How You Finance Goldman Sachs’ Profits

Wirepullers: Goldman Sachs è forse la banca più importante al mondo, e non deve essere un caso se i suoi manager prima o poi finiscono in una qualche amministrazione pubblica (in Italia gli esempi di Romano Prodi e Mario Draghi). Qualcuno addirittura pensa che sia la stessa Goldman Sachs a piazzarli nei punti nevralgici della politica mondiale, per poterla controllare come una sorta di piovra che si muove nell'ombra. Non sappiamo se questo sia vero, è indubbio però che Goldman Sachs è un colosso economico molto potente. (1)

This is perhaps the most important thing I learned over my years working on Wall Street, including as a managing director at Goldman Sachs: Numbers lie. In a normal time, the fact that the numbers generated by the nation's biggest banks can't be trusted might not matter very much to the rest of us. But since the record bank profits we're now hearing about are essentially created by massive federal funding, perhaps it behooves us to dig beneath their data. On July 27, 10 congressmen, led by Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.), did just that, writing a letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke questioning the Fed's role in Goldman's rapid return to the top of Wall Street.

To understand this particular giveaway, look back to September 21, 2008. It was a frenzied night for Goldman Sachs and the only other remaining major investment bank, Morgan Stanley. Their three main competitors were gone. Bear Stearns had been taken over by JPMorgan Chase in March, 2008, Lehman Brothers had just declared bankruptcy due to lack of capital, and Bank of America had been pushed to acquire Merrill Lynch because the firm didn't have enough cash to survive on its own. Anxious to avoid a similar fate, hat in hand, they came to the Fed for access to desperately needed capital. All they had to do was become bank holding companies to get it. So, without so much as clearing the standard five-day antitrust waiting period for such a change, the Fed granted their wish.

Bank holding companies (which all the biggest financial firms now are) come under the regulatory purview of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC. The capital they keep in reserve in case of emergency (like, say, toxic assets hemorrhaging on their books, or credit derivatives trades not being paid) is supposed to be greater than investment banks'. That's the trade-off. You get access to federal assistance, you pony up more capital, and you take less risk.

Goldman didn't like the last part. It makes most of its money speculating, or trading. So it asked the Fed to be exempt from what's called the Market Risk Rules that bank holding companies adhere to when computing their risk.

Keep in mind that by virtue of becoming a bank holding company, Goldman received a total of $63.6 billion in federal subsidies (that we know about—probably more if the Fed were ever forced to disclose its $7.6 trillion of borrower details). There was the $10 billion it got from TARP (which it repaid), the $12.9 billion it grabbed from AIG's spoils—even though Goldman had stated beforehand that it was protected from losses incurred by AIG's free fall, and if that were the case, would not have needed that money, let alone deserved it. Then, there's the $29.7 billion it's used so far out of the $35 billion it has available, backed by the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and finally, there's the $11 billion available under the Fed's Commercial Paper Funding Facility.

Tactically, after bagging this bounty, Goldman asked the Fed, its new regulator, if it could use its old risk model to determine capital reserves. It wanted to use the model that its old investment bank regulator, the SEC, was fine with, called VaR, or value at risk. VaR pretty much allows banks to plug in their own parameters, and based on these, calculate how much risk they have, and thus how much capital they need to hold against it. VaR was the same lax SEC-approved risk model that investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers used, with the aforementioned results.

On February 5, 2009, the Fed granted Goldman's request. This meant that not only was Goldman getting big federal subsidies, but also that it could keep betting big without saving aside as much capital as the other banks. Using VaR gave Goldman more leeway to, well, accentuate the positive. Yes, Goldman is a more risk-prone firm now than it was before it got to play with our money.

Which brings us back to these recent quarterly earnings. Goldman posted record profits of $3.4 billion on revenues of $13.76 billion. More than 78 precent of those revenues came from its most risky division, the one that requires the most capital to operate, Trading and Principal Investments. Of those, the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) area within that division brought in a record $6.8 billion in revenues. That's the division, by the way, that I worked in and that Lloyd Blankfein managed on his way up the Goldman totem pole. (It's also the division that would stand to gain the most if Waxman's cap-and-trade bill passes) .

Since Goldman is trading big with our money, why not also use it to pay big bonuses? It's not like there are any strings attached. For the first half of 2009, Goldman set aside $11.4 billion for compensation—34 percent more than for the first half of 2008, keeping them on target for a record bonus year—even though they still owe the federal government $53.6 billion, a sum more than four times that bonus amount.

But capital is still key. Capital is the lifeblood that pumps through a financial organization. You can't trade without it. As of June 26, 2009, Goldman's total capital was $254 billion, but that included $191 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing (meaning money it had borrowed without putting up any collateral for it). On November 28, 2008 (4Q 2008), it had only $168 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing. Thus, its long-term unsecured debt jumped 14 percent. Though Goldman doesn't disclose exactly where all this debt comes from, given the $23 billion jump, we can only wonder whether some of it has come from government subsidies or the Fed's secret facilities.

Not only that, by virtue of how it's set up, most of Goldman's unsecured funding comes in through its parent company, Group Inc. (Think the top point of an umbrella with each spoke being a subsidiary.) This parent parcels that money out to Goldman's subsidiaries, some of which are regulated, some of which aren't. This means that even though Goldman is supposed to be regulated by the Fed and other agencies, it has unregulated elements receiving unsecured funding—just like before the crisis, but with more of our money involved.
As for JPMorgan Chase, its profit of $2.7 billion was up 36 percent for the second quarter of 2009 vs. the same quarter last year, but a lot of that also came from trading revenues, meaning its speculative endeavors are driving its profits. Over on the consumer side, the firm had to set aside nearly $30 billion in reserve for credit-related losses. Riding on its trading laurels, when its consumer business is still in deterioration mode, is not a recipe for stability, no matter how much cheering JPMorgan Chase's results got from Wall Street. Betting is betting.

Let's pause for some reflection: The bank "stars" made most of their money on speculation, got nearly $124 billion in government guarantees and subsidies between them over the past year and a half, yet saw continued losses in the credit products most affected by consumer credit problems. Both are setting aside top-dollar bonuses. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon mentioned that he's concerned about attracting talent, a translation for wanting to pay investment bankers big bucks—because, after all, they suffered so terribly last year, and he needs to stay competitive with his friends at Goldman. This doesn't add up to a really healthy scenario. It's more like bad déjà vu.

As a recent New York Times article (and many other publications in different words) said, "For the most part, the worst of the financial crisis seems to be over." Sure, the crisis may appear to be over because the major banks of Wall Street are speculating well with government subsidies. But that's a dangerous conclusion. It doesn't mean that finance firms could thrive without the artificial, public-funded assistance. And it certainly doesn't mean that consumers are any better off than they were before the crisis emerged. It's just that they didn't get the same generous subsidies.

Autore: Nomi Prins

Fonte: www.motherjones.com

The Chinese Come Calling

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (4)

What a hoot. The Chinese Communists invaded Washington on Monday demanding not that we sacrifice our freedoms but rather that we balance our budget. Creditors get to make that kind of call. And the Marxists of Beijing, who have turned out to be the world's most prudent bankers, are worried about their assets invested in our banana republic.

"China has a huge amount of investment in the United States, mainly in the form of Treasury bonds. We are concerned about the security of our financial assets" was the way China's assistant finance minister put it. Briefing reporters at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, he added, "We sincerely hope the US fiscal deficit will be reduced, year after year." Quite sincerely, one suspects, given a US budget shortfall this year that is slated to reach $1.85 trillion.

Suddenly, it was US officials who were promising deep reform to their disgraced economic system rather than demanding it from incompetent foreigners. President Barack Obama's economic team of Clinton-era holdovers, who a decade ago had hectored China on the virtues of fiscal responsibility, now were falling over themselves to reassure the Chinese that their $1.5 trillion stake in US government-issued securities is safe, and that they should buy more at this week's $200 billion Treasury auction. If they don't, we're in big trouble.

US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner promised to behave, saying the US is "committed to taking the necessary measures to bring our fiscal deficits down to a more sustainable level once recovery is firmly established." Now let's hope that the Chinese Communists and their natural allies among congressional deficit hawks will be able to keep him to his word.

And don't blame any of this on peacenik liberals. The new conciliatory--nay, deferential--tone toward China precedes the Obama administration, having begun in bilateral talks during the last years of the Bush administration as the US economy began its ignominious downfall. It was George W. Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, who set the course when the former Goldman Sachs chairman realized how dependent were his Wall Street buddies on Chinese goodwill.

But from all of this adversity may come something good: recognition that the United States is not the repository of all wisdom. Maybe the Chinese have found a model different from ours that also works? Might there not be an Arab, Latin or Indian one that also qualifies and need not be overthrown?

The tone of this week's talks, ironically held at the Reagan Building and co-chaired by Geithner and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, finally signaled the end of the cold war assumption that regimes with labels like communist and capitalist could not form profitable partnerships. On the contrary, as Secretary Clinton noted, it is time to move from "a multipolar world to a multipartner world." And President Obama in opening the conference made clear that the partnership between China and the US is decisive: "The relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world."

Mark it as a historic Rip van Winkle moment. For those who recall the rhetoric of the cold war, the idea that we would someday be cooperating with Chinese Communists because they had humbled us economically rather than militarily is a startling turnabout. How did they get to be better capitalists than us, and being that they are good capitalists, why are we still spending hundreds of billions a year on high-tech military weapons to counter a potential Chinese military threat when the weapons they are using are all market-driven deployments?

A recognition that our tension with China is not military in nature came at this week's conference in an announcement by Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of the US Pacific Command, that agreement had been reached with his Chinese counterparts on improving relations: "A statement was made by a Chinese delegation official yesterday [Monday] that no country can develop sound policy if they try and do so in isolation. And I think that's a great way of addressing the sense that all of us feel, the desire, to get back together again and discuss exercises, discuss personnel exchanges, discuss responses to humanitarian assistance crises and the provision of disaster relief."

Not bad for a start, and maybe we can help solve our economic problems by selling our latest high-tech weapons to China as we do to the rest of the world. Or better yet, we could do some serious damage to our deficits, and our dependence on the Chinese, by sharply cutting expensive weapons programs now that the cold war is finally over.

Autore: Robert Scheer

Fonte: www.thenation.com

With China, Money Talks

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (3)

Strategic and economic dialogue? Forget it, Hillary -- it's China.

It's a new dawn of summitry in Washington with this week's Strategic & Economic Dialogue between the United States and China, a meeting of several hundred top government officials to talk about shared interests. The discussions made little news -- some shared macroeconomic ideas here, a framework for climate-change discussions there. Mainly, they served to keep leaders in both countries informed of each other's plans and motivations, a way to prepare both countries for four years of Obama administration policy.

Earlier in the year, the administration changed what had been the Strategic Economic Dialogue, previously led only by the Treasury Department, into the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, jointly led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. Despite the structural change, though, the summit demonstrated that economic issues trump all other concerns, leaving Clinton at something of a disadvantage.

The narrative that undergirds the U.S.-China relationship is by now rote: Chastened U.S. officials who once lectured their counterparts in the People's Republic on financial liberalization are now humbled in front of their largest creditor, reduced to offering promises of fiscal responsibility. But that conventional wisdom is both boring and rather irrelevant. Neither country can afford to disturb the fiscal relationship between the two nations. Chinese officials who normally stress out about U.S. borrowing -- no banker likes to see their debtor in the red -- seemed unusually convinced by Office of Management and Budget Direct Peter Orszag's speech on the U.S. government's plan to reduce the deficit after the recession, delivered during one of the summit's official exchanges.

Throughout those exchanges, the central message from U.S. officials was a warning: We will not be providing the world's consumer demand anymore as Americans increase their savings. U.S. officials also advised China to shift its policies to cultivate domestic consumption and to reduce exports and investments. Meanwhile, China pushed demands for a larger role in international economic institutions. Both sides complained about each other's protectionism. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to push forward climate-change negotiations, consulted on North Korea and Iran, and agreed to take the whole show on the road to Beijing next year. Nonetheless, issues of trade and finance dominated the talks.

I was reminded why that is the case at the conclusion of the conference, a gala dinner at the Ritz Carlton. The event was dedicated to prosperity -- a program studded with corporate and banking logos certainly made that point. Heavy hitters from both delegations were in attendance, and the U.S.-China Business Council hosted the whole affair. Were all that not enough, the dinner itself was practically a jamboree of Leftie bête noirs, with Robert Rubin and Henry Kissinger both making remarks.

There's little question that as long as China and the U.S. are the two largest economies in the world and deeply intertwined, all other issues will be a distant second priority. So it makes sense that the explicit talk was of trade deals and carbon caps, while references to the recent crackdown on the Uighurs, China's Muslim minorities in Xinjaing province, were carefully worded. That doesn't mean Clinton's strategic discussions are a waste of her time, but the importance of maintaining our economic partnership overlays a patina of realism on a relationship that cries out for idealism.

As we debate the importance of engagement versus isolation in foreign affairs, it is heartening to see hundreds of high-level government officials from two very different countries meet with each other to candidly discuss critical issues. Kissinger's emotion at the gala as he recalled the great moment when the U.S. and China opened relations nearly 40 years ago was a reminder of what diplomacy can accomplish.

President Barack Obama, delivering an opening statement on the first day of the dialogue, noted that "some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America that think there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a different view. I believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations; a future when our nations are partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity."

His vision is the right one, and it is shared by one of the leaders of the Chinese delegation: State Councilor Dai Bingguo explicitly told Americans that China sought no arms race or hegemony, simply internal prosperity. But a subtler point was made by China's other delegation head, Vice Premier Wang Qishan.
"The trend of the China-U.S relationship is decided by the common interest of our two peoples," he said. "The statesmen in both countries can only follow this trend, and must follow this trend."

The common interest of the peoples, rather than the economic elite, ought to be the driving motivation behind the two countries interactions. There is no doubt that economic openness has brought wealth to both countries, and the Obama administration is happy to laud the Chinese for bringing millions out of poverty. But in a relationship between "capitalism with American characteristics" and "socialism with Chinese characteristics," sometimes the people -- whether they be workers losing jobs in the United States or the millions of Chinese living without political freedom or prosperity -- have interests other than the elites. Today, we're in an economic crisis, and pragmatism overrides all else. But as recovery continues, the U.S. will require more thought on the strategic track, and perhaps in a few years our discussions with China, as they should be with all our friends, will be more frank.

Autore: Tim Fernholz

Fonte: www.prospect.org

Usa-Cina, le prove di G-2 e la vera "bolla" cinese

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (2)

Il vertice Stati Uniti-Cina dei giorni scorsi ha fornito ulteriori elementi di riflessione riguardo l'ipotesi G-2, una governance globale sempre più imperniata sull'asse Washington-Pechino su temi quali l'economia, il clima, la non-proliferazione nucleare. Il presidente americano Obama ha parlato di partnership strategica, spiegando che "le relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Cina daranno forma al 21esimo secolo". La natura strategica e non solo economica che Washington vuole conferire alla cooperazione con la Cina è confermata dalla definizione stessa dei due giorni di incontri come "Dialogo strategico ed economico" e dall'intervento congiunto, alla vigilia, del segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton e del segretario al Tesoro Timothy Geithner, che dalle colonne del Wall Street Journal hanno sostenuto la necessità di "discussioni di livello strategico" tra Usa-Cina.

Nel dibattito sulla natura dei rapporti da tenere con la Cina, a Washington si confrontano due scuole di pensiero: i "funzionalisti" e gli "strategici", li definisce John Lee, studioso dell'Hudson Institute. I primi ritengono che Stati Uniti e Cina sono così interdipendenti dal punto di vista economico da essere obbligati ad essere partner strategici. Una cooperazione da cui entrambi avrebbero tutto da guadagnare - invece che una competizione a "somma zero" - è a loro avviso un obiettivo fattibile. Tutti gli eventuali motivi di tensione tra le due potenze sono transitori e dovuti per lo più ad incomprensioni, mentre le profonde divergenze che ancora esistono passano in secondo piano se ci si concentra sui problemi pratici. "Quando siete sulla stessa barca, dovete attraversare il fiume in modo pacifico", è il proverbio cinese cui hanno fatto ricorso la Clinton e Geithner per spiegarsi. Gli "strategici" non hanno una visione così rosea. Per loro i rapporti tra Stati Uniti e Cina vanno letti nell'ottica di una competizione strategica, una rivalità irreversibile e già in corso. Ciò non significa che non debbano migliorare le loro relazioni e aumentare la reciproca comprensione per minimizzare le tensioni, ma che ogni cooperazione può essere solo tattica, non strategica. Dietro di essa uno scontro sostanziale di interessi e valori, che può essere gestito ma non risolto, a meno che interessi e valori dell'una o dell'altra potenza non mutino, ma è altamente improbabile.

Nell'attuale amministrazione i "funzionalisti" stanno prevalendo, osserva Lee. Dal punto di vista economico la collaborazione è obbligata perché la Cina detiene oltre 2 mila miliardi di dollari di debito Usa. Gli Stati Uniti hanno quindi interesse che la Cina continui a finanziare il loro debito, soprattutto in un momento di crisi e quindi di crescita del deficit federale. Per quanto li riguarda, anche i cinesi hanno interesse ad aiutare la ripresa americana e mondiale, perché la loro economia dipende quasi del tutto dalle esportazioni, e si trovano nella posizione di non potersi liberare dalle enormi riserve in dollari che hanno accumulato, poiché solo iniziare a farlo significherebbe far cadere il valore del dollaro e quindi esporsi a perdite ingenti.

Su altri temi però la cooperazione tra Stati Uniti e Cina è più incerta, perché gli interessi di fondo divergono. I temi del clima, della non-proliferazione nucleare e del rispetto dei diritti umani hanno pesanti implicazioni sulla sopravvivenza stessa del regime di Pechino, che infatti cerca di prendere tempo. Andare incontro alle richieste americane su tali questioni potrebbe significare per il Partito comunista perdere il monopolio del potere, o per lo meno trovarsi di fronte sfide interne alla sua autorità sempre più insidiose. Il tumultuoso sviluppo cinese è reso possibile dal mancato rispetto dell'ambiente e dei diritti dei lavoratori. La riduzione delle emissioni rischierebbe di frenare il tasso di crescita, e quindi di alimentare tensioni sociali (centinaia di proteste e ribellioni avvengono già ogni anno) che potrebbero destabilizzare il regime. Fondamentali per l'economia, la sicurezza e per le ambizioni strategiche di Pechino sono inoltre i rapporti con la Corea del Nord e l'Iran. La Cina si oppone all'adozione di sanzioni più stringenti nei confronti di Pyongyang e Teheran, ma anche se il suo veto all'Onu dovesse cadere, senza una sua convinta adesione ad eventuali nuove sanzioni, esse risulterebbero comunque inefficaci. Con l'Iran la Cina ha rapporti sempre più stretti dal punto di vista energetico e commerciale, mentre il collasso del regime nordcoreano aprirebbe la strada alla riunificazione delle due Coree ai suoi confini, ma sotto l'ombrello politico e militare americano. Uno scacco alle sue ambizioni egemoniche in Asia. Per non parlare dei diritti umani e del rispetto delle minoranze culturali e religiose. E' fin troppo evidente la sfida al potere del partito unico e al centralismo che rappresenterebbero reali aperture in questi campi.

I "funzionalisti" credono che la crescita economica incoraggerà riforme politiche interne e che in futuro, quindi, la Cina diventerà un attore responsabile, e persino difensore, dell'attuale ordine "liberale" in Asia. Al contrario, gli "strategici" pensano che la Cina sia una potenza "revisionista", cioè essenzialmente interessata a sovvertire quest'ordine. Sono i settori dell'economia controllati dallo stato che si stanno rafforzando, non il settore privato, che viene "deliberatamente soppresso", osserva John Lee. Delle circa 1.500 compagnie quotate sulle Borse di Shanghai e Shenzhen, meno del 50 per cento sono davvero private e il 95 per cento del pacchetto di stimolo da 586 miliardi di dollari, annunciato dal governo cinese nel novembre scorso, andrà a imprese controllate dallo stato. Ciò renderà probabilmente la Cina più potente, ma "non la spingerà verso le riforme politiche", visto che il Partito comunista avrà modo e risorse per "rafforzare il suo potere e la sua posizione nell'economia e nella società".

Con l'aumentare della sua potenza, la Cina sarà sempre meno propensa, non più propensa, obiettano gli "strategici", a preservare l'attuale ordine regionale in Asia, che i cinesi ritengono strumentale a mantenere l'egemonia americana nella regione. Anche se ne avrà tratto beneficio, a Pechino potrebbe risultare stretto l'ordine esistente quando il suo potere si sarà accresciuto. Gli "strategici" non possono impedire l'ascesa della Cina, né lo vogliono, spiega Lee, ma sostengono che le ambizioni strategiche di Pechino devono essere "contenute", soprattutto in Asia. A questo scopo gli Stati Uniti devono imbrigliare la Cina nella rete delle loro alleanze regionali con il Giappone, la Corea del Sud, l'Australia, l'Indonesia, la Tailandia, le Filippine, Singapore e, sempre di più, con l'India. Per questo gli "strategici" vedono come un pericolo l'approccio G-2 nelle relazioni tra Washington e Pechino, perché un dialogo strategico "tra eguali", proprio ciò che i cinesi desiderano, rischia di lasciare in secondo piano gli alleati asiatici che possono aiutare l'America a contenere le ambizioni cinesi. E infatti molti di loro, come la Corea del Sud e il Giappone, vedendo nell'attuale equilibrio assicurato dagli Usa la migliore garanzia di pace e stabilità durature, temono l'approccio G-2 dei "funzionalisti", perché potrebbe compromettere quest'ordine. Finché i problemi economici domineranno la scena - conclude John Lee - i "funzionalisti" avranno campo libero. Gli altri a Washington e in Asia possono solo sperare che nel frattempo l'influenza americana non si riduca troppo.

In tutto questo, la crescita economica cinese non dovrebbe essere considerata un dato scontato, una variabile indipendente. Mentre la bolla cinese di cui molti analisti finanziari temono l'esplosione è quella azionaria, secondo Vitaliy N. Katsenelson bisogna guardare altrove: è "l'intera economia cinese che si sta preparando a esplodere", ha scritto per Foreign Policy. L'economia cinese ha dimostrato finora "un'incredibile resistenza". Nonostante le esportazioni siano calate di oltre il 20 per cento a causa della crisi dei suoi principali "clienti" (Stati Uniti ed Europa), le più recenti stime parlano di una crescita annuale dell'8 per cento. La Cina ha strumenti di potere estremamente più potenti, e rapidi, di quelli americani per stimolare l'economia. Ecco perché le stime di crescita sono ancora così "robuste". La Federal Reserve può stampare denaro, ma non può obbligare le banche a prestarlo, a meno che non vengano nazionalizzate, e non può obbligare le imprese e i consumatori a spendere. Dal momento che la Cina non è una democrazia, non ha di questi problemi. Il governo comunista di Pechino possiede larga parte dell'apparato di creazione della moneta e di spesa. L'offerta di moneta è salita del 28,5 per cento nel mese di giugno. E poiché controlla le banche, può obbligarle a prestare soldi, come può obbligare le imprese di stato a prestare e a spendere. In Cina non esistono le lungaggini e le complicazioni delle democrazie. "Se il governo centrale decide di costruire un'autostrada, gli basta tracciare una linea retta sulla mappa. Qualsiasi ostacolo può essere sacrificato per il bene superiore". Non avendo una rete di protezione sociale come nei Paesi sviluppati, per impedire l'esplodere delle tensioni sociali a causa di milioni di disoccupati e affamati nelle grandi città, il governo cinese sta facendo di tutto per stimolare artificialmente l'economia, nella speranza di prendere tempo finché il sistema globale non si sarà stabilizzato.

"Non bisogna confondere però - avverte Katsenelson - una crescita rapida con una crescita sostenibile". Gran parte della crescita cinese dell'ultimo decennio è stata possibile grazie ai soldi prestati agli Stati Uniti perché continuassero a comprare beni cinesi. La Cina è affetta da un reale eccesso di capacità produttiva. In questo momento di crisi sostiene la sua crescita con un cattivo indebitamento interno - perché "prestiti forzati sono cattivi prestiti". L'elenco delle conseguenze negative, secondo Katsenelson, è "molto lungo", ma "il risultato finale è semplice": "Non c'è alcun miracolo nella miracolosa crescita cinese, e la Cina pagherà un prezzo. L'unica domanda è quando e quanto".

La Cina ha venduto i suoi prodotti negli Stati Uniti ricevendo in cambio dollari, ma ha scelto di non convertirli in renminbi, per evitare che il valore del dollaro calasse e quello del renminbi salisse, rendendo meno competitivi i prodotti cinesi e quindi danneggiando le esportazioni. Se lo avesse fatto, la Cina avrebbe esportato meno, e la sua economia sarebbe cresciuta a un tasso minore, ma non si troverebbe nella delicata situazione in cui si trova oggi. Adesso infatti la Cina detiene 2,2 mila miliardi di dollari in titoli di debito Usa, ma avrebbe bisogno di denaro all'interno per finanziare la sua crescita. Se li vendesse, la sua moneta schizzerebbe alle stelle, e perderebbe il suo vantaggio competitivo di produttore "low-cost". Ecco perché la Cina sta disperatamente cercando di capire come liberarsi dei dollari senza far cadere il loro valore, ma il governo Usa non è d'aiuto. Continua a stampare moneta e a emettere Buoni del Tesoro, e a chiedere ai cinesi di comprarli. Difficile capire quando questa enorme bolla cinese esploderà, conclude Katsenelson, "ma come abbiamo imparato di recente, puoi sfidare le leggi di gravità finanziaria solo per poco tempo... Più a lungo gli eccessi durano, più violentemente la gravità finanziaria riporterà l'economia cinese sulla Terra".

Autore: Federico Punzi

Fonte: www.ilvelino.it

An Insider's Guide to Washington's China War

Wirepullers: la Cina tiene il proprio popolo nella povertà per far vivere nel lusso quello americano. Il fondo sovrano cinese infatti possiede una montagna di buoni del tesoro americani, avendo di fatto in mano l'economia statunitense e il benessere dei cittadini americani. Se i cinesi chiudessero i rubinetti, l'America sarebbe in ginocchio. Il problema è che se questo succedesse, finirebbero gli investimenti americani in Cina, con il conseguente crollo dell'economia cinese. Queste due potenze sono legate da un cordone ombelicale a doppio senso, una non puo vivere senza l'altra. Una situazione questa che potrebbe funzionare da "deterrente atomico" sui generis, in un'ipotetica futura guerra fredda con gli altri comunisti. Molto però, evidentemente, faranno le volontà di chi sta al governo da ambo le parti. (1)

When it comes to U.S.-China policy, Washington is broadly separated into two camps: the "functionalists" and the "strategists." And as the two countries have met in Washington this week, the internal debate has begun to unfold. U.S. President Barack Obama told his counterparts that Washington and Beijing should be "partners"; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote a joint op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for broad "strategic level discussions." Make no mistake: The functionalists are winning.

The functionalists tend to be economists and those concerned with the U.S.-China economic relationship. The United States and China are so economically intertwined, the functionalists argue, that they ought to be strategic partners as well. Win-win cooperation -- not zero-sum competition -- is a very achievable goal. Barriers between the two countries are transactional, and any tensions are usually due to mere misunderstanding. Yes, there are profound disagreements, but fix the practical problems, and many obstacles toward a fruitful partnership will eventually melt away. In fact, they will have to melt away -- out of necessity on both sides. As Clinton and Geithner put it, quoting a Chinese proverb, "When you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river peacefully."

"Strategists," however, don't see quite such a rosy picture. For them, the U.S.-China relationship is one of strategic competition -- an irreversible rivalry already well under way. Sure, Washington and Beijing ought to improve their interactions and mutual understanding to minimize friction. But any such cooperation is tactical, nothing more. Underlying all bilateral interactions, the strategists believe, is a fundamental clash of interests and values that can be managed but never solved unless the values and interests of either Washington or Beijing change -- and that's highly unlikely.

Amid global recession, at a time when China owns a hefty sum of U.S. Treasury bonds, it's easy to see why the functionalists have the upper hand. The Chinese economy is ticking at an enviable pace that many hope will spur global (and U.S.) growth back to life. Encouraging economic growth in China has the doubly touted benefit of accelerating the prospects for domestic political reform. China could, over time, become a willing participant in -- and even defender of -- the liberal regional order in Asia, the functionalists believe.

But there's a logic leap here, overlooked to America's peril. As China grows richer, it is the state-controlled sectors of the economy that are growing more powerful, not the independent private sector -- which has been deliberately suppressed. Of the roughly 1,500 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, less than 50 are genuinely private. As much as 95 percent of Beijing's $586 billion economic stimulus package, announced last November, will go to state-controlled enterprises. This makes China Inc. more powerful but does not push it closer to political reform. On the contrary, it has offered the Chinese Communist Party better and more resources to entrench its power and position in the country's economy and society.

The implications go well beyond China's borders, strategists warn. As Beijing's power grows, it will be less inclined, not more, to uphold the current regional order in Asia. In a recent study of 100 recent articles by more than two dozen of China's top strategic thinkers, I found that four of every five articles spoke of circumventing, reducing, or superseding U.S. power and ideas in Asia. China views the liberal order as one designed to preserve American hegemony in the region. Even if Beijing has so far benefited enormously from rising up within the existing order, it might not be so friendly to it once it's risen far enough.

Washington's strategists cannot prevent China's rise, nor do they want to. But they do argue that the country's strategic ambitions must be constrained, especially in Asia. That will mean enmeshing China in the regional hierarchy that is underwritten by U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and increasingly, India. Acutely aware of this existing dynamic, China prefers to deal either with Washington or Asia -- never both.
This is why the "G-2" approach to U.S.-China relations is more dangerous than reassuring. Strategists fear that such a top-level dialogue of equals, discussing non-economic issues such as security and regional institutions, would offer Beijing precisely the strategic billing it desires from Washington -- with little in return. Already, U.S. allies in Asia -- basically the whole region minus Myanmar, North Korea, Cambodia and Laos -- fear that U.S. leverage over Beijing will be too easily given away.

As advantageous as functionalists' win-win U.S.-China cooperation may seem, the hidden loser may well be Asia, where most states see the current U.S.-led power structure as the best guarantee of continued peace and stability. Rushing into a G-2 approach - the kind that Washington functionalists prefer -- would jeopardize much of this.

Unfortunately, so long as economic matters dominate, functionalists may well win the day. Others in Washington and throughout Asia can only hope that too much U.S. leverage on China is not whittled away in the meantime.

Autore: John Lee

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com

videocarta: la crisi AfPak tra Usa e Iran

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. La videomappa di limes. (4)

La guerra in Afghanistan diventa prioritaria per il presidente Obama. Ma il problema principale è impedire il collasso del Pakistan nucleare.

Più dell'Iran Obama teme il Pakistan e il rischio che i terroristi islamici mettano le mani sul nucleare pakistano.

Lo scenario afghano-pakistano che i generali Usa hanno illustrato al presidente è più che allarmante. Se la tendenza non venisse invertita, gli Stati Uniti rischierebbero di perdere la guerra in Afghanistan e, peggio, il controllo del Pakistan.

Obama ha dunque ridefinito l’obiettivo della guerra: sconfiggere la galassia jihadista in Pakistan e Afghanistan più che l’insurrezione talibano-pashtun.

E' dal Pakistan, inventore dei taliban che nasce il caos afghano. Frutto dell’insanabile rivalità con l’India, per cui Islamabad concepisce l’Afghanistan in chiave di “profondità strategica”: un retroterra contro un attacco indiano.

Il nucleo centrale delle crisi va dalla frontiera irano-afghano-pakistana fino al Kashmir conteso e ritorno. Qui la minaccia più grave per Obama sono il Punjab e il Balucistan.

Negli ultimi due anni la pressione jihadista dalle aree tribali e dalla Provincia del Nord-Ovest si è rivolta verso il Punjab, il cuore pulsante del Paese, quartier generale delle forze armate e dei centri nucleari più importanti. La cooperazione tra militari e jihadisti in Pakistan sembra finita.

L'altra area strategica è il Balucistan, a cavallo di Pakistan e Iran, dove sono presenti movimenti separatisti e jihadisti, dediti a ogni tipo di traffico. Di qui dovrebbe poi passare l’importante gasdotto Iran-Pakistan - estendibile all’India e forse alla Cina.

Per Teheran gli attentati nella parte iraniana non sono solo opera dei movimenti separatisti ma un'aggressione di Pakistan, Stati Uniti e Israele e minaccia di marciare contro Islamabad.Tratto dal volume di Limes 4/2009 "La rivolta d'Iran nella sfida Obama-Israele

Autori: Alfonso Desiderio - carte di Laura Canali

Fonte: www.limesonline.it

Our Man in Afghanistan

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. Vediamo un ritratto di Richard Holbrooke, inviato speciale dell'amministrazione Obama per l'Afghanistan e il Pakistan. (3)

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is a man in a hurry, working in a land that can seem to defy time. His mission, as special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is to achieve some measure of success in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to prevent a nuclear-armed country from collapsing. He feels that he's under pressure to achieve something positive by next summer. If he can't, he says, political support in the United States will slip away. The question is whether Holbrooke's relentlessness—his sheer force of -personality—will make a real difference in countries that can seem immune to progress.

"Impatience will not solve this problem," says journalist Ahmed Rashid, who has written three respected books on the region. "And Holbrooke is an impatient guy." At least one Pakistani official has felt that firsthand. "He'll call you up, and after two minutes he'll say, 'I've got to go, I've got to go,' " recalls the official, who did not want to be named discussing personal interactions. "He's always got nine other things he's working on at the same time, texting people in the middle of a conversation." One of Holbrooke's close advisers, speaking in confidence about his boss, doesn't disagree: "Yes, he does kick Pakistan's ass, and they don't like it." Holbrooke's particular head-knocking skills may not be perfectly cast for this job, the hardest of his life. On the other hand, who else has the right mixture of grandiosity and smarts to even try?

Holbrooke doesn't look anything like an ornately costumed diplomat as he pads, barefoot, around his government jet, wearing yellow pj's, and eating a banana. Still, in some ways, he is a throwback to the old days of the ambassador plenipotentiary—the type of envoy whose word was imperial writ in far-flung places. True, Holbrooke is encumbered by a ubiquitous, buzzing cell phone and required to work with about eight different government agencies (State, Defense, Treasury, CIA, FBI, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and USAID). But he has a way of making everyone work for him. Last week The New York Times reported that the Defense Department had a plan to reform Afghanistan's prisons. The idea (as Holbrooke is not shy about admitting) came from him. Holbrooke had been appalled to discover that jihadists were allowed to keep their cell phones in the local jails. Upon taking his assignment last winter, Holbrooke decided that eradicating poppy crops in Afghanistan to stop the opium trade was futile and only hurt poor farmers. It was only a matter of time before USAID, intelligence, and the military changed their strategy to target only big-time opium dealers.

Holbrooke has been studying great envoys "all my life," he says. In high school, he wrote a paper on Lord Kitchener, the much-beribboned proconsul sent to Sudan by Victorian Britain. "He was a pompous windbag," jokes Holbrooke. At 21, fresh out of Brown, Holbrooke joined the Foreign Service. This was 1962, during the "twilight struggle" of the Cold War, when American hubris was peaking. As a young State Department officer in the Mekong Delta, Holbrooke encountered the CIA's Col. Edward Lansdale—the model for Colonel Hillandale in the novel The Ugly American. He says today we would describe Lansdale as "sort of a successful con man."

Holbrooke learned from watching failure. He notes that one of his heroes and role models, Ambassador Averell Harriman, whom Holbrooke admiringly describes as "tenacious," failed to get a peace treaty with the North Vietnamese. He dislikes Vietnam analogies to Afghanistan but keeps coming back to them in conversation. Choosing his words carefully, he says, "I don't feel burned by Vietnam. I feel informed by it."

The clearest lesson Holbrooke took from Vietnam is that military success is useless without winning the hearts and minds of the population. He is obsessed with the problem of civilian casualties in Afghanistan—it is "the big issue," he says, "which could cost us the war." Of the hour and a half he recently spent with Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new ground commander, most of the time was consumed by Holbrooke hammering away at "civ cas," as Holbrooke calls them, using the military acronym. (An Air Force general who declined to be identified says that McChrystal was sensitive to the issue before he talked to Holbrooke.)

Holbrooke still has a bit of New Frontier swagger, and he loves the aura of power and glamour. The late columnist Joseph Alsop, an arch-hawk on Vietnam, once described Holbrooke as one of the "Young Lords of the Delta." Holbrooke's friend and fellow Young Lord, Frank Wisner Jr., introduced Holbrooke to the fancy dinner parties of his mother, Polly. A middle-class suburban kid from Scarsdale, N.Y., Holbrooke still sounds like a boy with his nose pressed against the window when he describes his first dinner party at the Wisners'. "I sat next to Teddy Roosevelt's daughter!" he exclaims. Years later, as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Holbrooke and his wife began running elegant salons for movers and shakers, showbiz types, and the occasional journalist. Generally speaking off the record, Holbrooke is unusually open with journalists, whom he alternately scolds and shamelessly flatters.

Officials in Pakistan were at first wary of Holbrooke, reports NEWSWEEK's correspondent in Islamabad, Ron Moreau. The new special representative was an admitted neophyte in the region, and his reputation for heavy arm-twisting preceded him. But the Pakistani officials interviewed by Moreau give him high marks for persuading Congress to provide billions in aid, and they say he has been deft at engaging Nawaz Sharif, the popular opposition leader. The Bush administration had treated Sharif as a dangerous Islamist and did not deal with him. As we flew into Islamabad last week, Holbrooke called Sharif by phone to schmooze—but then he was careful to make sure that President Asif Ali Zardari knew that he had placed the call. "I don't go behind Zardari's back," he says.

In March, a million people had filled the streets in Pakistan, as Sharif and Zardari squared off in a power struggle. For a tense moment, it seemed likely that the military would take over the government. But Holbrooke, furiously working the phones, mobilized President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen to lean on the Pakistani leadership to step back from the brink.

Since then, an uneasy truce has prevailed. When we arrived in Islamabad, the streets had been cleared so Holbrooke's armored convoy could career between government offices. Meeting with Pakistan's hostile, conspiracy-minded press, he was firm without getting sucked into debate (he may have learned a lesson from an earlier trip, when he made headlines by chastising a Pakistani news network for -anti--American reports). At another gathering with a group of Pakistanis who had been driven from their homes by the Taliban, he was polite, patient, even gentle with a 12-year-old girl whose school had been destroyed.

That evening, on the ride to have dinner with Zardari, I asked Holbrooke if he was patient enough for the job. "It isn't me that's impatient," he replied. "It's Congress. They want results." At the president's house, Holbrooke, who is 6 feet 2, gave the dapper, coiffed Zardari a big bearhug. "Every time I see you, things are a little better," said Holbrooke. Zar-dari beamed. "It's the karma. You send good stars to us," he said. I asked Zardari if he agreed that things were better, and he launched into a speech that Pakistan needed a $50 billion Marshall Plan. Holbrooke interjected that he agreed, but didn't think the United States should have to pay for it.

When Holbrooke was negotiating with Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic to end the Balkan war in the mid-'90s, he earned his nickname, "the Bulldozer," by threatening to bomb Serbia if Milosevic did not come to the bargaining table. Now he's pushing the Pakistanis to expand military pressure on the Taliban. But Holbrooke's bluster is largely gone. "You have to suit your method to the moment, and your style to the situation," he says. Holbrooke "feels the pressure" to succeed in "AfPak," as he calls the region. But he doesn't seem all that burdened. His staffers say they've heard the stories of his bullying but that he never tries that with them. "He's the easiest man I've ever worked with," says his chief of staff, Rosemarie Pauli, who has been with Holbrooke off and on for more than 15 years. (She laughs as she says this.)

"This is my last job in government," says Holbrooke, who is 68. Maybe, but Holbrooke, who doesn't hide his disappointment that he was never appointed secretary of state, doesn't seem like the retiring type. In David Halberstam's Vietnam chronicle, an anonymous government official is quoted as saying that Averell Harriman is "the only ambitious seventy-seven-year-old I've ever met." Holbrooke told me he was the anonymous source. In about 10 years, that's probably what they'll be saying about him.

Autore: Michael Hirsh

Fonte: www.newsweek.com

America’s new-old military thinking

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. (2)

From Somalia to Iraq, Afghanistan to Lebanon, an emerging global landscape of variable security threats is provoking United States military analysts into an intense process of reflection.

The centre of the wars that the western powers, principally the United States and Britain, are involved in has moved east. Afghanistan, where the "war on terror" was launched in October 2001, has replaced Iraq as the site of their principal military effort. But as the campaign there becomes increasingly mired in difficult local terrain, a larger effort is being made to use this shift in the major theatre of war to think about the fundamental purposes of what these powers are engaged in.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001Bradford's peace-studies department now broadcasts regular podcasts on its work, including a regular commentary from Paul Rogers on international-security issues. Listen/watch here

What are the wars and local insurgencies the United States and Britain are seeking to win, manage or contain now about? How are the different "small" conflicts around the world related to each other? How do military analysts now understand the current security threats faced by western states? Such questions shadow the increasingly fraught atmospherics of the anti-Taliban effort in Afghanistan.

The Afghan dilemma
A tough summer campaign by British forces in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand is incurring almost daily casualties that are widely reported by the media. There is a fairly even split of public opinion between those supporting and those opposing a continued presence in the country; while overall backing for the troops is often accompanied by doubts over their mission and military strategy. What is most striking about mid-2009 is that these doubts and concerns have been voiced by senior military and political figures (see "Afghanistan's lost decade", 16 July 2009).

The British government has been on the defensive in a controversy over equipment limitations. This itself can become a diversion from the reality on the ground, namely the unexpectedly strong resistance that the Taliban and other paramilitaries are offering in Helmand. Moreover, in many ways the experience of the British troops is little different to that of the other national contingents (Canadian, Dutch or American) that have been heavily involved in direct combat. All forces in southern Afghanistan have been struggling with the same problem: how to bring in larger numbers of heavily armoured vehicles and helicopters, as they face paramilitaries adept at disrupting road patrols.

A view that has quickly acquired the status of an orthodoxy is that the answer is "more helicopters". This too is misleading, on two counts. The first is that any enduring presence by western forces, intended as a medium-term prelude to a handover to a rebuilt Afghan national army, requires numerous small units entrenched in towns across the province and able to conduct frequent foot-patrols. This presence cannot be provided by helicopters, and even robust armoured road vehicles have limited relevance.

The second point is that any greater reliance on helicopters will be met by paramilitary attempts to acquire shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. It was the introduction of these weapons that inflicted so much damage on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, even arguably creating a military turning-point in the war. They could once again become a major threat.

Turn, and turn again
A wider view of the evolving conflict entails recognition that the war in Afghanistan is closely linked both with what has happened in Iraq and current developments in Somalia. The impact of the "insurgency knowledge" gained by paramilitaries in Iraq is clear enough, as is its translation into both countries. What has happened is that Iraq has been a six-year combat-training zone for young paramilitaries from across the middle east and north Africa, a process that will have an enduring impact (see "Iraq's gift to Afghanistan", 20 November 2008).

In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click herePaul Rogers's books include Why We're Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm is needed. A third edition of his Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 2009) is forthcoming
These trends are part of a more general change in military circumstances, as a worldwide security environment emerges that is markedly different to what was anticipated as recently as 2000. This evolving environment is provoking intense rethinking within the US armed forces - though to some extent what they are engaged is less new thinking than a recovery of ideas that were common currency in the 1990s but receded to the background when George W Bush came to power in January 2001.

For example, a notion that was common in the US navy in the early 1990s was that its post-cold-war function would be to "keep the violent peace" and protect US interests across the world (see Paul Rogers & Malcolm Dando, A Violent Peace: Global Security After the Cold War[Brasseys, 1992]). A more colourful way of expressing the same point was used in 1993 by Bill Clinton's first CIA director James Woolsey, when he said that the United States had slain the dragon (the Soviet Union) but now lived in a jungle full of poisonous snakes.

This perspective was embodied in the mid-1990s in an emphasis on special forces and amphibious-warfare capabilities, but their moment passed when the Bush administration's neo-conservative agenda revealed itself to have other priorities. The idea of "taming the jungle" was essentially defensive; now, in 2001, a much more aggressive and proactive project - creating the "new American century", in which global security is guaranteed by a single, unrivalled superpower - came to the forefront.

This worldview regarded 9/11 with utter shock and dismay. It reacted with fury and the appearance of certitude, and prepared its military for what was intended to be a definitive and awesome demonstration of unchallengeable military might. But the outcomes of this policy choice - two bitter and lengthy wars, the risk of deep instability in Pakistan, and the continuing risk of al-Qaida attacks - only deepened its predicament and exposed its inner fragility.

The response has been a bout of serious reflection within the US military as to its future direction. The debates that are occurring are made even more sombre by the spreading acknowledgment that the routinely huge increases in military budgets under the Bush administration cannot be maintained in an era of more constrained American power (see "The costs of America's long war", 8 March 2007).

The militant mix
A conventional digest of these debates sees them in terms of two broad views: arguing that the United States's main military emphasis should either be on preparation for counterinsurgency campaigns, or on conventional wars (most likely involving Iran, or in the longer term China or a renewed Russia).

A recent study concludes that this is too much of a simplification (see Frank G Hoffman, "Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict", Strategic Forum, April 2009 [Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington]).

Frank G Hoffman identifies four, rather than two, schools of thought:

* Counterinsurgents - who focus heavily on irregular forces as the main threat

* Traditionalists - who are concerned very much with conventional warfare

* Utility infielders - who say the answer is to create forces that are sufficiently agile and well-trained to handle any threat

* Division-of-labour people - who want forces divided into different categories to meet the different threats.

These varied currents tend to be complicated by inter-service rivalry, with the army and the marines emphasising counterinsurgency and the air force and navy much more geared to conventional war. These divisions are not absolute, and there is certainly some overlap; but they still run deep. They are also accentuated by the sheer costs and timescales involved in expensive projects such as aircraft-carriers and new strike-aircraft, as well as the need for senior officers to protect their own careers.

There is nonetheless a sense in which military analysts are going beyond these institutional limitations to focus on what are increasingly being termed "hybrid threats". This approach recognises that in the reasonably near future the the United States and its allies will face opponents - non-state movements, and possibly states - that according to circumstances employ a combination of guerrilla tactics and conventional war. These opponents may be all the more challenging in their versatile capacity to recognise the overwhelming conventional military power available to the United States and its allies without being in any way cowed by it.

Thus, Hizbollah in southern Lebanon in 2006 used a complex mix of strategies - ranging from sophisticated anti-ship missiles acquired from Iran to guerrilla tactics close to the Israeli border. In Iraq, the conventional forces of the special republican guard (SRG) military units were the backbone of the military units that initially fought the US after 2003. These rapidly evolved into effective guerrilla forces; in turn, they attracted young paramilitaries from across the region, and the tactics and weapons developed in Iraq have since turned up in other war-zones.

Frank G Hoffman cites intelligence sources suggesting that several middle-eastern states, most likely including Iran and Syria, are purposely developing irregular units on a substantial scale while retaining conventional forces. The latter may have a defensive function; they may be no match for the US military, but could combine with irregular warfare in any future confrontation to create real damage.

Hoffman concludes that the United States:
"must maintain the ability to wage successful campaigns against both large, conventionally armed states and their militaries and against widely dispersed terrorists - and against everything in between. We must be smart about our force posture and lean towards agile, rigorously multipurpose forces capable of being adaptive in approach to the unique conditions each conflict poses."

The far horizon
In its own way, such thinking is typical of the intelligent analysis being conducted in some of the United States's military-research centres. It is all a long way from the immediacy of Washington's politics, and all the more interesting for that. But it also remains limited by a basic premise: that the world is a jungle and that jungle has to be tamed.

This analysis thus says very little about the underlying causes of conflict; and still less about why states and sub-state groups may be antagonistic to US interests in particular and western power in general. Moreover, it shows no recognition of any wider understanding of security, one that could raise awareness of the need to address two major global issues: the widening socio-economic divide and the likely impact of climate change (see "A tale of two paradigms", 25 June 2009).

But it does at least recognise what the eight years since 9/11 have made unavoidably clear: that the world is changing. The best military analysts have the habit of thinking long term. It is as good a reason as any for engaging with them on these much wider and more fundamental security issues.

Autore: Paul Rogers

Fonte: www.opendemocracy.net

We should not be afraid to talk to the Taliban

Wirepullers: cambio di strategia o ammissione di sconfitta? Dopo Vietnam e Somalia, l'Afghanistan potrebbe rappresentare il teatro di una nuova sconfitta militare americana, se è vero che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero più o meno segretamente aperto al colloquio con i taliban moderati. E' comunque evidente che con le armi non si è fatta molta strada da quell'ottobre del 2002, data d'inizio dei bombardamenti su Kabul. I taliban fanno costanti progressi nel conflitto e possono contare sulla retroguardia offerta dal permeabile confine con il Pakistan. Zona, questa, letteralmente in mano ai ribelli. In Afghanistan potrebbe cadere l'ennesimo impero. (1)

Is it credible to expect elements within the Afghan Taliban to beat their weapons into ploughshares? David Miliband certainly believes so. The Foreign Secretary gave a speech at Nato headquarters in Brussels yesterday urging Afghanistan's leaders to reach out to more moderate Taliban insurgents. This echoes sentiments expressed earlier this year by Barack Obama and his top general, David Petraeus, suggesting that there is scope for offering an amnesty to less committed fighters if it helps to end the insurgency.

Taking the fight to the militants of Afghanistan while simultaneously offering truce terms appears contradictory, but it makes sense given the incoherent nature of the Taliban. The insurgents are not a solid bloc, but rather a motley mixture of hardcore Islamists, mercenaries, drug traffickers and others who fight the Afghan government in the belief that the Taliban will ultimately prevail.

It is sensible to attempt to split off the moderates from the hardcore elements with offers of amnesty and incorporation into Afghanistan's conventional security forces. Indeed, it seems that Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul is already cutting such deals. Yesterday it announced the signing of a truce with insurgents in Badghis province in the north-west of the country.
Yet such overtures remain politically sensitive. Two Western diplomats (one working for the United Nations, the other for the European Union) were expelled by the Karzai government in late 2007 for engaging in informal contacts with the Taliban. There is a danger that Western governments, in pushing for engagement, will make Karzai look like a puppet ruler. Such a perception would be the kiss of death, not only for President Karzai, but also Western hopes of stabilising Afghanistan.

There is no shortage of reasons to dislike the Karzai regime. In recent years it has proven itself corrupt, incompetent and soft on human rights abuses. President Karzai has made one brutal Tajik warlord, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, his running mate for next month's elections. But if Nato is to have any chance of convincing ordinary Afghans that it is working in their interests, rather than its own, it has no alternative but to work with Karzai's administration. Any initiative to talk with insurgents must be seen to come from Kabul.

This flurry of peacemaking gestures comes as the first stage of the Afghan "surge" comes to a close. The British Army announced an end to Operation Panther's Claw yesterday, with claims that a sizeable area of northern Helmand province has been cleared of militants. This has come at a price. Twenty British soldiers have been killed this month. And, as our poll shows today, that has damaged British public confidence in the Afghan mission. But we ought not to overlook the fact that Afghan civilian casualties have also risen drastically in recent weeks as the Taliban has increased its attacks to destabilise the country. Protecting those civilians is still a worthy and honourable mission. And while the Taliban remains unpopular it is still a feasible one.

Success will depend on political resolve – and leadership. There was a somewhat worrying tone in Gordon Brown's comments yesterday. The Prime Minister seemed to be suggesting that the worst is now over. This idea is a dangerous delusion. The truth is that the project of stabilising Afghanistan is only beginning. And we need our leaders to be clear-eyed and open about the sacrifices to come.

Fonte: www.independent.co.uk

Why Won’t Obama Talk to Israel?

Wirepullers: c'è il gelo tra Obama e Israele. Che il problema sia il rapporto personale con Netanyahu o semplicemente un cambiamento di rotta nella politica americana verso Tel Aviv, il rapporto stenta a decollare, e anzi sembra sprofondare sempre più verso l'incomprensione e la sfiducia. In particolare quella israeliana verso il presidente americano. Forse perchè, chiedendo lo stop degli insediamenti israeliani illegali, Obama ha dimostrato di essersi accorto che i palestinesi esistono davvero. (2)

IN his global tours and TV appearances, President Obama has spoken to Arabs, Muslims, Iranians, Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans, Russians and Africans. His words have stirred emotions and been well received everywhere.

But he hasn’t bothered to speak directly to Israelis.

And the effect? Six months into his presidency, Israelis find themselves increasingly suspicious of Mr. Obama. All they see is American pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to freeze settlements, a request that’s been interpreted here as political arm-twisting meant to please the Arab street at Israel’s expense — or simply to express the president’s dislike for Mr. Netanyahu.

This would seem counterproductive, given the importance the president has placed on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If Israel is part of the problem, it’s also part of the solution. Yet so far, neither the president nor any senior administration official has given a speech or an interview aimed at an Israeli audience, beyond brief statements made at diplomatic photo ops.
The Arabs got the Cairo speech; we got silence.

This policy of ignoring Israel carries a price. Though Mr. Obama has succeeded in prodding Mr. Netanyahu to accept the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, he has failed to induce Israel to impose a freeze on settlements. In fact, he has failed even to stir debate about the merits of one: no Israeli political figure has stood up to Mr. Netanyahu and begged him to support Mr. Obama; not even the Israeli left, desperate for a new agenda, has adopted Mr. Obama as its icon.
As a result, Mr. Netanyahu enjoys a virtual domestic consensus over his rejection of the settlement freeze. Moreover, he has succeeded in portraying Mr. Obama as a shaky ally. In Mr. Netanyahu’s narrative, the president has fallen under the influence of top aides — in this case Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod — whom the prime minister has called “self-hating Jews.” Meanwhile, Mr. Netanyahu is the defender of national glory in face of unfair pressure, someone who sticks to the first commandment of Israeli culture: thou shalt never be the freier (that is, the dupe).

So far, Israelis have embraced Mr. Netanyahu’s message. A Jerusalem Post poll of Israeli Jews last month indicated that only 6 percent of those surveyed considered the Obama administration to be pro-Israel, while 50 percent said that its policies are more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli. Less scientifically: Israeli rightists have — in columns, articles and public statements — taken to calling the president by his middle name, Hussein, as proof of his pro-Arab tendencies.

What went wrong? Several explanations come to mind.

First, in the 16 rosy years of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Israelis became spoiled by unfettered presidential attention. Memories of State Department “Arabists” leading American policy in the Middle East were erased. The White House coordinated its policy with Jerusalem, and stayed out of the way when Israel embarked on controversial military offensives in Lebanon and Gaza. This approach infuriated America’s Arab and European allies, which blamed Washington for one-sidedness — something they were willing to forgive of Bill Clinton but not of George W. Bush.

Mr. Obama came to office determined to repair America’s broken alliances in Europe and the Middle East. One way to do this — to prove that he was the opposite of his predecessor — was to place some distance between Israel and himself.

Second, Mr. Obama’s quest for diplomacy has appeared to Israelis as dangerous American naïveté. The president offered a hand to the Iranians, and got nothing, merely giving them more time to advance their nuclear program. In Israeli eyes, he was humiliated by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. And he failed to move Arab governments to take steps to normalize relations with Israel. Conclusion: Mr. Obama is a softie, eager to please his listeners and avoid confrontation with anyone who is not Mr. Netanyahu.

Third, Mr. Obama seems to have confused American Jews with Israelis. We are close emotionally and politically, but we are different. We speak Hebrew and not English, we live in the Middle East and have separate historical narratives. Mr. Obama’s stop at Buchenwald and his strong rejection of Holocaust denial, immediately after his Cairo speech, appealed to American Jews but fell flat in Israel. Here we are taught that Zionist determination and struggle — not guilt over the Holocaust — brought Jews a homeland. Mr. Obama’s speech, which linked Israel’s existence to the Jewish tragedy, infuriated many Israelis who sensed its closeness to the narrative of enemies like Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.

Fourth, as far as most Israelis are concerned, Mr. Obama has made a mistake in focusing on a settlement freeze. For starters, mainstream Israelis rarely have anything to do with the settlements; many have no idea where they are, even when they’re a half-hour’s drive from Tel Aviv.

More important: in the past decade, repeated peace negotiations and diplomatic statements have indicated that larger, closer-to-home settlements (the “settlement blocs”) will remain in Israeli hands under any two-state solution. Why, then, insist on a total freeze everywhere? And why deny with such force — as the administration did — the existence of previous understandings between the United States and Israel over limited settlement construction? There is simply too much evidence proving that such an understanding existed. To Israelis, the claim undermined Mr. Obama’s credibility — and strengthened Mr. Netanyahu’s position.

Perhaps there are good reasons behind Mr. Obama’s Middle East policy. Perhaps the settlement freeze is in Israel’s best interest. Perhaps the president is truly committed to Israel’s long-term security and well-being. Perhaps his popularity in the Arab street is the missing ingredient of peacemaking.

But until the president talks to us, we won’t know. Next time you’re in the neighborhood, Mr. President, speak to us directly. We will surely listen.

Autore: Aluf Benn

Fonte: www.nytimes.com