa Gazprom. Il che aggirerebbe il così detto "embargo". La Russia lavora velocemente e bene: la prossima mossa di Mosca è integrare completamente il suo sistema con quello iraniano.

Di fronte a ciò i tempi di Reagan sembrano lontani: oggi Iran e Russia governano il prezzo dell'energia non meno degli arabi. Gli USA e l'Occidente giocano una partita difficile, che si traduce nella crisi economica attuale. E' anche vero che il giudice Ellen Huvelle ha decretato la responsabilità iraniana nell'attentato contro l'ambasciata israeliana di Buenos Aires nel 1992. Secondo il verdetto del giudice il governo di Teheran dovrà pagare 63 milioni alla famiglia di un diplomatico ucciso nel massacro, organizzato dagli Hezbollah, secondo il giudice americano. Aggiungiamo noi: con la complicità di elementi neonazisti argentini, poi diventati buoni amici dei leader socialisti dell'america latina. (Articolo del 28 febbraio 2008)

Autore: Paolo di Lautrèamont

Iran and the Pipelineistan Opera

Wirepullers: è il Grande Gioco dei giorni nostri. Al tavolo Iran, Stati Uniti e Israele, impegnati in una serie di scaramucce, minacce, simulazioni e dissimulazioni. In realtà al Gioco partecipano in molti e per scoprire chi sono gli altri partecipanti basta seguire le vie del gas. Si parte dai nuovi test missilistici iraniani, si passa ai dossier dell'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia Atomica, che ci dicono che Teheran è sempre più vicina al possesso della bomba e si arriva alla politica estera di Obama il quale, tendendo la mano ad Ahmadinejad, sta mettendo il leader iraniano in seria difficoltà. Per il presidente iraniano la crisi politica sembra alle porte (si sta già parlando della nomina di un suo successore). Ecco allora che serve un nuovo (vecchio) nemico: Israele. E' Tel Aviv che, sotto la minaccia dei nuovi test nucleari iraniani, può rappresentare la via d'uscita di Ahmadinejad dall'impasse che sta affliggendo la Repubblica iraniana. Provocare il più possibile Israele, dato che Obama sembra imperturbabile e saldamente ancorato alla via della non belligeranza e porsi nuovamente come l'uomo forte, che sa tenere testa all'odiato nemico. Una crisi tutta interna quindi, se non fosse che l'Iran è uno dei protagonisti della grande corsa al gas che caratterizzerà la politica energetica mondiale dei prossimi decenni. Nabucco contro South Stream, Obama contro Putin, tutti contro tutti. (4)

Jumpin' Jack Verdi, It's a Gas, Gas, Gas.

Oil and natural gas prices may be relatively low right now, but don't be fooled. The New Great Game of the twenty-first century is always over energy and it's taking place on an immense chessboard called Eurasia. Its squares are defined by the networks of pipelines being laid across the oil heartlands of the planet. Call it Pipelineistan. If, in Asia, the stakes in this game are already impossibly high, the same applies to the "Euro" part of the great Eurasian landmass--the richest industrial area on the planet. Think of this as the real political thriller of our time.

The movie of the week in Brussels is: When NATO Meets Pipelineistan. Though you won't find it in any headlines, at virtually every recent NATO summit Washington has been maneuvering to involve reluctant Europeans ever more deeply in the business of protecting Pipelineistan. This is already happening, of course, in Afghanistan, where a promised pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India, the TAPI pipeline, has not even been built. And it's about to happen at the borders of Europe, again around pipelines that have not yet been built.

If you had to put that Euro part of Pipelineistan into a formula, you might do so this way: Nabucco (pushed by the US) versus South Stream (pushed by Russia). Be patient. You'll understand in a moment.

At the most basic level, it's a matter of the West yet again trying, in the energy sphere, to bypass Russia. For this to happen, however--and it wouldn't hurt if you opened the nearest atlas for a moment--Europe desperately needs to get a handle on Central Asian energy resources, which is easy to say, but has proven surprisingly hard to do. No wonder the NATO Secretary General's special representative, Robert Simmons, has been logging massive frequent-flyer miles to Central Asia over these last few years.

Just under the surface of an edgy entente cordiale between the European Union (EU) and Russia lurks the possibility of a no-holds-barred energy war--Liquid War, as I call it. The EU and the US are pinning their hopes on a prospective 3,300-kilometer-long, $10.7 billion pipeline dubbed Nabucco. Planning for it began way back in 2004 and construction is finally expected to start, if all goes well (and it may not), in 2010. So if you're a NATO optimist, you hope that natural gas from the Caspian Sea, maybe even from Iran (barring the usual American blockade), will begin flowing through it by 2015. The gas will be delivered to Erzurum in Turkey and then transported to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.

Why, you might ask, is the pipeline meant to save Europe named for a Verdi opera? Well, Austrian and Turkish energy executives happened to see the opera together in Vienna in 2002 while discussing their energy dilemmas, and the biblical plight of the Jews exiled by King Nabucco (Nebuchadnezzar), a love story set amid a ferocious struggle for freedom and power, swept them away. Still, it's a stretch to turn aluminum tubes into dramatic characters.

Of course, the operatic theater here isn't really in the tubing, it's in the politics and strategic implications that surround the pipeline. In Eastern Europe, for instance, Nabucco is seen not as a European economic or energy project, but as a creature of Washington, just like the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey that President Bill Clinton and his crew backed so vigorously in the 1990s and which was finally finished in 2005. For those who have never believed the Cold War is over--the Eastern Europeans among them--once again it's the good guys (the West) against the commies...sorry, the Russians...at an energy-rich OK Corral.

The Great Borderless Gas Bazaar
Russia's answer to Nabucco is the 1,200-kilometer-long, $15 billion South Stream pipeline, also scheduled to be finished in 2015; it is slated to carry Siberian natural gas under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria. From Bulgaria, one branch of the pipeline would then run south through Greece to southern Italy while the other would run north through Serbia and Hungary towards northern Italy.

Now, add another pipeline to the picture, the $9.1 billion Nord Stream that will soon enough snake from Western Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany, which already imports 41.5 percent of its natural gas from Russia. The giant Russian energy firm Gazprom holds a controlling 51 percent of Nord Stream stock; the rest belongs to German and Dutch companies. The chairman of the board is none other than former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

Put this all together and Russia, with its pipelines running in all directions and firmly embedded in Europe, spells trouble for Nabucco's future and frustration for Washington's New Great Game plans to contain the Russian energy juggernaut. And that's without even mentioning Ukhta which, chances are, you've never heard of. If you aren't in the energy business, why should you have? After all, it's a backwater village in Russia's autonomous republic of Komi, 350 kilometers from the Arctic Circle. Built by forced labor, it was once part of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Gulag archipelago. By 2030, however, you'll know its name. By then, a pipeline from remote Ukhta will be flooding Europe with natural gas and the village will be one of Nord Stream's key transit nodes.

While Nabucco as well as South Stream remain virtual, Nord Stream is a Terminator on the run. By 2010, it will be tunneling under the Baltic Sea heading for Germany. By 2011, it should be delivering the goods and a second pipe--12 meters wide, 100,000 tubes long--will be under construction to double its capacity by 2014. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller pulls no punches: this, he says, will be "the safest and most modern pipeline in the world."

How can Verdi lovers possibly compete? In the middle of a global recession, Gazprom is spending at least $20 billion to conquer Europe via Nord and South Stream. The strategy is a killer: pump gas under the sea directly to Europe, avoiding messy transit routes across troublesome countries like Ukraine. No wonder Gazprom, which today controls 26 percent of the European gas market, is expected to have a 33 percent share by 2020.

In other words, in many ways, the Nabucco versus South Stream energy war already looks settled. Nabucco is, at best, likely to be a secondary pipeline, incapable, as Washington once hoped, of breaking the EU away from energy dependence on Russia.

Brussels, predictably, is in its usual multilingual policy mess. Most bureaucrats at its monster, directive-churning body, the European Commission, publicly bemoan the "pipeline war." On the other hand, Ona Jukneviciene, chairwoman of the committees at the European Parliament dealing with Central Asia, admits that Nabucco cannot be the only option.

As for Reinhard Mitschek, managing director of the Nabucco consortium, he tries to put a brave face on things when he stresses, "we will transport Russian gas, Azeri gas, Iraqi gas." As for the top European official on energy matters, Andris Piebalgs, he can't help being a pragmatist: "We'll continue to work with Russia because Russia has energy resources."

From a business point of view, it's tough to argue with South Stream's selling points. Unlike Nabucco, it will offer cheaper, all-Russian natural gas that won't have to transit through potential war zones, and while Nabucco will always deliver limited amounts of Caspian natural gas to market, South Stream, given Russian resources, will have plenty of room to increase its output.

The fact is that, as of now, Nabucco still has no guaranteed sources of gas. In order for the gas to come from energy-rich Turkmenistan, to take but one example, the Turkmen leadership would have to break a deal they've already made with Russia, which now buys all of that country's export gas. There's no way that Moscow is likely to let one of the former Soviet Republics do that easily. In addition, both Russia and Iran could well be capable of blocking any pipeline straddling the floor of the Caspian Sea.

Gazprom will pay to build South Stream, and then distribute and sell gas it already controls to Europe; Nabucco, on the other hand, has to rely on a messy consortium of six countries (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Germany) simply to finance one-third of its prospective costs, and then convince wary international bankers to shell out the rest.


The Pentagon does the Black Sea
So what does Washington want out of this mess? That's easy. Rewind to then-prospective Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her Senate confirmation hearings on January 13, 2009. There, she decried Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas and issued an urgent call for "investments in the Trans-Caspian energy sector." Think of it as a signal: the new Obama administration would be as committed to Nabucco as the Bush administration had been.

What is never spelled out is why. Enter the Black Sea, that crucial geo-strategic stage where Europe meets the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Enter, thus, Bulgaria, home to a new Pentagon air base in Bezmer, one of six new strategic bases being built outside the US and as potentially important to Washington's future games as the stalwart air bases in Incirlik, Turkey, and Aviano, Italy, have been in the past. (Aviano was the key US/NATO base for the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 and the seventy-eight-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.)

With the Pentagon's bases already creeping within a stone's throw of Southwest and Central Asia, it doesn't take a genius to imagine the role Bezmer might play in any future attack on Iran (something the Russian defense establishment has already taken careful note of). With both Romania and Bulgaria now part of NATO, Article 5 of the alliance's charter now applies. NATO can take action "in the event of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members."
In this way, Pipelineistan meets the American Empire of Bases.

Young Turks and Wily Russians
Why is everyone so damn hooked on Central Asian oil and gas? Elshad Nasirov, deputy chairman of the state-owned Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR, sums the addiction up succinctly enough: "This is the place where there is oil and gas in abundance. It is not Arab, not Persian, not Russian, and not OPEC."

It's the Caspian and, unfortunately for Europe, the region could, in energy terms, turn out to be not the caviar for which it's renowned but so many rotten fish eggs. No one knows, after all, whether the EU will ever be able to buy Iranian gas via Nabucco. No one knows whether the Central Asian "stans" have enough gas to supply Russia, China, and Turkey, not to mention India and Pakistan. No one knows whether any of their leaders will have the nerve to renege on their deals with Gazprom.

Ever since a 2008 British study determined that Turkmenistan may have natural gas reserves second only to Russia on the planet, the European Commission has been on a no-holds-barred tear to lure that country into delivering some of its future gas directly to Europe--and not through the Russian pipeline system either. Turkmenistan's inscrutable leader, the spectacularly named Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, just has to say the word, but despite the claims of EU officials that he has agreed to send some gas Europe-wards, he's never offered a public word of confirmation. No wonder: with Nabucco unbuilt and a pipeline from his country to China still under construction, Turkmenistan can play Pipelineistan games only with Russia and Iran. In fact, Russia essentially controls the flow of Turkmen gas for the next fifteen years.

Should Gurbanguly someday say the magic word--and assuming the Russians don't throw a monkey wrench into the works--he can marry Turkey, as the key transit country, with the EU and let them all sing Verdi till the sheep come home. In the meantime, angst is the name of the game in Europe (and so in Washington).

A declassified dossier from the FSB, the Russian heir to the KGB, is adamant: considering Nabucco's shortcomings, "Russia will remain the primary supplier of energy to Europe for the foreseeable future." Call it a matter of having your gas and processing it, too. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has been making the point for years. If Europe tries to snub it, Russia will simply build its own liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants, to facilitate storage and transport, and sell its LNG all over the world.

Anyway it's worth paying attention to what the St. Petersburg State Mining Institute (where Putin earned his doctorate) has to say. According to the institute, Russia has only twenty years' worth of its own natural gas reserves left. Since Russia plans to sell up to 40 percent of its gas abroad, "Russian" gas may in the future actually mean Central Asian gas. All the more reason for the Russians to make sure that those massive Turkmen and other reserves flow north, not west.

Whatever Washington thinks, the Europeans know that energy independence from Russia is, in reality, inconceivable. Bottom line when it comes to natural gas: Europe needs everything--Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco. The bulk of the natural gas in this Pipelineistan maze may well turn out to be Central Asian anyway, and a substantial part could be Iranian, if the Obama administration ever normalizes relations with Iran.

That, then, is the current state of play in the European wing of Pipelineistan. Russia seems to have virtually guaranteed its status as the top gas supplier to Europe for the foreseeable future. But that brings us to Turkey, a key regional power for both the US and the EU. As President Obama has recognized, Turkey is both a real and a metaphorical bridge between the Christian and Muslim worlds. It is also an ideal transit country for carrying non-Russian gas to Europe and is now playing its own suitably complex Pipelineistan game.

Chances are that, like Ukhta in far off Siberia, you've never heard of Yumurtalik either. It's a fishing port squeezed between the Mediterranean Sea and the Taurus mountains, very close to Ceyhan, the terminal for two key nodes of Pipelineistan: the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline from Iraq and the monster BTC pipeline. Turkey wants to turn Yumurtalik-Ceyhan into nothing less than the Rotterdam of the Mediterranean.

Even as it dreams of future EU membership, however, Turkey worries about antagonizing Moscow. And yet, being aboard the Nabucco Express and already fully committed to the functioning BTC pipeline puts the country on a potential collision course with Russia, its largest trading partner. Of course, this does not displease Washington.

On the other hand, the Turkish leadership draws ever closer to Iran, which provides 38 percent of Turkey's oil and 25 percent of its natural gas. Ankara and Tehran also have geopolitical affinities (especially in fighting Kurdish separatism). Together, they offer the best alternative to the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia) in terms of supplying Europe with Iranian natural gas. All this, of course, drives Washington nuts.

Needless to say, the Nabucco consortium itself would kill to have Iran as a gas supplier for the pipeline. They are also familiar with realpolitik: this could happen only with a Washington-blessed solution to the Iranian nuclear dossier. Iran, for its part, knows well how to seduce Europe. Mohammad-Reza Nematzadeh, managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), has insisted Iran is Europe's "sole option" for the success of Nabucco.

Is Russia just watching all this gas go by? Of course not. In October 2007, Putin signed a key agreement with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: if Iran cannot sell its gas to Nabucco--a likelihood, given the turbulence of American domestic politics and its foreign policy--Russia will buy it. Translation: Iranian gas could end up, like Central Asian gas, heading for Europe as more "Russian" gas. With its European and Iranian policies at cross-purposes, Washington will not be amused.

When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to "rethink Nabucco" if the tricky negotiations for Turkey to enter the EU drag on forever, EU leaders got the message (as much as France and Germany may be against a "Europe without borders"). Pragmatically, most EU leaders know very well that they need excellent relations with Turkey to one day have access to the big prize, Iranian gas; and that puts Europe's energy and EU membership inclinations at loggerheads.

Last July in Ankara, Nabucco was formally launched by an inter-governmental agreement. The representatives of Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were there. Obama's special Eurasian envoy, Richard Morningstar (a veteran of the BTC adventure), was there as well. The Central Asian stans were not there.

But crucially, Gurbanguly, ever the showman, finally made an entrance without ever leaving Turkmenistan, (almost) uttering the magic words in a meeting with his ministers in the capital, Ashgabat, on July 10: "Turkmenistan, staying committed to the principles of diversification of supply of its energy resources to the world markets, is going to use all available opportunities to participate in major international projects--such as, for example, [the] Nabucco project."

At the Vienna headquarters of Nabucco, the mantra remains: this is "no anti-Russian project." Still, everyone knows that Russia's leaders are eager to kill it, and not a soul, from Brussels to Vienna, Washington to Ashgabat, knows how to link Central Asia to Europe via a non-Russian pipeline, at the cost of more than $10 billion, without some assurance that Turkmeni, Kazakh, Azerbaijani and/or Iranian natural gas will be fully (or even partially) on board. Who would be foolish enough to invest that kind of money without some guarantee that hundreds of miles of aluminum tubes won't remain empty? You don't need Verdi to tell you this is one hell of a quirky plot for a global opera.


Autore: Pepe Escobar
Fonte: www.tomdispatch.com/www.thenation.com

Iran, Usa e il nucleare: il possibile crollo di Ahmadinejad

Wirepullers: è il Grande Gioco dei giorni nostri. Al tavolo Iran, Stati Uniti e Israele, impegnati in una serie di scaramucce, minacce, simulazioni e dissimulazioni. In realtà al Gioco partecipano in molti e per scoprire chi sono gli altri partecipanti basta seguire le vie del gas. Si parte dai nuovi test missilistici iraniani, si passa ai dossier dell'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia Atomica, che ci dicono che Teheran è sempre più vicina al possesso della bomba e si arriva alla politica estera di Obama il quale, tendendo la mano ad Ahmadinejad, sta mettendo il leader iraniano in seria difficoltà. Per il presidente iraniano la crisi politica sembra alle porte (si sta già parlando della nomina di un suo successore). Ecco allora che serve un nuovo (vecchio) nemico: Israele. E' Tel Aviv che, sotto la minaccia dei nuovi test nucleari iraniani, può rappresentare la via d'uscita di Ahmadinejad dall'impasse che sta affliggendo la Repubblica iraniana. Provocare il più possibile Israele, dato che Obama sembra imperturbabile e saldamente ancorato alla via della non belligeranza e porsi nuovamente come l'uomo forte, che sa tenere testa all'odiato nemico. Una crisi tutta interna quindi, se non fosse che l'Iran è uno dei protagonisti della grande corsa al gas che caratterizzerà la politica energetica mondiale dei prossimi decenni. Nabucco contro South Stream, Obama contro Putin, tutti contro tutti. (3)

L'azione dell'amministrazione Obama non è una sorpresa. Decine di volte sono state minacciate sanzioni o promesse aperture. La novità è che il leader iraniano è un presidente dimezzato. Si fa il nome di Ghalibaf, il sindaco conservatore di Teheran, come possibile sostituto.

Dopo alcuni mesi, peraltro drammatici a causa della contestata rielezione di Mahmud Ahmadinejad alla presidenza della Repubblica islamica, si torna a parlare del dossier nucleare iraniano in un contesto presumibilmente differente rispetto al passato.

E la novità sarebbe la presenza di un presidente americano disposto a trattare con l'Iran. Così la ripresa del dibattito intorno all'atomica degli ayatollah ha creato delle aspettative forse irrealizzabili, ma anche delle delusioni precoci. Rapidamente dal voto all'Onu per un mondo senza armi atomiche e il rinnovo dell'offerta di dialogo da parte di Barak Obama si è passati alla minaccia d'intervento militare e di sanzioni letali contro l'Iran, reo di aver nascosto l'impianto di Qom all'Agenzia internazionale per l'energia atomica.

Nel frattempo il regime di Teheran mostrava muscoli e dai deserti nazionali lanciava missili in grado di raggiungere Israele, paesi arabi ostili, basi americane nel Golfo persico e nell'Est dell'Europa. Tutto in pochi giorni, dall'apertura dell'Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite all'incontro ginevrino del primo ottobre tra la delegazione iraniana e l'Ue.

Certamente la presenza di un'amministrazione americana al comando di Barak Obama è un fattore decisivo per la sorte delle diverse crisi internazionali, in particolare per ciò che riguarda i rapporti tra gli Usa e l'Iran. E' bene tuttavia attenersi ai fatti. E i fatti fin qui dicono che siamo di fronte ad una vecchia sceneggiatura recitata e sublimata per decine e decine di volte.

Decine e decine di volte l'America ha minacciato guerre, sanzioni e ha offerto dialogo, qualche volta sottobanco e alcune altre, un dialogo ufficiale; decine e decine di volte i dirigenti iraniani si sono chiusi nel proprio autismo radicaleggiante, per dire successivamente che intendono invece trattare; decine e decine di volte Ahmadinejad ha giurato che il suo nucleare è pacifico, per far filtrare in un secondo tempo che ciò vale per i suoi impianti conosciuti e visitabili, mentre in quelli nascosti, chissà?

Anche Francia, Inghilterra e Germania recitano lo stesso copione, come del resto i russi e i cinesi, che sono contro le sanzioni, ma non del tutto, punendo ogni volta gli iraniani quel tanto che basta perché non alzino la testa troppo e il prezzo delle loro merci.

Nulla di nuovo, dunque? No, la novità c'è, ma riguarderà il dossier nucleare iraniano in un secondo tempo. La novità è la crescente debolezza politica di Mahmud Ahmadinejad in seno al regime.

Gli occidentali non trovano più un Ahmadinejad come uomo di fiducia dei Pasdaran, amato dal "popolo basso" e temuto dalla gerarchia sciita, quel Ahmaedinejad, insomma, all'indomani del suo primo round presidenziale.Ora Ahmadinejad è un presidente dimezzato, ha represso l'opposizione nelle piazze, ma non nei Palazzi. E se le indiscrezioni che provengono dall'Iran sono basate su qualche elemento concreto, sarebbero in corso una serie di ampissime consultazioni per raggiungere un accordo su chi lo potrà sostituire, a quanto pare, il più quotato sarebbe Ghalibaf, il sindaco conservatore di Teheran.

Il crollo possibile del potere di Ahmadinejad - trascinando dietro di sé anche il leader supremo, l'Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, il suo unico sponsor, ma anche la sua vera disgrazia politica - non sarà comunque un processo né semplice, né breve e neppure indolore. Nel frattempo Ahmadinejad cercherà di guadagnarsi qualche credibilità proprio sul dossier nucleare, ma, secondo quanto dicono i leader dell'opposizione e gli umori della base in Iran, il paese non è più così compatto sul nucleare come è stato prima delle elezioni del 12 giugno e i dissensi sono innanzitutto sulla gestione di Ahmadinejd della politica nucleare che espone il paese all'attacco dall'esterno e alla povertà come conseguenza delle sanzioni dell'Onu.

Da qui a una situazione meno ingarbugliata della situazione politica delle Repubblica islamica è difficile che decollino le trattative, oppure una guerra o sanzioni veramente letali per l'economia iraniana: rivedremo ancora la stessa sceneggiata, con qualche variazione, in toni più bassi o più alti, ma la sostanza non cambierà. E di ciò sono consapevoli anche gli interlocutori e gli avversari della Repubblica islamica, tra gli attori principali dello sceneggiata "Bomba degli ayatollah".

Autore: Bijan Zarmandili


Also read:

http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/480259/obama_s_deal_with_iran

http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/479142/us_strategy_in_iran_talks

http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/478079/can_the_us_iran_talks_succeed

Iran, America, Israel: the nuclear gamble

Wirepullers: è il Grande Gioco dei giorni nostri. Al tavolo Iran, Stati Uniti e Israele, impegnati in una serie di scaramucce, minacce, simulazioni e dissimulazioni. In realtà al Gioco partecipano in molti e per scoprire chi sono gli altri partecipanti basta seguire le vie del gas. Si parte dai nuovi test missilistici iraniani, si passa ai dossier dell'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia Atomica, che ci dicono che Teheran è sempre più vicina al possesso della bomba e si arriva alla politica estera di Obama il quale, tendendo la mano ad Ahmadinejad, sta mettendo il leader iraniano in seria difficoltà. Per il presidente iraniano la crisi politica sembra alle porte (si sta già parlando della nomina di un suo successore). Ecco allora che serve un nuovo (vecchio) nemico: Israele. E' Tel Aviv che, sotto la minaccia dei nuovi test nucleari iraniani, può rappresentare la via d'uscita di Ahmadinejad dall'impasse che sta affliggendo la Repubblica iraniana. Provocare il più possibile Israele, dato che Obama sembra imperturbabile e saldamente ancorato alla via della non belligeranza e porsi nuovamente come l'uomo forte, che sa tenere testa all'odiato nemico. Una crisi tutta interna quindi, se non fosse che l'Iran è uno dei protagonisti della grande corsa al gas che caratterizzerà la politica energetica mondiale dei prossimi decenni. Nabucco contro South Stream, Obama contro Putin, tutti contro tutti. (2)

The renewed controversy over Iran’s nuclear plans again puts the possibility of military conflict on the agenda. But western states underestimate the costs and consequences of an attack on Iran.

The revelation late on 24 September 2009 that Iran is in the process of building a second uranium-enrichment plant inside a mountain near the holy city of Qom introduces a fresh source of dispute to a longstanding contest of wills between the Tehran regime and western states. The information - supplied by Iran itself to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 21 September, after it emerged that western intelligence sources had become aware of the project - is not in itself evidence that Iran has an active nuclear-weapon programme; but it most certainly does mean that Iran will have that option at a time of its choosing.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001Bradford's peace-studies department now broadcasts regular podcasts on its work, including a regular commentary from Paul Rogers on international-security issues. Listen/watch here

The varying parts of the differentiated Iranian leadership have been consistent in denying that their state intends to acquire a nuclear-weapon capacity, though they also affirm - and foreign governments and international agencies agree - that Iran has the right to develop civil nuclear technologies. The information about the second installation both heightens the ambiguity that has always surrounded this issue, and creates a new source of tension.

Iran responded to the moment on 27-28 September by test-firing short- and long-range missiles on successive days (the latter the liquid-fuel Shahab-3 and the solid-fuel Sajil, each with a range of up to 1,987 kilometres). This forms a tense backdrop to the already scheduled meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009, part of the ongoing cycle of diplomatic discussion among the "five-plus-one" group (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany - plus Iran).

The context
The strategic and economic relevance of nuclear power for an oil-and-gas-rich state such as Iran has been endlessly disputed. There is a strong and longstanding belief in Iran that the possession of a thriving nuclear-energy sector forms one of the attributes of modernity, a sentiment arguably reinforced by western nuclear lobbies' powerful advocacy of this energy source as a big part of the response to climate change.

The development of a nuclear-weapons capacity carries the civil-nuclear argument into another realm, but for many Iranian politicians there are pressing security reasons to take this course, even if their public stance (including that of the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) is to disclaim any interest in a military nuclear capacity.

The most immediate argument is the perceived need to counter Israel, a nuclear-weapons state since the late 1960s that now has a substantial arsenal. This extends to a sense of Iran existing alongside (if not indeed being encircled by) other nuclear-weapons states in the region - Pakistan and India to the east, and Russia to the north. Many western analysts pay little attention to such concerns, as indeed to Iranian perceptions of the massive United States presence in the vicinity of Iran, but this is all the more reason for registering their existence.

Indeed, it is hard to understand the tortuous arguments over Iran's nuclear plans over the past decade without taking the view from Tehran centrally into account. In this respect, President Bush's state-of-the-union address in January 2002 - which identified Iran as a core member of the "axis of evil" alongside Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Kim Jong-Il's North Korea - was hugely significant. This speech, after all, was delivered while Iran was still ruled by the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatami, whose government had - just two months earlier, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks - aided the United States in terminating the Taliban regime across Iran's eastern border in Afghanistan.

The George W Bush administration went on to demolish an even more bitter adversary of Iran, the Ba'athist regime across Iran's western border, in 2003; but the accompanying rhetoric and the underlying dynamic meant that this also was perceived in Iran as threatening. Iran attempted to address this new situation by offering a "grand bargain" with Washington in spring 2003, but this was rejected. Iran's elite came to see the US leadership as representing a "clear and present danger", which may have been one factor in the election of the hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Khatami's successor in June 2005.

It is true that the outcomes of US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were in some ways helpful to Iran: the despised Taliban were driven back, Tehran was handed greater influence in Iraq, Barack Obama is clearly different to George W Bush. But the Iranian leadership - armed with a perspective that is rooted (as authors such as Fred Halliday emphasise) in 3,000 years of continuous statehood - also understands that Obama may continue in office only until January 2013, and could well be replaced by a new president every bit as hawkish as Bush.

The calculations
At present, however, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his cohort do have a problem: that Barack Obama is not functioning sufficiently as the embodiment of the "evil empire". This fact is strikingly confirmed in the United States administration's reaction to the news of 24 September 2009; for it is becoming clear that Obama has effectively ruled out a military option and is sticking forcefully to diplomatic engagement. If Iran does not so engage, then US policy will be to isolate Iran through even more stringent sanctions, anticipating that even Russia will come at least part of the way (see Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Aims To Isolate Iran if Talks Fail", Washington Post, 29 September 2009).

True, China may present difficulties here, given its close relationship with Tehran over oil-and-gas deals as well as armaments supplies (see Michael Wines, "China‘s Ties With Iran Complicate Diplomacy", New York Times, 30 September 2009). But even without China's aid, a United States-led coalition could significantly increase the damage to Iran's already shaky economy.

In a broader frame, the foreign-policy approach of the Obama administration poses serious difficulties to Ahmadinejad, who badly needs an external enemy to divert attention from the failing economy and the deep political divisions inside Iran (see Nazenin Ansari, "Iran's unfinished crisis", 16 September 2009). In the absence of such an enemy, and with the United States highly unlikely to take the war option, the obvious and logical option is to use every opportunity to identify Israel as the core threat.

This motive is matched and even exceeded on the other side: for both the rightwing government of Binyamin Netanyahu and a wider, deep-seated and cross-party view in Israel hold that Iran simply cannot under any circumstances be allowed to become a nuclear-weapons power. This combination of circumstances makes it more than likely that the period following the Geneva meeting on 1 October 2009 will be characterised by Iran's further diplomatic stalling and high-pitched anti-Israel rhetoric, and Israel's own repeated warnings about the imminent nuclear danger from Tehran.

This means that Obama will have the tough job of persuading the Israelis not to take military action against Iran on their own account. He will persist in this, both out of conviction and from underlying concern over the probable results of any Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. These were explored in an Oxford Research Group briefing - Iran: Consequences of a War (February 2006) - which at the time of publication and after was widely read, in Tehran as well as in Washington. The document is still pertinent.

In military terms, Israel has the capacity to inflict serious damage on most of Iran's current nuclear facilities, principally by using its recently acquired long-range F-15I and F-16I strike-aircraft as well as its ballistic and cruise missiles. It might even be able to conduct an operation without overflying Iraqi territory - if Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose leaders have their own concerns about Iran, give such permission; but in any case, it is unlikely that any attack would do more than set Iran's nuclear ambitions back by two or three years.

The consequences
In the short term, and especially from an Israeli perspective, there would be value in accomplishing even this: for it could be seen as sending the necessary message that Iran will not be permitted to take the nuclear-weapons path, either now or in the future.

In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click herePaul Rogers's books include Why We're Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm is needed. A third edition of his Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 2009) is forthcoming.

At the same time, this assessment could be deeply mistaken in that it underestimates greatly the immediate consequences an attack on Iran is almost guaranteed to provoke:

* It unites much of Iranian political opinion behind Ahmadinejad and his intransigent allies - at least for some months. He may be disliked in many circles and hated in some, but if the country is under attack this will transcend political differences

* Iran formally withdraws from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This will disallow any future inspections, and allow the country to rebuild its bomb-damaged facilities and move as rapidly as possible to develop a nuclear-weapons capability. This alone means that more attacks from Israel will be necessary - leading to a long-term state of war.
Iran also has other options, although it may chose to wait for months or even years to utilise them:

* Engineer a series of crises over transit through the Straits of Hormuz, not sufficient to demand an out-and-out response from the United States fifth-fleet but more than enough to send shock-waves through the oil markets. Such a process could be sustained for many months

* Increase engagement with the Shi'a majority in Iraq, to the extent of encouraging more forceful opposition to any continuing US presence in the country

* Provoke more difficulties for the US-led coalition in western Afghanistan, less by aiding Taliban elements than by expanding Iranian influence from Herat eastwards and undermining central governance in Kabul

* Aid the Hizbollah movement in Lebanon even more overtly in its confrontation with Israel.
If any of these actions and strategic choices were in turn to lead to a forceful US response - perhaps around 2013-14, after the end of the Barack Obama presidency - then Iran has more extreme options in its armoury: including the paramilitary targeting of oil-and-gas production and transport facilities in western Gulf states.

The predicament
It is relevant to these prognoses that most Arab elites would quietly welcome an Israeli strike on Iran, but that Arab public opinion would be bitterly opposed. The absence of any real political progress in achieving a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a key factor here. An additional relevant factor is that while Iraq is the only major Arab state with a Shi'a majority, there are substantial Shi'a communities in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. There is particular concern in security circles in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that Shi'a minorities would react with great anger to an Israeli attack on Iran.

All these issues have been analysed in great depth in Washington policy-circles. The Barack Obama administration is facing a difficult position as a new period of negotiations with and about Iran gets underway (see Godfrey Hodgson, "Barack Obama's great test", 30 September 2009). Some of the wilder voices on the American right argue even now for military action against Iran. But this constant domestic refrain pales against a far greater external challenge: from elements in Tehran that actively want confrontation, and from an Israeli government that could be all too ready to oblige.

Autore: Paul Rogers

Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb

Wirepullers: è il Grande Gioco dei giorni nostri. Al tavolo Iran, Stati Uniti e Israele, impegnati in una serie di scaramucce, minacce, simulazioni e dissimulazioni. In realtà al Gioco partecipano in molti e per scoprire chi sono gli altri partecipanti basta seguire le vie del gas. Si parte dai nuovi test missilistici iraniani, si passa ai dossier dell'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia Atomica, che ci dicono che Teheran è sempre più vicina al possesso della bomba e si arriva alla politica estera di Obama il quale, tendendo la mano ad Ahmadinejad, sta mettendo il leader iraniano in seria difficoltà. Per il presidente iraniano la crisi politica sembra alle porte (si sta già parlando della nomina di un suo successore). Ecco allora che serve un nuovo (vecchio) nemico: Israele. E' Tel Aviv che, sotto la minaccia dei nuovi test nucleari iraniani, può rappresentare la via d'uscita di Ahmadinejad dall'impasse che sta affliggendo la Repubblica iraniana. Provocare il più possibile Israele, dato che Obama sembra imperturbabile e saldamente ancorato alla via della non belligeranza e porsi nuovamente come l'uomo forte, che sa tenere testa all'odiato nemico. Una crisi tutta interna quindi, se non fosse che l'Iran è uno dei protagonisti della grande corsa al gas che caratterizzerà la politica energetica mondiale dei prossimi decenni. Nabucco contro South Stream, Obama contro Putin, tutti contro tutti. (1)

Senior staff members of the United Nations nuclear agency have concluded in a confidential analysis that Iran has acquired “sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable” atom bomb.

The report by experts in the International Atomic Energy Agency stresses in its introduction that its conclusions are tentative and subject to further confirmation of the evidence, which it says came from intelligence agencies and its own investigations.
But the report’s conclusions, described by senior European officials, go well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States.

Two years ago, American intelligence agencies published a detailed report concluding that Tehran halted its efforts to design a nuclear weapon in 2003. But in recent months, Britain has joined France, Germany and Israel in disputing that conclusion, saying the work has been resumed.

A senior American official said last week that the United States was now re-evaluating its 2007 conclusions.
The atomic agency’s report also presents evidence that beyond improving upon bomb-making information gathered from rogue nuclear experts around the world, Iran has done extensive research and testing on how to fashion the components of a weapon. It does not say how far that work has progressed.

The report, titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” was produced in consultation with a range of nuclear weapons experts inside and outside the agency. It draws a picture of a complex program, run by Iran’s Ministry of Defense, “aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system,” Iran’s medium-range missile, which can strike the Middle East and parts of Europe. The program, according to the report, apparently began in early 2002.

If Iran is designing a warhead, that would represent only part of the complex process of making nuclear arms. Engineering studies would have to turn ideas into hardware. Finally, the hardest part would be enriching the uranium that could be used as nuclear fuel — though experts say Iran has already mastered that task.
While the analysis represents the judgment of the nuclear agency’s senior staff, a struggle has erupted in recent months over whether to make it public. The dispute pits the agency’s departing director, Mohamed ElBaradei, against his own staff and against foreign governments eager to intensify pressure on Iran.

Dr. ElBaradei has long been reluctant to adopt a confrontational strategy on Iran, an approach he sees as counterproductive. Responding to calls for the report’s release, he has raised doubts about its completeness and reliability.

Last month, the agency issued an unusual statement cautioning it “has no concrete proof” that Iran ever sought to make nuclear arms, much less to perfect a warhead. On Saturday in India, Dr. ElBaradei was quoted as saying that “a major question” about the authenticity of the evidence kept his agency from “making any judgment at all” on whether Iran had ever sought to design a nuclear warhead.

Even so, the emerging sense in the intelligence world that Iran has solved the major nuclear design problems poses a new diplomatic challenge for President Obama and his allies.
American officials say that in the direct negotiations with Iran that began last week, it will be vital to get the country to open all of its suspected sites to international inspectors. That is a long list, topped by the underground nuclear enrichment center under construction near Qum that was revealed 10 days ago.

Iran has acknowledged that the underground facility is intended as a nuclear enrichment center, but says the fuel it makes will be used solely to produce nuclear power and medical isotopes. It was kept heavily protected, Iranian officials said, to ward off potential attacks.

Iran said last week that it would allow inspectors to visit the site this month. In the past three years, amid mounting evidence of a possible military dimension to its nuclear program, Iran has denied the agency wide access to installations, documents and personnel.

In recent weeks, there have been leaks about the internal report, perhaps intended to press Dr. ElBaradei into releasing it.

The report’s existence has been rumored for months, and The Associated Press, saying it had seen a copy, reported fragments of it in September. On Friday, more detailed excerpts appeared on the Web site of the Institute for Science and International Security, run by David Albright, a nuclear expert.

In recent interviews, a senior European official familiar with the contents of the full report described it to The New York Times. He confirmed that Mr. Albright’s excerpts were authentic. The excerpts were drawn from a 67-page version of the report written earlier this year and since revised and lengthened, the official said; its main conclusions remain unchanged.
“This is a running summary of where we are,” the official said.

“But there is some loose language,” he added, and it was “not ready for publication as an official document.”


Most dramatically, the report says the agency “assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device” based on highly enriched uranium.

Weapons based on the principle of implosion are considered advanced models compared with the simple gun-type bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima. They use a blast wave from a sphere of conventional explosives to compress a ball of bomb fuel into a supercritical mass, starting the atomic chain reaction and progressing to the fiery blast. Implosion designs, compact by nature, are considered necessary for making nuclear warheads small and powerful enough to fit atop a missile.

The excerpts also suggest that Iran has done much research and testing to perfect nuclear arms, like making high-voltage detonators, firing test explosives and designing warheads.
The evidence underlying these conclusions is not new: Some of it was reported in a confidential presentation to many nations in early 2008 by the agency’s chief inspector, Ollie Heinonen.
Iran maintains that its scientists have never conducted research on how to make a warhead and that any documents to the contrary are fraudulent.

But in August, a public report to the board of the I.A.E.A. by its staff concluded that the evidence of Iran’s alleged military activity was probably genuine.

It said “the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts” about the nature of its nuclear program.

The agency’s tentative analysis also says that Iran “most likely” obtained the needed information for designing and building an implosion bomb “from external sources” and then adapted the information to its own needs.

It said nothing specific about the “external sources,” but many intelligence agencies assume that Iran obtained a bomb design from A. Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani black marketer who sold it machines to enrich uranium. That information may have been supplemented by a Russian nuclear weapons scientist who visited Iran often, investigators say.

The I.A.E.A.’s internal report concluded that the staff believed “that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly.”


Autori: William J. Broad and David E. Sanger