Nuovo asse energetico e militare sino-russo nel Pacifico, verso una nuova Guerra Fredda?

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (4)

Settanta miliardi di metri cubi di gas e venticinque miliardi di dollari: questo il valore del patto siglato da Gazprom e China National Petroleum Corporation. Con questo agreement, negoziato direttamente dai due premier Wen Jabao e Wladimir Putin nel corso di colloqui ufficiali tenutisi a Pechino nei giorni scorsi, il gigante cinese corre in soccorso di un’economia russa che attraversa, ormai da alcuni mesi, una crisi produttiva profonda. Le previsioni degli economisti e le dichiarazioni dello stesso primo ministro russo Dmitri Medvedev indicano che nell’ultimo anno il paese ha prodotto il 7,5% in meno rispetto ai passati dodici mesi mentre la Cina crescerà di una percentuale variabile tra l’8,3 ed il 9%, un differenza sostanziale che potrebbe riscrivere gli equilibri geopolitici nell’area asiatica nel prossimo futuro e in prospettiva nel medio e lungo periodo.

Mosca fornirà a Pechino ogni anno 70 miliardi di metri cubi di gas ottenendo in cambio prestiti commerciali per 25 miliardi di dollari, i tecnici russi in collaborazione con quelli cinesi costruiranno una raffineria a Tianjin e gestiranno in joint venture tra le 300 e le 500 stazioni di rifornimento. Gazprom si è impegnata inoltre a fornire alla Cina gas liquido estratto da Sakhalin, ad ulteriore riprova della volontà di entrambi i paesi di stringere rapporti politico-commerciali sempre più profondi in tema di energia ed idrocarburi. Il vicepremier cinese Wang Qishan ha definito quella apertasi nei giorni scorsi come “una nuova fase di collaborazione a lungo termine” tra le due potenze, che riguarderà non solo il settore energetico ma anche quelli finanziario e militare. La Development Bank e la Agricultural Bank, entrambe cinesi, hanno infatti accordato a Vnesheconombank e a Vneshtorgbank, banche russe, un prestito da mezzo miliardo di dollari ciascuna e le Forze Armate dei due paesi si doteranno di una linea di comunicazione preferenziale per mantenere un contatto costante in caso di lanci di missili balistici contro i due paesi. Cina e Russia si candidano quindi a diventare il baricentro politico ed economico di una regione, quella del Pacifico, che sarà di fondamentale importanza per gli interessi globali. Al contempo, condividendo informazioni in campo di sicurezza militare, cercano di gettare basi comuni che possano consentire ad entrambe di affrontare eventuali sfide strategiche, in un futuro che sembra farsi ormai sempre più prossimo. Se nei prossimi quindici o venti anni il mondo assumerà sempre più una dimensione “Pacifico-centrica” non potranno essere che Pechino e Mosca a decidere di voler spostare a proprio favore gli equilibri regionali, a probabile detrimento di una posizione statunitense che sembra farsi sempre più debole nell’area asiatica.

Restano da verificare quali saranno le scelte statunitensi per la regione, sia a livello strategico che commerciale. Al momento scenari di scontro tra Washington e Pechino sembrano essere quanto mai utopici. Gli Stati Uniti sono fortemente indebitati e scatenare un conflitto di qualsivoglia tipo con la Cina rischierebbe di portare il paese verso un crollo in stile sovietico. Non è però da escludersi a priori la possibilità che, nel prossimo futuro, la Casa Bianca si trovi costretta a dover fronteggiare una Cina più potente ed arrogante sia sul versante economico che su quello strategico-militare. Come affronteranno allora a Washington la minaccia cinese? Si tornerà ad una situazione già vista, in cui due superpotenze si affrontano in una guerra congelata dalla paura? Difficile dirlo ora, ma tutto lascia pensare che in questo caso non ci troveremo di fronte a ricorsi storici, le leadership saranno quindi chiamate a scrivere una nuova pagina di politica internazionale se vorranno preservare uno dei beni più preziosi per l’umanità.

Autore: Simone Comi

Fonte: http://simonecomi.blogsome.com/

Karl Marx Predicted Collapse of US Dollar in 1857

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (3)

The great October fall of the US dollar is turning into an avalanche. On Tuesday, the American currency lost nine kopeks in Russia and reached a new minimum mark this year - 29.5 rubles per dollar. Within six months (April through September) the dollar lost over 10 percent at the world foreign exchange trading, which marked the sharpest decline since 1991. Some experts believe that the American currency is close to collapse, which may lead to a new financial crisis.

The tendency of the US dollar devaluation has been observed for a few years, but the current rate of decline is unprecedented. Some jokesters even rushed to re-read the letters of Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels written during the US financial panic of 1857 discussing the collapse of America. It would have been funny if it wasn’t so serious.

The chief economist of HSBC Bank Stephen King believes that if the US officials fail to stop the fall of American currency, it may provoke another financial crisis. “A dollar collapse would be a disaster all round… It would leave the international monetary system short of stability and long of fear. It would unleash economic upheavals on a similar scale to those seen in the 1970,” King wrote for The Independent.

American officials don’t seem to be overly concerned since nothing is being done about it. The US hasn’t done anything to support the currency since 1955. But is a collapse inevitable? From the viewpoint of macroeconomic indicators, the US state of affairs is, indeed, scary: record budget deficit of $1.4 trillion, record state debt that now exceeds $11.9 trillion, high unemployment and weak currency. Huge inflows of capital into the economy that Obama is proud of haven’t yet shown results.

But on the other hand, weak currency may be good for the US.
“The economy is supported by industrial orders based on the current weak dollar and higher prices in the future. Key players in the market are ready to support their manufacturers by weakening the currency,” says Alexander Kuptsikevich, FxPro financial analyst.

If the state debt is growing, it means that the US continues to obtain loans.

“Market participants prefer to borrow money in dollars, and dollar loans are relatively affordable. They invest into more active instruments denominated in currencies of developing countries,’ explains Yevgeny Nadorshin, chief economist of Trust Investment Bank.
This causes growth of stock index. For example, Russian Trading System increased by 34 percent within two and a half months.

World center banks, who used to be trusted American partners, also turn their backs to dollar. They reduced investments into assets denominated in American currency. According to Barclays Capital , in April, May, and June, the banks invested 63% of their gains in euro or yen. If it continues, this may lead to further devaluation of dollar.

However, central banks of the countries that depend on export try not to let it happen. For example, last week a group of Asian central banks carried out unprecedented intervention in the financial markets by actively buying American currency. Bank of Russia was not a passive observer either. According to experts’ evaluations, the bank purchased over three billion dollars.

The good thing about it is that it helped Russian manufacturers to maintain competitiveness and bank reserves. The question is whether we would have to spend much more when investors change their minds and flee the Russian market changing their rubles into dollars. Last year we paid a high price for it.

“I’m not afraid that the events of the last year will repeat. The circumstances now are different. The world touched the bottom of the crisis and revival began, so there won’t be sharp moves,” says profile manager of Pilgrim Asset Management Olga Izyumova.

Yevgeniy Nadorshin agrees with her. He also thinks that dollar will continue weakening. But many experts think that as soon as the US announces the raise of interest rates, American currency will stop falling and even start growing. When is it going to happen?

Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve evades the answer. All he says is that this will happen when the US is sure of stable growth. On Tuesday investors discussed information obtained from the US official sources that the Federal Reserve will start raising interest rates no earlier than the second half of the next year.

Fonte: english.pravda.ru

Decline of the Dollar

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (2)

Don't believe everything you read on the Drudge Report. Well into the next few decades, the global economy will still be all about the benjamins.

The greenback is looking a bit green around the gills -- and no matter where you look, the bad news for the U.S. dollar just seems to be getting worse. America's currency has been plunging in value against the euro and the Japanese yen (and the Barack Obama administration has shown little inclination to brake the slide). Dark mutterings from the world's other great powers about the need for a new global reserve currency have accelerated the trend. Rumors about plans to topple the dollar from its pedestal abound. And just in case someone might be inclined to dismiss all the dire talk as a foreign conspiracy, the (American) head of the World Bank went on the record last month with a warning: "The United States would be mistaken to take for granted the dollar's place as the world's predominant reserve currency," Robert Zoellick said in a speech. "Looking forward, there will increasingly be other options to the dollar."

Some onlookers cite the dollar's decline as yet one more bit of evidence that the long period of American global dominance is coming to an end. The greenback's function as the world's leading reserve currency has been one of the key features of Washington's privileged place in the world since World War II. For decades the dollar has been the currency the world's countries tend to use when they do business with each other. Most central banks around the world have held the lion's share of their foreign exchange reserves in dollars, while most globally traded commodities (like oil) have been priced in the U.S. currency, too. It's an arrangement that translates into many benefits for the United States, most notably lower borrowing costs (because there's always more demand for the reserve currency than others). And then there are the myriad political and cultural knock-on effects -- the power and the prestige -- that accrue to the currency at the top of the economic pecking order. So it should come as no surprise that predictions about the impending "demise of the dollar" tend to go hand in hand with the expectation that America's hyperpower days are numbered.

There's just one problem with this picture: It ain't necessarily true. Or not yet, at least. The creation of the euro and the rise of new economic heavyweights like China are indeed opening up prospects for a global monetary system that is much less dollar-centered than today's. For that to happen, though, will require myriad changes that are likely years, if not decades away. And in the meantime, Benjamin Cohen of the University of California-Santa Barbara, points out, "It's clear that the dollar is still the leading currency in almost every category."

Overall, he notes, the dollar continues to remain well out in front of the pack in foreign exchange trading, trade, and international banking markets. Although most countries have been adding euros to their reserves since the European currency was introduced in 1999, the amount of reserves held in dollars is 2½ times greater -- "and in terms of absolute magnitude, the amount of dollars held in reserves is still on the increase," Cohen says. In fact, he points out, the dollar's share of the world's global currency reserves is actually much higher than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990 the dollar accounted for just 45 percent of reserves; today the figure is 65 percent. (For what it's worth, Cohen adds, the dollar's share peaked at 71.5 percent in 1999, the year of the euro's introduction. So sure, the euro has made a dent.)

Cohen and other economists -- including those who are less sanguine about the dollar's future -- point out that much of the current hysteria (or, depending on where you stand, euphoria) about the greenback's role tends to confuse two things: present volatility in the foreign exchange markets and the dollar's medium- to long-term structural role in the global economy. Take a look at history, in fact, and the present aura of uncertainty about the dollar appears, well, historical. Some dollar doomsayers have been claiming of late, for example, that the world's oil-producing countries are contemplating a wholesale switch to pricing oil in euros rather than dollars -- a move that, the pessimists claim, would mark the virtual death knell of America's economic dominance.

That was the thrust, for example, of a much-ballyhooed recent article, "The Demise of the Dollar," by British journalist Robert Fisk, who darkly points out that the United States invaded Iraq shortly after Saddam Hussein started pricing Iraqi oil in euros. Fisk's piece, despite presenting minimal detail to back its claims, triggered something of a run on the dollar when it was published -- a good example of the degree of the current jitteriness. In response, Harvard University economist Richard Cooper points out that the OPEC countries traditionally bring up the idea of junking the dollar pricing system periodically every time the dollar gets weak. The idea, for example, of jettisoning dollars in favor of SDRs (special drawing rights, a sort of IMF pseudo currency) that is making the rounds again has been brought up repeatedly over the years. And if they did? "I don't think it's a big deal one way or the other," he says.

And that brings us to the biggest question that potential dollar-dumpers find themselves compelled to answer: If not the dollar, then what's the alternative? The most obvious candidate would seem to be the euro. Back in pre-euro days, the deutsche mark and the French franc never really posed a serious alternative to the dollar, given their comparatively small reach back then. The economic heft of the euro-area countries, by contrast, is about the same as that of the United States; both sides account for about one-quarter of global GDP. And European financial markets are relatively deep and liquid (though still not quite on the scale of the United States'). Skeptics argue that European economic growth in the decades to come is likely to remain tepid, given Europe's rigid labor markets, dense regulation, and graying populations. And then there's that little detail that the political underlay of the euro is an international treaty rather than a nation-state.

Still, given the rising financial problems faced by the United States -- like its miserable current account deficits and exploding national debt -- economists like Harvard's Jeffrey Frankel and the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Menzie Chinn speculate that the euro could well make a go of it, perhaps surpassing the dollar's share of overall reserves as soon as 2015. Still, one wonders whether even this scenario really represents the fundamental transformation of the global order that some would predict. So what about, say, the Chinese renminbi or the Japanese yen? Although the latter is still widely held as a reserve currency in some parts of the world, its attractiveness has been diminished by the lackluster performance of Japan's economy since the 1990s. As for the renminbi, even the biggest China boosters acknowledge that it will take years before China's economy takes on the attributes needed for a global reserve currency -- particularly the deep, transparent, and liquid financial markets that still attract overseas investors to the United States. Oh, yes, and moving toward genuine convertibility might not hurt, either. (Meanwhile, it should be noted, China's dollar reserves continued to grow in the third quarter of this year.)

Another idea making the rounds involves the aforementioned SDRs. The idea has been gaining currency (forgive the pun) ever since March 23, when Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, proposed that central banks shift more of their foreign exchange reserves from dollars to SDRs. Far from ordering someone in the CIA to zap Zhou with a poison dart, though, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner actually welcomed the suggestion. (Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that the need for greater international reliance on SDRs has been the official policy of the IMF since 1978.) At April's G-20 meeting in London, the assembled countries then approved a massive issuance of $250 billion worth of SDRs -- the first in years.

There's just one problem, though. As Barry Eichengreen, a leading economist at the University of California-Berkeley, writes in a recent article, "[S]keptics question whether the SDR could ever replace the dollar as the world's leading reserve currency, for the simple reason that the SDR is not a currency. It is a composite accounting unit in which the IMF issues credits to its members." Based on a basket of four currencies (the dollar, euro, pound, and yen), the SDR can only be used right now by central banks and a few international institutions like the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements -- and not, it should be noted, by companies or consumers. Expanding the role of SDRs beyond their present function and into that of a genuine global currency would entail an amount of political and economic re-engineering that few of the major powers would seem to have the stomach for as things stand now.

And that, in turn, drives home another important point: Although politics do play a major role in deliberations about the future reserve currency, they do so rather differently from the simplistic ways evoked in public discussion. The University of California's Cohen scoffs at the notion, for example, that Gulf Arabs might be blithely prepared to toss the dollar aside for the sake of dimly defined commercial advantage. Saudi Arabia, he points out, has a long-standing agreement with the United States to refrain from actions that might seriously destabilize the dollar; in return the United States promises to guarantee Saudi security in a region that offers myriad threats. "The Saudis have much more important issues to worry about than earning a few more percentage points on their currency reserves," Cohen says. The same applies, he points out, to Japan, still bound to the United States in a military alliance as well as through an intricate web of commercial relationships. Although China has surpassed the United States as Japan's No. 1 trading partner, that fact alone is hardly enough to compel Tokyo to shift all of its reserves to renminbi.

In short, the dollar's continued global predominance is not a sure thing; it's just that it looks a lot more likely than just about any of the other options. "To seriously dislodge the dollar in its international role would actually require concerted action around the world," says Harvard's Cooper. Does he see any signs of that? "No."

Autore: Christian Caryl

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com

The demise of the dollar

Wirepullers: dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, per quarant'anni, il mondo è rimasto congelato, fermo sulla cortina di ferro. La storia di quegli anni è stata la storia della contrapposizione tra i due blocchi e qualsiasi cosa succedesse, anche nel più remoto angolo del pianeta, trovava giustificazione nella distinzione est/ovest. La caduta del muro prima e l'11 settembre dopo hanno sconvolto questo mondo, prima sancendo la fine della contrapposizione tra i blocchi, poi creando le condizioni per la nascita di un mondo nuovo, monocolore, a stelle e strisce. Era l'inizio di una nuova epoca, caratterizzata dal controllo di Washington sul pianeta. Ma questo nuovo mondo già scricchiola, come il vecchio aveva iniziato a fare negli anni Ottanta, preannunciando la propria fine. Il multipolarismo è una realtà che si sta inesorabilmente affermando. La crisi economica, le guerre stagnanti in Iraq e Afghanistan e l'emergere di nuove economie, sempre più solide e potenti, fanno intravedere le prime crepe nel progetto dei neocon americani. I sismografi geopolitici registrano le prime vibrazioni, anticipo delle scosse telluriche che potrebbero aspettarci in un futuro non troppo lontano. Un mondo si è chiuso nell'89, uno forse lo sta per fare a breve. E a Mosca e Pechino ci si dà da fare per accelerare il tutto, cancellando un caposaldo di entrambi: il dollaro. (1)

In a graphic illustration of the new world order, Arab states have launched secret moves with China, Russia and France to stop using the US currency for oil trading.

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars.

The plans, confirmed to The Independent by both Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources in Hong Kong, may help to explain the sudden rise in gold prices, but it also augurs an extraordinary transition from dollar markets within nine years.

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China's former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. "Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable," he told the Asia and Africa Review. "We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security."

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region's conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy. China uses more oil incrementally than the US because its growth is less energy efficient. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold. An indication of the huge amounts involved can be gained from the wealth of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who together hold an estimated $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves.

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations," he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China's extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America's power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.

Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East.

China imports 60 per cent of its oil, much of it from the Middle East and Russia. The Chinese have oil production concessions in Iraq – blocked by the US until this year – and since 2008 have held an $8bn agreement with Iran to develop refining capacity and gas resources. China has oil deals in Sudan (where it has substituted for US interests) and has been negotiating for oil concessions with Libya, where all such contracts are joint ventures.

Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region now account for no fewer than 10 per cent of the imports of every country in the Middle East, including a huge range of products from cars to weapon systems, food, clothes, even dolls. In a clear sign of China's growing financial muscle, the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, yesterday pleaded with Beijing to let the yuan appreciate against a sliding dollar and, by extension, loosen China's reliance on US monetary policy, to help rebalance the world economy and ease upward pressure on the euro.

Ever since the Bretton Woods agreements – the accords after the Second World War which bequeathed the architecture for the modern international financial system – America's trading partners have been left to cope with the impact of Washington's control and, in more recent years, the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. "The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies," a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. "The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won't be able to use the US dollar."

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years' time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.
The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

"These plans will change the face of international financial transactions," one Chinese banker said. "America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate."

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

Autore: Robert Fisk

Fonte: www.independent.co.uk

L'articolo di Robert Fisk si puo leggere tradotto in italiano su Internazionale Nr. 816, 9/15 ottobre 2009.

The Iranian Revolutionary Bazaar

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (4)

The ongoing war in Yemen between its Army and a group of extremist Shiite Zaydis, known as the Huthists, has taken a dangerous turn, with the situation escalating and the number of victims rising at an alarming rate. As the conflict spreads reaching new areas, this "war" is the Huthists' sixth attempt to separate from the current rule in Yemen and establish an Islamic emirate based on the Shiite Zaydi faith.

The clashes mainly center in the areas that are under the Huthists' control, namely in Al-Azqul, Al-Malahiz, Harf Sufyan, Al-Maqash, Wadi Shahwan, Al-Naqah, Damaj, Jabal al-Hafur, and other areas.

The Huthists belong to the founder, Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Some reports say he belonged to the Zaydi faith and converted to the 12-imam Jafarite faith and that he studied in the city of Qom in Iran and demanded his right to the imamate.

Abdul-Malik, son of Badr al-Din, is now leading the war, and he uses a different policy in spreading the Zaydi faith, which has been known for being tolerant and supportive of coexistence. The Zaydi faith in Yemen has always been famous for its ability to absorb diverse groups without hostility.

Currently, there are unequivocal evidences that absolutely clearly show Iran's flagrant and direct involvement in triggering the war in Yemen by explicitly supporting the Huthists with ammunition, weapons, money, and military combat expertise.

This stepped up fighting in Yemen is part of a dexterous plan, prepared by the Qods Force unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, within the "Yaman khosh hal" scheme. "Yamankhosh hal" is a Persian phrase meaning happy Yemen.

This plan was prepared more than a year ago, with direct blessing from Mohammad Jafari, the most important commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. An initial amount of money exceeding $4 million was earmarked for the plan.

Among the most important components of the plan is to train the Huthists' forces on guerrilla warfare, fighting inside cities and in mountainous areas, planting explosive charges, and mobilizing the public. This is in addition to buying tribes' loyalty, opening up to and linking with the ready separatist Southern Mobility Movement in southern Yemen in order to increase the pressure on the central government from all direction while engaging in direct coordination with members of the Al-Qaeda Organization, which has clearly become an obvious tool of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

There are astonishing new facts that are being revealed, most importantly the fact that the Iranian involvement in Yemen began in 2004 under the tempting cover of a humanitarian charity work that began with the large project of building the Iranian Red Crescent Hospital in Sa'dah. The revenues of this hospital went directly to the Huthists.

The ultimate goal of the "Yaman khosh hal" plan is to set up two states. In one state, the imamate rule would return with a pro-Iranian religious regime, led by Al-Huthi. The other state would be under a separate southern rule, headed by a group of political factions that would be directly funded and run by Iran. And, of course, the two states would be a prelude to Iran's entry into the heart of the Horn of Africa.

The aim behind Iran's clandestine activity in Somalia and Kenya, an activity that is being gradually revealed, is to forcefully tighten the control of the navigation route in the Red Sea.
The world was distracted by the Iranian nuclear issue, which turned out to be a fanfare, and was preoccupied with domestic developments in Iran while the Iranian bazaar continues to expand and open destructive branches.

Autore: Hussein Shobokshi

Fonte: www.aawsat.com

Zooming in on the conflict in northern Yemen

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (3)

In mid-August, just prior to the start of Ramadan, the Yemeni government launched an all-out offensive on rebel positions in the northern governorate of Saada. Leaving no doubt as to its intentions, the government dubbed the campaign Operation Scorched Earth. The fighting between the government and the Huthis, as the rebel group is known, has been some of the fiercest since the conflict began in June 2004 when government forces attempted to arrest the founder of the movement, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi.

The conflict has created thousands of internal refugees and has spread to neighboring governorates. Repeated calls for humanitarian aid have been largely ignored by the international community even as many, most notably the United States and the EU, worry that instability in Yemen will allow a resurgent Al-Qaeda the space to plan and launch attacks.

The Huthis subscribe to a sect of Shiite Islam called Zaydism, although the Zaydis in Yemen are traditionally closer to Sunni Islam than they are to the type of Shiite Islam practiced in Iran, and are often referred to as the “fifth school” of Sunni Islam. The government has provided differing rationale for war since the fighting began, but at this point it believes that the existence of an autonomous Zaydi-governed region presents an existential threat to the survival of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. The Zaydis in Saada meanwhile view themselves as a community under attack and in danger of cultural extinction.

Since the 1980s there has been sporadic fighting between Zaydis and Wahhabi-inspired Salafis in the North, with the latter destroying sacred tombs and attempting to convert Zaydi youth. The Zaydi responded with a vigorous campaign, publishing religious material designed to shore up local support, and forming a youth organization that combines theological teaching with military training.

The government is seen as backing the Salafis against the local Zaydis. This divide-and-rule approach to governing has long been favored by Saleh as a way of keeping potential opposition groups perpetually dependent on government support. In Saada the local Zaydis were usually deemed to be more of a threat to the government than the interloping Salafis.

In 2004 the conflict shifted from periodic clashes between competing Huthi and Salafi paramilitary forces to open war.

Due to the fear that Al-Qaeda would find a safe haven in an unstable Yemen, the United States and the EU have a significant stake in a stable Yemen, and therefore a role to play in ending open military conflict. The United States, which has limited influence in Yemen, must work behind the scenes to steadily convince Saudi Arabia that the threat of a strong Al-Qaeda in Yemen takes precedence over fears of a Shiite state on its southern border. Saudi Arabia, in turn, must use its considerable influence with Sanaa to bring it to the bargaining table.

Such steps would be a significant reversal of policy for both countries, but silence has done little to encourage stability in Yemen.

The United States appears reluctant to push Yemen toward a political settlement to the crisis with the Huthis for fear that any pressure will further dissuade a reluctant ally from taking action against Al-Qaeda, which is viewed by many Yemenis as a Western problem. Some worry that if the United States does not support Yemen in what it describes as its own “war against terror,” the Yemeni government will not support the United States against Al-Qaeda.

The protracted nature of the Yemeni conflict has also led to evolving justifications for its continuation. Tribesmen have been brought into the fighting on both sides. Those backing the Huthis are doing so not out of any adherence to Zaydi theology but rather as a response to government overreaching and military mistakes. In effect, the government’s various military campaigns have created more enemies than it had when the conflict began.

There is, as five years of fighting have made clear, no military solution to this conflict. The Yemeni government has tried and failed numerous times to bomb the Huthis into submission, to no avail.

Neither side has the political capital to yield to the demands of the other, and members of both sides are benefiting financially from a thriving war economy. But the longer the fighting goes on, the greater the threat to regional security.

The United States must persuade the EU and, more importantly, Saudi Arabia to present a unified front to the Yemenis, convincing them that the military phase of the conflict is over and that it’s time for a political solution.

Autore: Gregory D. Johnsen

Fonte: www.dailystar.com.lb

Tearing Yemen apart

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (2)

As clashes revive fears of a Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy war, the US is focused on al-Qaida's presence in a troubled nation.

Renewed fighting in northern Yemen between government and rebel forces is feeding fears that a Middle Eastern proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran is spreading to the ungoverned spaces of the southern Arabian peninsula. But western analysts are staring boggle-eyed at quite a different spectre: the prospect that the biggest beneficiaries of Yemeni weakness will be the fanatical jihadis of al-Qaida.

UN agencies raised the alarm last week after 55,000 people, mostly women and children, fled clashes in and around Sa'ada city in northern Yemen between the forces of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's Sunni-led government and the Zaydi Shia followers of Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. The exodus brought to 150,000 the number of people rendered homeless since July by a conflict that rekindled in 2004 but whose roots reach back to 1962.

The UN complained that its $23m emergency appeal launched on 2 September "has not yet received a single cent" despite the refugees' acute need. "Internally displaced people from Sa'ada governorate who fled to Amran arrived traumatised and exhausted, having spent three to five days walking in the desert," the UN said. Access to the remote area was hazardous and attempts were under way to open a humanitarian corridor from Saudi Arabia.

Yet according to the Houthi rebels, the Saudis are part of the problem. Claiming Riyadh is arming and supporting government forces, they issued a video last week purporting to show captured Saudi mortars. They also claim to have been bombed by Saudi jets. "We are placing before everyone the fact of direct Saudi support," a rebel statement said. "The regime has ceded sovereignty [and] delivered the country to foreign interests." Saudi Arabia denies the charges.

Saleh's government in turn accuses Iran and its Iraqi Shia ally Muqtada al-Sadr of backing the Houthis, who say they want greater autonomy. They also oppose the spread of Saudi-inspired Wahhabi teaching – an ostensibly reasonable aim given the links between Wahhabism and Sunni extremism. Saleh told al-Jazeera television that unnamed Iranians were in direct communication with the rebels and had funded secret "cells" within Yemen's security apparatus. Iran's ambassador to Yemen was recently warned of "negative consequences" should Iranian media continue "to be a tool in the hands of the subversives in Sa'ada".

Saudi Arabia's concerns about its neighbour's plight go beyond northern instability. Reviving separatist tendencies in southern Yemen are combining with shrinking national earnings (caused by declining oil revenues), high male unemployment, corruption, kidnapping and a chronic water shortage to undermine the central government's ability to hold the country together. Last month's assassination attempt on a Saudi minister was launched from Yemen.

For its part, Iran believes it has good reason to be suspicious of the Yemeni government's pro-western stance, suspicions stoked last week by a visit to Sana'a by John Brennan, the White House's counter-terrorism chief. Ignoring the complex nuances of the war in the north, Brennan delivered a letter from Barack Obama declaring that "the security of Yemen is vital for the security of the United States" – a surprisingly brash commitment – and promised increased US and international assistance. Obama stressed partnership in confronting the "common threat" posed by al-Qaida and Islamic extremism in general.

"Even if the actual foreign material support in Yemen's civil strife is minimal, the conflict is probably the newest front in a broadening proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia," said Robert Haddick of Small Wars Journal. "Lebanon is one front. Iranian attempts to gain influence over Shia populations in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Persian Gulf is another." Now Yemen must be added to the list, he said, with Saudi officials nervous that Tehran's ultimate aim was control over Red Sea shipping lanes.

All this is worrying enough for the Obama administration and allies such as Britain with its own colonial era links to Aden. But as Brennan's mission suggested, al-Qaida's ongoing, apparently successful effort to establish a regional base in Yemen, taking advantage of a weak, distracted government, remains Washington's uppermost concern.

"Only Pakistan's tribal regions rival Yemen as a terrorist Shangri-La," the Wall Street Journal commented recently. Osama bin Laden was of Yemeni extraction, while about 100 Yemenis were held in Guantánamo Bay, it noted. It went on to quote Yemen's estimate that up to 1,500 al-Qaida-linked jihadis are based in the country – including Nasir al-Wahayshi, al-Qaida's "emir of the Arabian peninsula" and Jamal al-Badawi, wanted for his role in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour. The editorial accused Saleh of double-dealing, by pursuing "a tacit non-aggression pact" with al-Qaida that allowed him to deal with other challenges.

"If left unaddressed Yemen's problems could potentially destabilise Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states," warned author Christopher Boucek in a new report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The inability of the Yemeni central government to fully control its territory will create space for violent extremists to regroup and launch attacks against domestic and international targets. The international community must be realistic about the limitations of intervention in Yemen. In the near term, however, inaction is not an option."

Autore: Simon Tisdall

Fonte: www.guardian.co.uk

Is Yemen Breaking Apart?

Wirepullers: lo Yemen rischia di fare la fine della Somalia e entrare presto nella lista degli stati falliti (se già non ci fosse) oltre a scivolare verso il caos e l'ingovernabilità. Da anni ormai i ribelli guidati da Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi cercano di abbattere il governo di Abdullah Saleh, nell'eterno scontro tra diverse correnti dell'Islam. Ma sorge il dubbio che qualcuno da dietro il sipario tiri i fili di questa ribellione e questo qualcuno, guarda caso, sarebbe il solito Ahmadinejad, desideroso di mettere le mani sul corno d'Africa e avvantaggiato, in questo, da un governo che di fatto non ha più nessuna autorità in Somalia e da un altro che potrebbe presto perderla a Sanaa, capitale yemenita. Da Washington poi arriva l'avvertimento che uno Yemen instabile sarebbe terreno fertile per Al Qaida, come sempre. Il golfo di Aden insomma fa gola a molti. (1)

Yemen may need the mediation of neighbouring countries -- including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and even Iran, to help it resolve its internal conflicts, notes Patrick Seale.

In power for more than 30 years, Field Marshall Ali Abdallah Saleh, Yemen’s veteran President, is battling for his political life. He has ruled the north since 1978, and the whole country since 1990, but the problems now assailing him on all sides are the worst he has ever had to deal with.
Like other Arab autocrats, such as President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, in power since 1981, and Muammar al-Qadhafi, the ‘Guide’ of Libya’s 1969 revolution, Yemen’s President runs a country which, in theory, has a multi-party system. In fact, his word is law -- but a law which is now being violently contested in several parts of the country.

Many of the problems he faces have roots in the key events of Yemen’s often violent past -- in particular, the overthrow of the theocratic Zaidi Imamate by a republican coup in 1962, and the union in 1990 of North Yemen, ruled by President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s People’s Conference Party, with South Yemen, then ruled by the Socialist Party. The union has not been altogether successful.

Disasters soon followed its formation, notably the expulsion in 1990 of close to a million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia, when Yemen backed Saddam Hussein in his occupation of Kuwait. This serious blow to what was already a very poor country brought widespread misery. In 1994, the South tried to break away with a war of secession. But the war ended, after much bloodshed, with the North’s victory and the occupation on 7 July of the South’s capital city of Aden. Many smouldering resentments were thus created, that are now bursting into flame.

One might say that history has caught up with the embattled Field Marshall. The South is once again clamouring to secede from the union and establish its own independent state, under the leadership of Ali Salem al-Beid, a former president of the southern region.

Heading the pressure for secession is the so-called Peaceful Southern Mobilization Movement, which is clearly not as peaceful as its name suggests. Indeed, the south appears to be arming itself in preparation for a new confrontation. This summer has seen a spate of violent demonstrations against the government in Sanaa -- and, in response, a violent crack-down by the authorities.

An enemy of the central government who is at least as dangerous is Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, leader of a rebel movement in the north of the country, which has been battling the government on and off since 2004. Abd al-Malik’s relative, Hussein al-Huthi, the first leader of the movement, was killed in the early months of the rebellion. President Ali Abdallah Saleh has vowed to crush the rebels, accusing the Huthis of wanting to destroy the Republic and restore the Zaidi Imamate.

This month, he sent his army on a punitive expedition against the northern rebels -- operation Scorched Earth -- which, according to Aboudou Karimou Adjibade, UNICEF representative in Yemen, has led to the flight, in great distress, of more than 100,000 people, many of them children. The UNHCR in Geneva says that, in the rebel stronghold of Saada -- capital of Yemen’s northernmost province on the Saudi border -- 35,000 people have fled their homes in the past two weeks alone. The UN World Food Program airlifted 40 tons of high-energy biscuits to Yemen last week to feed the refugees. But access to them is difficult because of the fighting.

Government troops, backed by aircraft and artillery, have tried to open the roads to Saada, which the rebels had managed to block. But the rebels still control the mountains overlooking the town. This is the worst outbreak of violence in Yemen since the 1994 war of secession. Casualties are said to be very great.

Although the Huthis are Zaidis -- a branch of Shi‘a Islam -- it is not clear whether they really aspire to restore the Imamate or are simply rebelling against what they consider unfair treatment and economic discrimination by Sanaa. They are certainly demanding a degree of autonomy.

In any event, the conflict is threatening to draw in outside powers. Yemen’s Information Minister Ahmad al-Lawzi has indirectly accused Iran of supporting the Huthi rebels, while the Yemeni army has claimed to have captured Iranian-made weapons -- including machine-guns, short-range rockets and ammunition. Saudi Arabia is concerned that the fighting could provide Iran with an opportunity to extend its influence to its borders. Tehran, meanwhile – always concerned for the safety of Shia communities -- has called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

These uprisings in the north and south have caught the President and his government at a difficult moment. Oil production at about 320,000 barrels daily is dwindling. The fall in oil prices has hit the country hard. A population growth rate of well over 3 per cent – the highest in the Middle East --is expected to boost the population from 18 million at present to 35 million in 2029, exacerbating the many social and economic problems.

A perennial Yemeni problem is the production of qat, a drug to which many Yemenis are addicted. It is the country’s primary cash crop, occupying an estimated 145,000 hectares of land, up from 80,000 hectares a decade ago. It is a major source of tax revenue, but also a source of great corruption, involving some of the highest officials as well as many farmers. It also contributes to Yemen’s grave water shortage.

If this were not enough, Yemen appears to have attracted Al-Qaeda cells, including the one responsible for the bombing of USS Cole in the port of Aden in October 2000, which killed 17 U.S. sailors. Many suspected Al-Qaeda operatives were rounded up and jailed, but in February 2006, 23 of them -- including those believed responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole -- managed to escape by tunnelling out of the prison to a nearby mosque.
Among those who escaped was Nasir al-Wahayshi, 33, a former secretary of Osama bin Laden, who is thought to be the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen. Reports suggest that cells in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have united to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, raising the alarm of counter-terrorist agencies in the United States and elsewhere, which fear that Yemen may become a terrorist safe haven.

Yemen may need the mediation of neighbouring countries -- including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and even Iran, to help it resolve its internal conflicts. Above all, it urgently needs help for health, education, economic development and job creation. USAID is this year providing Yemen with the paltry sum of $24million, in scandalous contrast to the billions being wasted by the United States on unwinnable and unnecessary wars.

Autore: Patrick Seale

Fonte: www.middle-east-online.com

È davvero il momento di Tony Blair?

Wirepullers: l'Europa è tenuta in ostaggio da un ceco. Si chiama Vaclav Klaus, è il presidente della Repubblica Ceca e se entro maggio 2010 non firmerà la ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona l'Europa resterà senza costituzione ancora a lungo. Il 2 ottobre il Trattato è riuscito a superare anche l'ostacolo irlandese e a portarsi a "un solo uomo dalla meta". Ma i limiti dell'Unione Europea restano evidenti e anche se la firma dovesse arrivare, la paura di molti di venir derubati del potere di decidere in casa propria, cavallo di battaglia degli euroscettici, non svanirebbe da un giorno all'altro. E con essa la debolezza dell'Unione, ormai sempre più vicina a un grigiore e a un'irrilevanza politica evidenti. In Europa non c'è tanta voglia d'Europa e nel resto del mondo ancora meno. Se avranno la meglio gli euroscettici corriamo il rischio che nel Vecchio Continente ognuno finisca per coltivare il proprio giardino, mentre fuori gli altri decidono cosa fare del mondo. (3)

“Tieni duro, Vaclav!”: l’incitamento al presidente della Repubblica ceca Vaclav Klaus, euroscettico convinto, potrebbe paradossalmente divenire il nuovo slogan degli euroentusiasti. Se Klaus dovesse infatti superare le sue esitazioni e firmare la ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona - consentendone così l’entrata in vigore - all’Unione europea verrebbe a mancare ogni alibi: ciò renderebbe drammaticamente palese la mancanza di volontà di dare nuovo impulso al processo di integrazione. Se Klaus, invece, non firmasse, qualcuno afferma che la crisi che ne conseguirebbe potrebbe causare scossoni magari anche salutari per l'Ue, innescando ‘scatti in avanti’ dei paesi che storicamente hanno guidato il progetto europeo.

Per il momento, comunque a Praga il ‘fattore K’ resiste. L’Alta Corte ceca si riunirà a Brno il 27 ottobre per avviare l’esame del ricorso contro il Trattato di Lisbona presentato da 17 senatori. Klaus si rifiuta di garantire la firma alla ratifica anche se i giudici dovessero respingere il ricorso. La stasi ceca sta già avendo qualche riflesso sull’Ue: il Vertice di fine ottobre, ad esempio, non potrà sciogliere i nodi delle nomine dei membri della nuova Commissione europea, del presidente stabile del Consiglio europeo e del Signor ‘politica estera’, tutte dipendenti dall’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona.

Lo spettro dei conservatori inglesi

Dopo il sì nel referendum irlandese del 2 ottobre e la firma del presidente polacco Lech Kaczynsky, il presidente ceco resta l’unico dei 27 leader Ue a non avere perfezionato, nonostante il voto favorevole del parlamento nazionale, la procedura di ratifica. Se non lo facesse entro maggio 2010, i conservatori inglesi, probabili vincitori delle elezioni politiche della prossima primavera, già promettono di sottoporre il varo del Trattato ad un ennesimo, e probabilmente esiziale, referendum nazionale.

Lo scenario più verosimile è tuttavia che Klaus giunga alla firma entro l’autunno, facendo entrare in vigore il Trattato di Lisbona senza, tuttavia, che i cittadini europei percepiscano veri cambiamenti, fatta eccezione per le nuove nomine, che potrebbero essere discusse in un Vertice straordinario convocato dalla presidenza di turno svedese. Del resto, basta ripercorrere le principali novità previste dal Trattato di Lisbona per capire che esse non avranno, nell’immediato, un forte impatto sulla vita quotidiana degli europei. Il nuovo testo ha l’obiettivo, tra l’altro, di adattare il funzionamento della vecchia Ue - nata a 12 e pensata al massimo a 15 - a un’Unione che ha ormai 27 membri, destinati a loro volta ad aumentare. Firmando la ratifica, il presidente polacco Kaczynski, ha detto, ad esempio, che l’Ue deve restare aperta ad ulteriori allargamenti, fino alla Georgia.

I leader più restii alla ratifica sottolineano, a ogni occasione, che il nuovo Trattato costituisce “un passo in avanti”, ma che “l’Ue resta un’Unione di Stati nazionali” sovrani e gelosi della propria sovranità. Parole che cozzano un po’ con quelle d’augurio e speranza del messaggio inviato al collega polacco dal presidente italiano Giorgio Napolitano, secondo cui l’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona “potrà assicurare lo sviluppo dell’Unione e una maggiore solidarietà tra gli Stati e i Popoli d’Europa”.

Un’Unione più forte

Ricordiamo, dunque, le novità:

- il Parlamento europeo rafforza il suo ruolo e potrà dire la sua, tramite il processo di codecisione con il Consiglio dei Ministri dell’Ue, su nuove importanti materie, come giustizia, immigrazione, trattati internazionali;

- in ben 45 settori, il sistema di voto esclude il potere di veto, ovvero non impone che le decisioni vengano assunte all’unanimità, mentre lo mantiene in aree chiave come fiscalità e difesa. Il Trattato introduce inoltre, progressivamente fino al 2017, un meccanismo di voto a doppia maggioranza: ponderata dei Paesi e assoluta della popolazione. Per la prima volta, i Parlamenti nazionali compaiono nella mappa istituzionale dell’Unione europea, con una funzione di verifica del principio di sussidiarietà (se sia cioè meglio trattare una materia a livello europeo o nazionale);

- il potere d’iniziativa legislativa non sarà più esclusivo appannaggio della Commissione europea, perché i cittadini potranno lanciare un’iniziativa legislativa se saranno in grado di raggiungere un milione di firme raccolte in diversi paesi;

- cambiano i criteri di composizione della Commissione e del Parlamento europeo; l’Ue acquisisce una personalità giuridica e viene introdotta una “clausola d’uscita” dall’Unione.

Le novità più attese e simbolicamente più rilevanti sono quelle del presidente stabile del Consiglio europeo e del “nuovo” Alto rappresentante per la politica estera. Il primo presiederà le riunioni dei capi di Stato o di governo dei 27 e avrà un mandato di due anni e mezzo rinnovabili, superando così, la mancanza di continuità determinata dalla rotazione semestrale delle presidenze. Il secondo è una sorta di ‘ministro degli esteri’, che sarà anche vice-presidente della Commissione e riunirà finalmente in una sola figura i poteri del commissario alle relazioni esterne e quelli dell’Alto rappresentante per la politica estera e di difesa già esistenti.

Come era inevitabile, a Bruxelles e nelle capitali si è già scatenato il ‘toto-nomine’, con la candidatura forte, per la presidenza dell’Ue di Tony Blair, laburista britannico, eurotiepido , e molto vicino al presidente Usa George Bush nel cruciale passaggio della guerra in Iraq. Sarebbe davvero singolare se l’Unione non riuscisse a darsi un ‘testimonial’ più rappresentativo di quello di un politico mai distintosi per europeismo, ormai marginale in patria - specie in caso di vittoria dei conservatori - e interprete di un atlantismo che sa più d’acquiescenza agli Stati Uniti che di paritario confronto fra alleati.

L’insoddisfazione per questa Europa “ibrida, ermafrodita, istituzionale e inter-governativa” - la definizione è di Giuliano Amato, ospite tempo fa di un Colloquio Spinelli - non deve tuttavia fare passare in secondo piano elementi positivi: che l’Unione non si sarebbe fatta tutta in una volta sola lo aveva già previsto il ministro degli esteri francese Robert Schuman nella lettera del 9 maggio 1950, da cui prese avvio il processo d’integrazione; e il percorso compiuto fino ad oggi è comunque stato, a parità di tempo decorso, maggiore di quello compiuto dagli Stati Uniti d’America nei loro primi sessant’anni di vita. Per non fermarsi proprio ora, tuttavia, è necessario scegliere leader non di facciata e che siano all’altezza della sfida. Che rimane, comunque, tutta in salita ed estremamente ambiziosa.

Autore: Giampiero Gramaglia

Fonte: www.affarinternazionali.it

The Other Vaclav

Wirepullers: l'Europa è tenuta in ostaggio da un ceco. Si chiama Vaclav Klaus, è il presidente della Repubblica Ceca e se entro maggio 2010 non firmerà la ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona l'Europa resterà senza costituzione ancora a lungo. Il 2 ottobre il Trattato è riuscito a superare anche l'ostacolo irlandese e a portarsi a "un solo uomo dalla meta". Ma i limiti dell'Unione Europea restano evidenti e anche se la firma dovesse arrivare, la paura di molti di venir derubati del potere di decidere in casa propria, cavallo di battaglia degli euroscettici, non svanirebbe da un giorno all'altro. E con essa la debolezza dell'Unione, ormai sempre più vicina a un grigiore e a un'irrilevanza politica evidenti. In Europa non c'è tanta voglia d'Europa e nel resto del mondo ancora meno. Se avranno la meglio gli euroscettici corriamo il rischio che nel Vecchio Continente ognuno finisca per coltivare il proprio giardino, mentre fuori gli altri decidono cosa fare del mondo. (2)

How the Czech president became Europe's public enemy number one.

After two years of debate, referendums, furious revision, and campaigning, the fate of the Lisbon Treaty to reform the European Union has come down to the signature of one man. Unfortunately for advocates of European integration, that man is Czech President Vaclav Klaus.
In his latest bid to scuttle the treaty's adoption, Klaus is insisting that a new, basically meaningless footnote be added, a demand that the the Czech government, which previously endorsed the treaty, is grudgingly supporting, despite the fact the treaty had been approved by the Czech Parliament. If he can delay matters long enough until an anti-Lisbon Conservative government comes to power in Britain, Klaus now has a small but not insignificant chance to sink the treaty altogether, a fitting swan song for the lifelong Euroskeptic.

Although mostly known outside his country for his skeptical views on global warming (environmentalism, in his opinion, is "the most prominent antiliberal, populist ideology of the contemporary world, comparable to communism and Nazism.) Klaus is one of the most important figures in post-communist Czech history, and the Lisbon battle is just the latest in a long series of controversial stances in his career. But lately, this lifelong iconoclast appears more and more as a tragic political figure. He is now totally isolated in Europe, shunned by most EU politicians, who view his obstructions as proof of his, and his country's, lack of democratic credentials.
When Klaus first appeared on the Czech political scene shortly after the fall of communism in November 1989, the public viewed him as a godsend. Compared with both the former communist power elite and the anti-communist dissident leaders who came to power at the end of 1989, he appeared, well, very Western.
He differed from the former dissidents not only in ideology but in appearance. Impeccably dressed and groomed, the well-spoken Klaus had nothing but scorn for those hairy men in old sweaters, many of whom still adhered to slightly utopian ideas of post-totalitarian politics.
Former Czech President Vaclav Havel, the unofficial leader of the dissident movement in the 1980s, has recalled that Klaus was first introduced to pro-democracy leaders of the Civic Forum movement during their negotiations with the communist regime in the late 1980s. The dissidents were desperately searching for an economist familiar with Western free market theories. Klaus, who had studied at the University of Chicago as a disciple of Milton Friedman, fit the bill. He was hardly a dissident, having worked for years as a clerk for the Czechoslovak Central Bank -- but he certainly appeared to be competent.

Klaus became the first non-communist minister of finance in the government of "national reconciliation" that was created as a result of round-table talks with the communists in December 1989. He was later reappointed to the same position when the Civic Forum overwhelmingly won the first free elections in June 1990.
By then, however, his disputes with political theories voiced by some dissidents were growing increasingly vocal. Although some former dissident leaders believed that a broadly based civil movement, such as the Civic Forum, could continue governing and represent an alternative to political parties, Klaus wanted to follow political formulas used in the West. As a result, he began to use his increasing popularity to push the Civic Forum to transform into a regular political party.

In 1991, he and his followers broke from the Civic Forum to create a new conservative political party called the Civic Democratic Party. Klaus, who had already begun to be known both at home and abroad as an economic reformer, thus became also the most prominent political reformer in Czechoslovakia, taking this label away from Havel, the other Vaclav.
But 1991 was also the year when it started to be apparent that there were significant differences between Klaus' rhetoric and his policies. Klaus presented himself as a classic neoliberal, but in reality he tried to keep the state in control of many areas of the economy and had little taste for the controversial "shock therapy" privatization tactics used in neighboring Poland.
He defended a policy of what could be called "economic nationalism," keeping the most important Czech companies in Czech hands, and he resisted the privatization of banks. The privatization schemes that were carried out under Klaus' watch were plagued by corruption and lack of transparency.
Klaus also played a key role in the breakup of Czechoslovakia. In 1992, his Civic Democrats won elections in what is now the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, by contrast, leftist and nationalist parties dominated. Sensing the writing on the wall, Klaus began advocating the dissolution of the country.

Although this effort was strongly resisted by President Havel and other former dissidents, Klaus' actions were, in retrospect, quite rational. The Czechoslovakian government was already paralyzed by growing Slovak demands for autonomy, but after Slovak nationalist parties were swept into power in 1992, it became obvious that the state could no longer function.
The fact that Klaus was able to force the volatile Slovak nationalist leader Vladimir Meciar to sit down with him and organize a civilized, nonviolent division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states is today viewed as a major achievement.

It was shortly after this that Klaus' distrust of the European project came to the forefront. Although, as prime minister of the independent Czech Republic, Klaus had submitted the Czech Republic's application for membership in the European Union in 1995, he was always less then enthusiastic about the EU, which he saw as an over regulated socialist enterprise. By the time a successor left-wing Czech government completed the process of accession in 2002, Klaus had already positioned himself as a Euroskeptic.
After losing power in 1997, Klaus had decided to give his Civic Democrats a different image. Reformist policies were to a large extent replaced by an emphasis on nationalism, Euroskepticism, and populism. Klaus' change in tone did boost his popularity to some extent, but was not successful enough to bring him back as the prime minister.
But Klaus accomplished a major political coup in 2003 when he was elected to succeed Havel as the country's president. Ironically, the Czech Republic's most prominent right-winger could never have pulled it off without securing the support of the unreformed Communist Party.

The Czech presidency is traditionally a mostly ceremonial position, and the limits of the office have often proved frustrating for the proactive Klaus. During his first term, he repeatedly tested the limits of his constitutional powers by refusing, for example, to name judges recommended to him by the Ministry of Justice or by refusing to sign international treaties that had been recommended to him for ratification by the parliament. He also vetoed many bills approved by the Parliament, often simply because he disagreed with them ideologically.
This was a departure from Havel's relatively light touch and was certainly not appreciated by the leftist government. Klaus also found himself on a collision course with the pro-EU forces in Parliament when he criticized various reforms the Czech Republic had adopted to meet EU membership criteria.

To maintain high visibility as Czech president, despite his lack of executive powers, Klaus has repeatedly chosen highly controversial topics to call attention to himself. He criticized, for example, the influence of civil society as a new ideology, which he calls "NGO-ism." He also protested what he deems a new, potentially totalitarian ideology, which he calls "human-rightism." And he has fought repeated wars with the judiciary, describing its influence in modern democratic societies as a "tyranny of judges."

Klaus also became one of the chief opponents of the conventional wisdom on global warming, claiming, for example, that "icebergs melt only in the films of Al Gore," whom he describes as "the arch-priest" of the new totalitarian ideology of environmentalism. In the past few years, he spent more of his intellectual energy and travel time fighting the proponents of global-warming theories than speaking on relevant issues in Czech politics.
Klaus' dislike of the European Union is the one issue that has remained dominant throughout his years in power, and it has only grown more extreme over time. Although he once felt that realistically, the Czechs have no alternative to EU membership, he now claims that the EU is more dangerous to Czech security than is Russia.

He is also a staunch opponent of the common European currency and he does not mind using offensive language and exaggerations to support his views. In 1999 he declared that "efforts to introduce the euro are to a large extent driven by EU bureaucrats who eat breakfast in Venice, lunch in Paris, and dine in Copenhagen, and do not like changing money three times a day."
His opposition to further European integration stems not only from his nationalism, which is rooted in romantic 19th-century ideas of national identity, but also from his libertarian and conservative beliefs. In Klaus's world, the EU is an increasingly over-regulated, socialist organization that artificially suffocates the national identities of its members.
The Lisbon fight is Klaus' highest profile anti-European battle yet. and the president has made numerous efforts to sabotage the approval of the treaty in the Czech Republic. Last year he made an emotional appeal to the Constitutional Court to reject the treaty because it is supposedly incompatible with the Czech Constitution.

The Constitutional Court in the end ruled the opposite, and subsequently both houses of the Czech Parliament recommended the treaty to Klaus for ratification. Now that Ireland has finally approved the treaty in its second referendum, and Klaus' closest ally in the European Union, Polish President Lech Kaczynski, ratified the treaty in Poland, the completion of the ratification process in the entire EU depends on Klaus' signature.
To at least delay the ratification, he now wants the EU -- after the ratification process has been finished in 26 other EU countries and despite the approval of the treaty by the Czech Parliament -- to guarantee to the Czech Republic that the European Charter of Rights, which is part of the Lisbon Treaty, will not apply to the Czech Republic and cannot, therefore, be used by Sudeten Germans, 3 million of whom were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II, to reclaim their property confiscated by the Czechoslovak state.

This is a transparent ploy. All legal studies show that there is no such danger, because the charter cannot be applied retroactively. The EU may try to accommodate Klaus's demand, but more likely he is on a collision course not only with the EU, but also with the Czech government and major political parties, who increasingly view his behavior as violating his constitutional duties.
A man who was once viewed by many Czechs as a guarantee that Western democratic procedures would prevail in the Czech Republic is now seen as defying these very procedures for the sake of his own increasingly extremist beliefs. It's a sad end for a remarkable political career.

Autore: Jiri Pehe

Fonte: www.foreignpolicy.com